Kant's categorical imperative is equally vacuous and insipid when critically examined, IMO.
Um, and you have critically examined the categorical imperative and how it's deduced from the nature of practical reason?
Frankly, no, no it isn't. And this brings out the point that I made much earlier, which is that it's sometimes hard to see the difference between Rand and other philosophers if all you have is the basic intro-philosophy level summaries of what they've said. That doesn't mean there isn't a substantial different, though.
Gestahl said:
But, see, there is the issue. That argument does seem facile to me. If one has a goal, and one has facts about the operation of reality, then one has oughts in the form of action to bring about that goal. For every person, the ultimate goal is self-survival and self-interest, or there is no person (they die, or are completely ineffective). And that is an objective fact. And I can't seem to argue against that.
And why
ought one to pursue their own survival or self interest? Even if it is a fact that they do so - or even do so necessarily that doesn't show much about whether or not they ought to. Specifically, it doesn't unless you allow in some other premises. You can't, in other words, deduce that you ought to p from premises that don't themselves contain some form of an ought statement - even if that's as minimal as "you ought to do what advances your own interests". Basically though, yes, if one has facts and a goal then one can deduce, possibly, an ought statement - because that's the sort of statement a statement of a
goal is as well. The argument, however, was directed at the notion of deducing an ought from an is.
I think you would do well to actually read Hume carefully before dismissing his argument as facile - it's a fairly significant one and liable to be misconstrued.
What really confuses me, though, is that above you sound like you're saying that the only real sort of oughts there are are instrumental oughts (if one has goal x and means y are the means to x then one ought to y) - but these are precisely all that Hume allowed for. In fact, it was his entire picture of how reasoning worked in the first place. So I'm really entirely unsure of what you're disagreeing with at all.