An excellent article on materialism!

Paul C. Anagnostopoulos said:
...Notice that the author says that mental state is dumped in the ontological trash can.
~~ Paul

The standard approach. What is satisfying with stating, basically, that here we have a problem that the epistemology of science does not answer as we had hoped, therefore we declare the question meaningless?
 
Paul C. Anagnostopoulos said:
This is a typical confusion caused by the absolutism of philosophical concepts. Let's see the entire paragraph from the paper that Peskanov cited:


quote:
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Rorty (1965) and Feyerabend (1963a and 1963b) thus concluded that if scientific progress was the model for the relationship between brain states and mental states, then there is no need to establish identities between the two. Once we have a sufficiently sophisticated neuroscience, we may be able to simply say that there are no mental states. This effectively disposes of the problems raised by Shaffer and Feyerabend mentioned above. The differences between identity and causal correlation were no longer of significance, because we were now talking about only one entity--the brain state-- the mental state having been consigned to the ontological trash heap.
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Do you read this as suggesting that we might decide there is no such thing as love and hate?

Yes it seems pretty unambiguous on that point. More precisely no-one has ever had feelings of love and hate. There are only brain states.

Utterly preposterous isn't it?


Huh?? But it is quite clear in its denial! :eek:

I take it to mean that the informal descriptions of love and hate used in the neurophysiological arena will turn out to be virtually useless, supplanted by the description of the brain functions corresponding to those emotions. We wiill be able to say that there are "no mental states" because they are of no or limited scientific use.

No that is just a weak version of materialism, or even epiphenomenalism. It is not eliminitivism, which is seriously radical in its claims!

I don't think anyone is going to say that there is no such thing as love or hate. If they do, then they are simply rejecting words that are summaries of complex functions.

Huh?? No, love is more than a function! It is a certain raw experience.

It's like saying that computers don't compute, but instead [fill in complete description of computers here]. Notice that the author says that mental state is dumped in the ontological trash can.

Yes, this is because eliminitivists claim that mental states do not exist. Just like gaily gambolling invisible Unicorns which frolic in peoples back gardens do not exist!
 
hammegk said:


The standard approach. What is satisfying with stating, basically, that here we have a problem that the epistemology of science does not answer as we had hoped, therefore we declare the question meaningless?

No, it is just relating one layer of description with another. It is saying that the epistemology of science is finding different descriptions than ones commonly thought, and that our own self-analysis may be faulty.

People used to believe that four "fluids" governed the body. This underlying logical basis was replaced, and now we view the question "which fluid is imbalanced in this person" as meaningless, and rightly so. This is a by-product of the scientific model... observations guide knowledge. We don't get to "choose" reality, so if science answers something we don't like and doesn't agree with our expectations, our expectations have to change.

It all comes down to the fact that I don't trust my sensations and feelings as "real". I have made my brain think it was seeing some really weird stuff, and there are too many psychology case studies on altered perception for me to inherently trust my own "inner reality".
 
Well then, I would have to talk to an eliminativist, because I don't understand what it means to say that love does not exist. I understand what it means to say that love is not an ontological existent, and that informal descriptions of love are not useful neurophysiologically. I repeat my observation that the author specifically said that these things go on the ontological rubbish heap, not on the general-purpose rubbish heap.

Anyone know any eliminativists?

~~ Paul
 
Gestahl

So you believe the answer to the dichotomy, "I think, therefore I am" vs "I am, therefore I think" to be meaningless. Fine with me; I just don't share that faith. :)
 
Interesting Ian said:


Huh?? No, love is more than a function! It is a certain raw experience.


And yet, I can induce that experience, along with lust, empathy and euphoria (all very similar) with a good dose of MDMA, which has a fairly well-understood chemical pathway in the nervous system. I can garauntee that same person will not have a love experience afterwards for a while due to depleted neurotransmitters (for larger doses). Why do you think small doses used to be used in marriage counselling?

Tell me its not a brain function.
 
Re: Gestahl

Dichotomies do not have answers. They have resolutions. Care to explain what you meant by that statement, hammegk?

And if a resolution is produced for a particular dichotomy, in what way can it be considered to be 'meaningless'? Perhaps the dichotomy was meaningless, but its resolution is obviously as meaningful as the the things being discussed are.
 
Ian,
Don't be such a complete t*thead. Which is more likely to provide a correct definition of philosophical terms? Encyclopedias of philosophy, or some stupid a*seholes on the James Randi board such as you and Stimp. I think the answer is rather obvious
Such a pathetic strawman...
It isn't biased idiot.
It is, stupid. It's so biased it looks like Pepsi vs Coke propaganda.
Take a look at this at the end of you little treasure:
"In this mood, materialists are prepared to deny what seem to be the most obvious facts of mental life if their theory requires it".
Yeah, that's a really good dictionary, really unbiased: "And now we finish our report about materialism. As you can see materialism is totally flawed and crazy. BTW, hello ma, hello dad! I'm on TV!".

you can't compare because the article I referenced scarcely said anything about eliminitivism at all. People would have to be literally insane to subscribe to elimintivism. There's a simple refutation - "I think therefore I am"
It's an incomplete and misleading definition. And your refutation only adresses a false idea of eliminativism. Cheers!

I said it, and you have read it. Eliminativism discards "folk psychology". They declare our ideas about our mental life invalid and primitive, and vindicate neuroscience as the correct aproach to study it.
They DENY our prejudices. The DO NOT DENY the phenomena that gave origin to folk psychology. Will you accept it, or you will tell everybody again what's their position?
I do not understand, however, how the second definition differs from reductive materialism. I was thinking that on reading it, and lo and behold, it mentioned that very fact in the next paragraph! So it seems to me that eliminitivism generally refers to the first definition.
Great. You read two definitions and just accept the one you feel you can attack easier, discarding the other. Don Interesting Quixote.

About William Lycan and George Pappas article; so what? Some philosophers also consider that reductionism, functionalism, and eliminativism are equivalent positions expressed in different language games, and I tend to accept their arguments.
Yes that's right. Materialists have to reject the existence of the abstract concept of a number. More generally mathematics is something which is invented rather than discovered. How many mathematicians agree with this? About 1% of them?? LOL
Oh, you are too good with evil materialist...Materialists even reject any transcendental difference between "discover" and "invent". At information level, the correspondence of a set of symbols with an hypothetical reality does not afect the process of information creation.
What??? How the f*ck does all this sh!t establish numbers are information?? You've just rejected their existence, so how the f*ck can they possibly be information??
As usual, you confuse a disagreement in a definition with a rejection of existence.
 
Re: Gestahl

hammegk said:
So you believe the answer to the dichotomy, "I think, therefore I am" vs "I am, therefore I think" to be meaningless. Fine with me; I just don't share that faith. :)

That's a pretty big leap from my perspective... I guess I would have to say that our perception of "being" is driven by thought, and that thought is a function of the physical being. It is certainly not meaningless it terms of the terminology you use and the assumptions you make, but I think the results are the same if you are being honest (hell, they would have to be or reality would not be consistent, and there is no way to distinguish). I think this may be the human's analogue to the Godel sentence.
 
Gestahl said:


And yet, I can induce that experience, along with lust, empathy and euphoria (all very similar) with a good dose of MDMA, which has a fairly well-understood chemical pathway in the nervous system. I can garauntee that same person will not have a love experience afterwards for a while due to depleted neurotransmitters (for larger doses). Why do you think small doses used to be used in marriage counselling?

Tell me its not a brain function.

It's not a brain function. Correlations by themselves do not establish even a causal relationship, nevermind that the 2 correlated things are one and the same.

But identity would only be reductive materialism in any case. Eliminative materialism states that love doesn't exist. Arguing that love *is* brain processes, or even arguing that brain processes generate feelings of love is neither here nor there. I mean I consider such hypotheses to be false of course. But it is irrelevant to this discussion, even if true.

BTW Paul, I do not understand the difference between an existent and an ontological existent. They are both the same I think, are they not?
 
Ian said:
BTW Paul, I do not understand the difference between an existent and an ontological existent. They are both the same I think, are they not?
In philosophy, perhaps they are the same. I don't know. I can't quite get a grip on all these statements about monism having one fundamental existent, yet then talking about mind and brain and rocks as if they are fundamentally different. Confusing.

~~ Paul
 
Paul C. Anagnostopoulos said:

I can't quite get a grip on all these statements about monism having one fundamental existent, yet then talking about mind and brain and rocks as if they are fundamentally different. Confusing.

Hah! We found a point of 100% agreement.

Gestahl said:

That's a pretty big leap from my perspective... I guess I would have to say that our perception of "being" is driven by thought, and that thought is a function of the physical being.
But how does that stance differ from some form of interactive dualism?


......I think this may be the human's analogue to the Godel sentence.
From the viewpoint of the epistemology of science, I'd agree.

From the viewpoint of A and ~A logic, how will we determine? Yet different answers appear to questions; for example, could "god" exist? Is life = non-life? Is HPC actually a problem?
 
Actually, I sometimes try to understand someone's point first -- not that I necessarily do, and my ESP ain't worth a damn -- before I begin the insults.

You should try it once.


BTW, unplonk. Back to 3. ;)
 
We all tried, hammegk, but you never answered our questions - or for that matter, ceased making statements with such gaping holes in the reasoning that asking further questions was necessary.

Care to answer any of the questions that have been directed at you?
 
Not until you bring anything of merit into a conversation, somewhere. You could even start here. (Nah, I won't hold my breath.)

On the "we all tried" crap, I disagree. Few people actually try, and I do my best to answer actual questions when I get one.
 
Oh, really?

What properties does a physical thing have that makes it different from a nonphysical thing?

Try harder.

When you've finished with that, there are questions waiting in multiple threads and forums that you never saw fit to answer. Try actually saying something meaningful in the Quest for Consciousness thread.
 
Answered -- could have been another thread, but you follow me around like a puppy dog so that isn't a valid excuse for you -- that based on 3rd person science, no property could be found in one, absent in the other (so far as I know).
 
There's no such thing as "3rd person science".

You haven't answered the question before. The question was not limited to any form of science. And your response is nonsensical at best.
 
Your willingness and ability to laugh at things you don't understand should be a beacon of hope to doofuses everywhere.

Sort of, "Look, everybody! I can play, too!"
 

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