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Yet another Free Will Thread

AtaraX

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I was catching up on old episodes of The Skeptics Guide to the Universe on my flight back home from TAM 5 and listening to the Tom W. Clark interview in episode #20 raised my philosophical ire.

I hate it when naturalists so whole heartedly and easily abandon free will to the spiritualists and the dualists. It doubled my frustration when he so often cited Dennett. Dennett whose whole project in his two major works on the subject of free will (Elbow Room and Freedom Evolves) is reclaiming free will for naturalists and proving that a deterministic universe far from being in conflict with free will it is a necessary condition for its existence.

Apparently Mr. Clark (apologies Dr., if he is a PhD) has read Dennett but didn't get it. I am not going into the intricacies of Dennett's arguments (I highly recommend you buy his books if you are interested in the issue) but I am going to try and set the record straight using my own much simpler and clumsier arguments.

Yes, as far as we know the universe is determined and we as things contained in that universe must also be determined so free will as defined as the ability to act outside of the causal chain of events cannot exist.

But this is a not the really the kind of free will we want. This Bronze Age, metaphysical free will is both myopic and absurd. It also has about the same explanative and functional power as unicorns and fairies.

Think about it. Do we have the free will to act outside of all external causes? If we could chose to ignore the force of gravity or to not die from starvation when denied access to food then we would have this sort of free will.

But this sort of free will would also free you from internal causality as well which is a completely inconsistent notion. What could it possible mean to choose independent of your thoughts, emotions and desires? Is this something we would want or need? "I felt x, thought x, wanted x but I chose y! I wonder why I did that? Not that there is a why, a why is a cause after all, and I have metaphysical free will!" Does this sort of choice resemble the kind you have in your internal life?

So far I seem to be shooting myself in the foot. I have been bad mouthing free will when I set out to defend it and that's because I want to emphasize the distinction that Dennett makes. Really when philosophers have talked about free will through the ages they have muddled two distinct ideas together. There is the nonsensical free will that determinism negates (which is okay because no one really wants that anyway) and there is free will worth having (which Dennett sets out to prove we have and explain how it evolved).

The free will we want is the could-have-done-differently free will and we have that. We get this ability by the virtue of the fact that we are limited agents, working with a limited understanding of the causes around us.

We are designed by our genes to seek some outcomes and avoid others but our genes can't know exactly the situations we will find ourselves in. Our environment is too complex for our genes to perfectly predict the future and script out every motion we are to make through out our lives. If they could do this they would simply make us like clockwork automatons. Our genes cope with the complexity of the world by building flexibility into us: limited senses and limited speculative power so we have limited ability to determine how to reach goals we are designed to reach.

Ironically, our limited ability is the key to free will. If our genes could have designed us as super agents capable of perceiving and processing all causes then we would be no better off than the clockwork automatons, we would simply always take the optimal route (determined essentially by the interest of our genes) and our consciousness would be redundant.

It is in the middle ground of imperfect agency where free will emerges. We are complex multi-state avoiding and seeking machines with a high degree of flexibility. And thus we have the could-have-done-differently free will. Determinism states that everything has one ultimate outcome but within that deterministic universe we have build in flexibility so if it were possible to rewind the deterministic universal tape and whisper a piece of advice into ear of one of us imperfect agents the whole tape from that point on would change. If we could have known better (or just differently) we could have done differently. And in that is the free will we have and desire.

So in the only rational sense of the word we have free will. There are objections I can anticipate to my explanation but this is a forum so I will wait to others raise them to respond to them.

But there is another thing that Tom Clark said that I thought was horrendous. He claimed that (since there was no free will) we can't hold criminals truly responsible for their actions! I know he couched it with provisions that did not follow from his argument to make it more palatable, like we still need a criminal justice system, but seriously this is a complete non sequitur.

First, I resent the intellectual elitism that is implicit in this kind of thinking: we educated, liberal-minded sorts are capable of understanding the big picture but we need to make allowances for those lesser unfortunates without the advantages and abilities we have.

Second, if criminals cannot be held responsible for their actions because they lack free will, how can we (also lacking free will) be held responsible for the way we treat them? Morality goes right out the window.

Third, I think Tom Clark is quick to embrace this faulty reasoning because he is blinded here by his agenda of taking retribution out of the criminal justice system. I sympathize with his cause but there are much better arguments for it, there are studies he could cite for example that I'm sure have been done. Cherry-picking bronze age metaphysical arguments that erode our agency to make your moral point is just as bad as cherry-picking bronze age myths from the bible to make your moral point.
 
AtaraX said:
But there is another thing that Tom Clark said that I thought was horrendous. He claimed that (since there was no free will) we can't hold criminals truly responsible for their actions! I know he couched it with provisions that did not follow from his argument to make it more palatable, like we still need a criminal justice system, but seriously this is a complete non sequitur.

First, I resent the intellectual elitism that is implicit in this kind of thinking: we educated, liberal-minded sorts are capable of understanding the big picture but we need to make allowances for those lesser unfortunates without the advantages and abilities we have.

Second, if criminals cannot be held responsible for their actions because they lack free will, how can we (also lacking free will) be held responsible for the way we treat them? Morality goes right out the window.

Third, I think Tom Clark is quick to embrace this faulty reasoning because he is blinded here by his agenda of taking retribution out of the criminal justice system. I sympathize with his cause but there are much better arguments for it, there are studies he could cite for example that I'm sure have been done. Cherry-picking bronze age metaphysical arguments that erode our agency to make your moral point is just as bad as cherry-picking bronze age myths from the bible to make your moral point.
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"On responsibility and punishment"
From an objective point of view -- the only legitimate point of view for science -- "holding a man responsible" for his actions means nothing more than making him subject to punishment if he breaks the law. The social view of punishment assumes that people are sensitive to reward and punishment, that behavior be predictably subject to causal influences. If criminal behavior is predictably deterred by punishment, the justly punished criminal is less likely to disobey the law again, and serves as an example to other potential lawbreakers. This is the only objective justification for punishment. But if behavior were unpredictable and unaffected by "reinforcement contingencies" -- if it were uncaused, in Skinner's caricature of "freedom" -- there would be absolutely no point to punishment or any other form of behavioral control, because it would have no predictable effect. In short, legal responsibility requires behavioral determinism, not the reverse.
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We are designed by our genes to seek some outcomes and avoid others but our genes can't know exactly the situations we will find ourselves in. Our environment is too complex for our genes to perfectly predict the future and script out every motion we are to make through out our lives. If they could do this they would simply make us like clockwork automatons. Our genes cope with the complexity of the world by building flexibility into us: limited senses and limited speculative power so we have limited ability to determine how to reach goals we are designed to reach.
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The brain works by chemistry. Chemistry that is directed by stimuli. These stimuli are caused by the forces of nature. Therefore, the human mind is deterministic on the macro scale. Quantum weirdness probably adds some level of unpredictability on the micro scale but that doesn't give the mind control over itself.

You are suggesting that the mind is ultimately outside the chain of causation. What evidence do you have that this is so?

I don't see how the argument you posted applies to free will.
 
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AtaraX said:
It is in the middle ground of imperfect agency where free will emerges. We are complex multi-state avoiding and seeking machines with a high degree of flexibility. And thus we have the could-have-done-differently free will.
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Holy logical leaps, batman! How did you get from the second to the third sentences here?
 
AtaraX said:
ignore the force of gravity
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we ignore it every time we lift our foot up to take a step, or atleast resist it.

The free will we want is the could-have-done-differently free will
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hind-site, regret. Yes, because we are products of the universe. The universe isn't determined, it is predisposed because of probability, not certainty.

My genes and my environment make me predisposed to choices. The choice is the mechanism that enables a person to move within their environment. People evolved to function in their environment. Of coarse we couldn't choose independantly of our environment.

Determinism/Behaviorism, Compatibalism, and Free Will are all problematic.

Personally I "feel better" about compatibalism. It doesn't suggest that I'm am powerless over my "fate" and it allows me to value morality.

Morality is the number one reason why free will is defended.

Anyway, Compatibalism is saying that "free" does not mean "uncaused." Perhaps "uncoerced." James Rachels says "whether your behavior is free does not depend on whether it is caused; it only depends on how it is caused." -Problems From Philosophy, 2005

The problem with Compatibalism: Compatibalism says we are free if our actions flow from our own unmanipulated character and desires. But our characters and desires are caused by forces beyond our control.

But in a purely determined world, our actions would be predictable, and they aren't always. We are subject to the same impulsive behavior like the universe is subject to events of random chance.

The moral problem: of coarse people must be help accoutable for their choices even if that means that they must be isolated from society in order to protect society.

Knowing full well the consequences of murder, even outside an "act of passion," a person is punished for doing what they "knew" was "wrong," because they could have just as easily chosen the "right."

Some people have been molested. One victim ends up victimizing later in life, another victim ends up advocating other victims. Although both victims could not control their environment, they each had a very different expression of that experience.

I don't know if we'll ever learn that we are free or determined or both, especially whilst we defend the ambiguity of metaphysics, a problem in itself. I do know that what we have is MANY choices to choose from. You can choose to move yourself through your world, or end your life so you don't have to. You are indeed in control of that, contrary to the "path" of the universe.
 
But in a purely determined world, our actions would be predictable...
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How do you figure? Our brains are so complex that the outcome may be somewhat unpredictable but completely determined by the laws of nature.

The weather is the same way but no one I know tries to give a storm cloud free will.
 
Free will is not about causal determinism.
It is about social conceptions of self.

Just HAD to say it. You know....
 
dglas said:
Free will is not about causal determinism.
It is about social conceptions of self.

Just HAD to say it. You know....
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Guess it depends on the dictionary:

–noun
1.free and independent choice; voluntary decision: You took on the responsibility of your own free will.
2.Philosophy. the doctrine that the conduct of human beings expresses personal choice and is not simply determined by physical or divine forces.

If you are working with some other definition, you can't blame me for being confused.
 
AtaraX said:
Yes, as far as we know the universe is determined and we as things contained in that universe must also be determined so free will as defined as the ability to act outside of the causal chain of events cannot exist.
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Whether the universe is deterministic, or it is deterministic with random influences, I cannot even conceive of what acting "outside the causal chain of events" means.

Is there some other concept beyond determinism or randomness that squeezes in there somewhere? Some way to decide something that is neither random nor deterministic? I cannot conceive of such a thing. Either it does it because it is caused, or it "just happens". There is nothing else. The concept of some kind of spiritual free will is meaningless, like a square circle.
 
Beerina said:
Is there some other concept beyond determinism or randomness that squeezes in there somewhere?
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Taking a stab:

Determinism - Choiceless and can be predicted perfectly with enough information.

Random - Choiceless and can never be predicted perfectly.

Free will - Choice and can never be predicted perfectly because some entity has the ultimate final say.

I guess the real question is what is "choice"?
 
Mercutio said:
"On responsibility and punishment"
From an objective point of view -- the only legitimate point of view for science -- "holding a man responsible" for his actions means nothing more than making him subject to punishment if he breaks the law. The social view of punishment assumes that people are sensitive to reward and punishment, that behavior be predictably subject to causal influences. If criminal behavior is predictably deterred by punishment, the justly punished criminal is less likely to disobey the law again, and serves as an example to other potential lawbreakers. This is the only objective justification for punishment. But if behavior were unpredictable and unaffected by "reinforcement contingencies" -- if it were uncaused, in Skinner's caricature of "freedom" -- there would be absolutely no point to punishment or any other form of behavioral control, because it would have no predictable effect. In short, legal responsibility requires behavioral determinism, not the reverse.
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I can accept that argument as far as not making punishment more severe than is required to get the benefits of deterence, etc.
But what about the other extreme? What if we showed that the benefits of punishing an innocent man were just as great as those of punishing a guilty one?
(As an example of how this might happen - imagine a police force and justice system that doesn't care if it gets the person responsible for a crime, so long as it gets someone.)

If we answer "we still shouldn't punish the innocent man because he's done nothing wrong", how does this square with the above quote? The same amount of suffering is involved - someone is still being punished and punished just as severely. The same benefit (just for the sake of argument, I don't think it matters if that's reasonable) is being found. Yet, we're distinguishing based on something. What?

All that's left is saying that so-and-so (the innocent) wasn't responsible for the wrong that occured, and thus shouldn't be punished for it.

Now I don't believe in this 'free will' thing - I don't even really understand what it means - but I don't think there's anything wrong with saying that people shouldn't be punished for crimes they didn't commit, even if doing so would be an effective deterent.
 
Roboramma said:
But what about the other extreme? What if we showed that the benefits of punishing an innocent man were just as great as those of punishing a guilty one?
(As an example of how this might happen - imagine a police force and justice system that doesn't care if it gets the person responsible for a crime, so long as it gets someone.)
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An excellent question, but one that only makes sense from a free-will point of view. "Punishment", behaviorally, is defined differently than "punishment" is defined in our society. The former is defined by a reduction in the rate of a target behavior (yeah, there is more, but that is enough for now), not in what we are doing to a person. "Punishing an innocent man" is only defined within our society's view--it is a meaningless sentence within behaviorism.

But to address it anyway... note in your example that the "benefits of punishing" have nothing to do with suppressing the actual undesired behavior, but rather with "getting someone". This is not a rational goal of punishment, and does not depend on any assumption of determinism. If it does not matter whom we punish, "rounding up the usual suspects" will do.

If the benefits of punishing an innocent were as great as punishing a guilty party, I would suggest that the latter is being done poorly, and that such a finding would imply that neither works.
 
My view at the moment is that you don't have free will, the "agent" in your head saying it's you, at best, has a limited vote power over other "agents" in your head. Since, that "you" agent is still another brain process, it's deterministic. So, "you" have the illusion of "free will" but really "you" only have free wont.

Of course, that begs the question who are "you"? I will try and avoid starting a discussion over the "c" word.
 
Roboramma said:
I can accept that argument as far as not making punishment more severe than is required to get the benefits of deterence, etc.
But what about the other extreme? What if we showed that the benefits of punishing an innocent man were just as great as those of punishing a guilty one?
(As an example of how this might happen - imagine a police force and justice system that doesn't care if it gets the person responsible for a crime, so long as it gets someone.)
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I think any supposed benefits here would depend on the legal system convincing us they had actually got the right person, even though they hadn't. If we knew that the police just arrested people at random then we would feel just as safe committing crimes as we would sticking to the law. I'm assuming a legal system based on deception would not survive very long.

Punishing the innocent has no deterrence value because it doesn't target criminal behaviour.
 
If anyone is interested in the incompatibilist position, I recommend An Essay on Free Will by Peter van Inwagen. It is widely considered a modern classic, and it has been very influential in shaping the debate on the subject of free will (I think he wrote it in the 70's or 80's). Van Inwagen is a theist but not a dualist (but he doesn't invoke God in his arguments, so his being a theist is probably irrelevant), and having taken a class from him at Notre Dame, I can say that he may well be the smartest person I've ever met.

His conclusions are very interesting. He thinks that free will is definitely incompatible with determinism, but that it also seems to be incompatible with indeterminism. Nevertheless, we are powerless not to believe that we have free will. That is, I can believe that free will is an illusion, but I still cannot stop believing that I have free will. If I were really able to stop believing that I have free will, it would be impossible to ever try to decide what to do, and I would be incapable of functioning. It is impossible for me to try to decide whether to do A or B unless I believe that it is possible for me to do either.

If I believe that free will is an illusion then I simply hold incompatible beliefs, because in that case I would believe both that I do not have free will and that I do have free will, since it is impossible for me not to believe that I have free will.

(A subtle point: it is impossible for me not to believe that I have free will, but it is not impossible for me to believe that I do not have free will. This is because it is not impossible for someone to have inconsistent beliefs. People do it all the time. I can believe that I do not have free will, but that doesn't mean that I don't also at some level believe that I do have free will.)

Now, this doesn't mean that free will is real, because it is obvious that believing in one's free will is beneficial for survival (because belief in one's free will is necessary for decision making), and it may just be a trick of evolution. But we might as well believe that free will is real because we literally can't help it. The only alternative to believing that I have free will is for me to simultaneously believe two propositions that I know to be inconsistent.

I just think that it's a very creative way of approaching the problem, and as I said it has generated a lot of response and influenced the opinions of many analytic philosophers.
 
Paul C. Anagnostopoulos said:
Folks, don't forget the distinction between libertarian free will and compatibilist free will.

~~ Paul
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I've never encountered an account of compatibilist free will that I felt deserved to be so called. But then, I guess that's why I'm not a compatibilist.
 
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