are these statements logically equivalent?

[arthwollipot]

Well if you wanted to express this in a logical predicate, the differences are between: ~B(G) and B(~G), where ~ means not, and B(...S...) expresses your belief in a statement S. Symbolically they're different, although you could still argue that they are equivalent in meaning.

If you're going with formal logic, then you can do different things with the formula ~B(G) than you can with B(~G).

 

[rustytunes]

Perhaps you need to look at your definition of the word "belief". If belief is the conviction of the truth of a proposition without its verification, I would have phrased your problem:

1) I don't believe gods exist.
2) I think that no gods exist.

I don't really like using the word believe in this context.

 

[Mozybyte]

What is this word that "God" is?

 

[drkitten]

Knowledge is justified true belief. I guess I'm hinging on TRUE. True with certainty, or to some degree of probability?

Neither -- both -- depending upon how you phrase it.

It is, for example, TRUE that a bachelor is unmarried. It is also TRUE that a fair die has a 1/6 chance of showing an ace when thrown. Both of those statements are true-with-certainty, despite the fact that the second is technically a statement about a probability distribution, not about any particular die being thrown.

Both of those statements I think it makes a difference, as in my experience, it seems like many agnostics feel that unless they can know for sure, they can't call it, and hence are agnostic versus atheist.

Actually, the difference is not in TRUE, but in "justified." An atheist has a lower standard for what she considers a justified belief. At one extreme, a mathematical proof usually counts as justification by almost anyone's standards, but on the other hand, many people will consider a statement "justified" if a statement is merely so likely that to withhold assent would be perverse. For example, I consider it justified to state that my Honda is in the parking lot across the street, since I just parked it there. It could have been stolen in the past ten minutes, but I doubt it. It could have turned into a winged barracuda and flown away, but I doubt that. Under normal circumstances, "I parked it there, so that's where it is" is a legitimate justification, even if it's not 100% ironclad proof. If my car is in fact where I parked it, then I "know" where it is. If it's turned into a barracuda, then I will be both incorrect in my belief and very, very surprised.

Plus, is knowing a feeling or does knowing imply that what is known is true (not just to the person, but true given the evidence)?

Knowing, by definition, implies something is true. (That's the "true" part of JTB.)

Can you know something which in reality is false. I'd say yes, but the definition of K seems to say no.

Of course you can't, by the definition. What you can have is a justified belief in which you are highly highly confident, but it happens not to be untrue.

Also, if K is justified true belief, than both the atheist and the theist cannot K that there belief is true.

Yup. Under the JTB framework, you can never -- or only in exceedingly rare circumstances, like in a math class -- know that one of your beliefs is genuine knowledge.

 

[Bri]

Knowledge is justified true belief. I guess I'm hinging on TRUE. True with certainty, or to some degree of probability?

There isn't very much that we know for certain, therefore I think it is always going to be varying degrees of probability. The question is whether you think there is enough evidence against the existence of gods to hold a positive belief that there are none. Some agnostics would hold that if there isn't enough evidence, holding a positive belief that there are no gods would be a faith-based belief.

I think it makes a difference, as in my experience, it seems like many agnostics feel that unless they can know for sure, they can't call it, and hence are agnostic versus atheist.

I think it's more subtle than that, and agnosticism and atheism are not really opposites, but two dimensions of a related set of beliefs. Nearly all atheists are agnostic to some degree (i.e. they admit that it is currently impossible to know for certain whether gods exist). The question is whether they feel that there is enough evidence to hold a positive belief that there are no gods.

So, I still think there's a problem with that 2 x 2 box, but I haven't figured it out to my satisfaction.

There was a rather lengthy thread on this a while ago, and I came up with two charts that seem to work fairly well. The first one is the full grid with "gnosticism/agnosticism" along the left and "theism/atheism" along the top.

As you can see, this table leads to 6 cells. However, the "gnostic weak atheist" seems to be a fairly indefensible position, and therefore I doubt anyone believes it. So, removing that one yields the following easier to read chart:

Maybe that will help. It should be pointed out that there are no clear boundaries between the cells of these tables, so there is no clear boundary between an agnostic weak atheist and an agnostic strong atheist. Which you call yourself would depend on how much evidence you feel there is to justify a positive belief that there are no gods.

-Bri

 

[drkitten]

There isn't very much that we know for certain, therefore I think it is always going to be varying degrees of probability. The question is whether you think there is enough evidence against the existence of gods to hold a positive belief that there are none. Some agnostics would hold that if there isn't enough evidence, holding a positive belief that there are no gods would be a faith-based belief.

But that's not an issue of "truth," that's an issue of "justification."

If you do not feel that any belief can be "justified" by only partial evidence, then of course you will not claim to "know" that there are no gods. You'll also never recommend a dish in a restaurant -- just because the linguini has been good the past thirty times you've eaten it is not sufficient justification to believe that it will be good this time. You probably also bet on tape-delayed sports events, too. After all, just because the Chargers lost live doesn't mean that they will lose on the tape, too....

Fortunately, very few people are this extreme.

 

[Mangafranga]

Knowledge is justified true belief. I guess I'm hinging on TRUE. True with certainty, or to some degree of probability?

This seems to me to look at the TJB analysis from the wrong angle. The "true" aspect is not something that resides within the belief, as it were. It is just a constraint. That is, if the justified belief is not true, it is not knowledge.

 

[Bri]

But that's not an issue of "truth," that's an issue of "justification."

Yes, I entirely agree. Truth is truth, the question is whether or not you feel there is enough evidence to justify a belief that X is the truth.

If you do not feel that any belief can be "justified" by only partial evidence, then of course you will not claim to "know" that there are no gods.

That's why "for certain" is in parentheses in the tables, because most don't believe that it's necessary to know for certain (nor that we can know anything for certain), but only to have enough evidence to justify belief.

-Bri

 

[drkitten]

This seems to me to look at the TJB analysis from the wrong angle. The "true" aspect is not something that resides within the belief, as it were. It is just a constraint. That is, if the justified belief is not true, it is not knowledge.

Brilliantly put.

 

[Beerina]

I would say that statement one applies to me, where statement two does not. I feel the concept of gods as usually stated is unfalsifiable, therefore it is equally meaningless to believe and believe not. There's just no way to have any evidence either way, so it's pointless.

Yes, but at this point, I point out that the modern concept of God is really a corner into which He's been shoved by logic (and a healthy dose of my-god-is-tougher-than-your-god one-upsmanship over the millenia).

Modern God has the curious property of infinite power, and hence could hide infinitely well from modern, finite mortals. And he has the even more curious property of wanting to do this.

Many propose He values, for some strange reason, belief in Him without proof. As if this has some supreme metaphysical importance.

As if doing something for a reward, or to avoid punishment, or both, is acceptable only if you do it without proof it's going to actually happen. Is this a true value, or just an ad-hoc rationalization of the fact this "behavior" is really just a stretch trying to explain it, piling an ever-more-thinly-stretching reason on hypothisized God-behavior, when in fact, He just isn't there? And it's finally reached the level where the behavior matches simply not existing with complete mathematical precision. Curious that, and evidence of absence if you ask me.

I should point out, though, that this type of behavior (doing it because of a promise of reward, or avoiding punishment) really isn't very high on most ethicists' scales of ethical behavior rationales. It's considered better to do good things when people, including a hypothesized god, are not watching. It's better to do them because helping others helps you. Some, which I do not agree with, add in full-blown altruism, where you do it without any desire for a kickback benefit, although that does seem to be almost a meme-like reproduction taking precidence over a selfish gene.

Ahh, too much thinking. Where's the chocolate hot fudge and strawberry ice cream?

 

[blobru]

As you can see, this table leads to 6 cells. However, the "gnostic weak atheist" seems to be a fairly indefensible position, and therefore I doubt anyone believes it.

Very handy table, Bri; but I'm not sure you should toss out "Gnostic weak atheist" just yet.
What if you reword it: "The [non]existence of a god is known; I currently lack a belief in the existence of gods however."
This then is someone who believes the info is available, but until she has enough she'll reserve judgement...
Such a one might be called a 'seeker', no?

 

[Bri]

I think you're indicating a statement of ignorance, unless I misunderstand. Something along the lines of "I know there is evidence that there are no gods, but I don't know what the evidence is so I will reserve judgement one way or the other until I do more research."

The problem with that reasoning is that if you know the evidence exists (even if you don't know what it is) then that seems to imply a positive belief that there are no gods, which would indicate a gnostic strong atheist. There is no need to reserve judgment unless you aren't claiming to know whether or not the evidence exists.

-Bri

 

[Bri]

In thinking about this further, I can imagine a situation where person A has good evidence that person B has proof of either the existence or nonexistence of deities, but doesn't know which it is (perhaps person B hasn't disclosed to person A whether deities exist or not). In that case, I suppose one could argue that person A is a gnostic weak atheist until such time as person B discloses the verdict.

Of course, I'm not sure what evidence person A might have of person B's knowledge without also knowing the verdict, nor am I sure how defensible such a position would be to anyone else. So, I will concede that perhaps it is possible for someone to have evidence that the existence or nonexistence of deities is known, but not have a positive belief in the existence or nonexistence of deities.

From a practical standpoint, I would be willing to venture that there are few if any gnostic weak atheists out there.

-Bri

 

[triadboy]

Can't figure this out:

1) I don't believe gods exist.
2) I believe that no gods exist.

I'd like to know how many languages would translate both those thoughts the same. Maybe it's just something goofy you can do with the English language.

 

[joobz]

I'd like to know how many languages would translate both those thoughts the same. Maybe it's just something goofy you can do with the English language.

I'm certain that nuance exists in all languages (except perhaps pidgin forms)

the important point is if translations are always being true to the multiple layered meanings that can be encoded in the original. makes you wonder how any fundie can think they know what the bible is really saying.

 

[jsfisher]

Can't figure this out:

1) I don't believe gods exist.
2) I believe that no gods exist.

Trying to figure out if these two are equivalent, or differ logically.

There are (1) things I believe are true, (2) there are things I believe are false, and (3) there are things that fall somewhere in between.

English is often ambiguous. The statement, "I don't believe gods exist", could be a statement of the second type or the negation of a statement of the first type.

So, "I don't believe gods exist" could mean either "I believe no gods exist" or "I don't know what to believe". At least that's the way I see it....

 

[arthwollipot]

I'd like to know how many languages would translate both those thoughts the same. Maybe it's just something goofy you can do with the English language.

We have some polyglots on the forum - I'm sure some of them can help.

 

[blobru]

I think you're indicating a statement of ignorance, unless I misunderstand. Something along the lines of "I know there is evidence that there are no gods, but I don't know what the evidence is so I will reserve judgement one way or the other until I do more research."...

In thinking about this further, I can imagine a situation where person A has good evidence that person B has proof of either the existence or nonexistence of deities, but doesn't know which it is (perhaps person B hasn't disclosed to person A whether deities exist or not). In that case, I suppose one could argue that person A is a gnostic weak atheist until such time as person B discloses the verdict. ...

I see gnostic weak atheism as a confession of current ignorance, but a surety that researching "God" will prove whether It exists or not.
I don't think it means A believes B has proof; more likely, A believes with enough information she [A] will resolve the question herself (perhaps with a God-[dis]proof no one's thought of yet).
This differs from agnostic weak atheism in that: the a-w-a believes it is in principle impossible to know one way or another -- absent some future science which rules God out or an appearance by God; the g-w-a believes it is possible to know now based on current data, she just has to 'figure it out'.
(Note: gender aside, this describes my own position at times.)

 

[schlitt]

the first statement could be taken as "i dont beleive gods (plural) exist, i only beleive in one god"

Whereas the second statement does not leave room for any god(s), multiple or singular.

 

[Bri]

I see gnostic weak atheism as a confession of current ignorance, but a surety that researching "God" will prove whether It exists or not.
I don't think it means A believes B has proof; more likely, A believes with enough information she [A] will resolve the question herself (perhaps with a God-[dis]proof no one's thought of yet).
This differs from agnostic weak atheism in that: the a-w-a believes it is in principle impossible to know one way or another -- absent some future science which rules God out or an appearance by God; the g-w-a believes it is possible to know now based on current data, she just has to 'figure it out'.
(Note: gender aside, this describes my own position at times.)

The agnostic weak atheist believes that it is unknown whether gods exist, not necessarily that it is unknowable. The latter view is a subset of agnosticism (sometimes called "strong agnosticism") but it is difficult to defend since there is the possibility of the appearance of a god. Logically, such a view is problematic because to claim that gods are unknowable is itself a statement of knowledge about gods.

What you describe seems to be an agnostic weak atheist, not a gnostic weak atheist. A gnostic position is that the existence or nonexistence of gods is known. What you describe certainly acknowledges that the existence of gods is currently unknown.

In addition, there are some problems with the view you described that could make it a difficult one to defend. She claims to know that there is enough information of sufficient quality available to resolve the question, but doesn't know what that information is. So the question must be asked: how does she know that there is enough information of sufficient quality available, and what justifies the belief that she will come up with an answer when nobody else has in thousands of years?

-Bri