What materialists must believe.

[Interesting Ian]

I contend that materialists must either reject the existence of consciousness, or alternatively conclude that consciousness is an epiphenomenon. Do you agree?

I should explain what I mean by consciousness. Basically I'm referring to phenomenology. That is to say that by consciousness I mean its subjective qualitative character. What it is like to taste ice cream; what it is like to be experiencing toothache; what it is like to experience a warm summer's day and to feel that all is right with the world, etc.

And that is all I mean by consciousness. Even if certain bodily behaviour is associated with consciousness, what I mean by consciousness is this subjective qualitative nature.

I should also explain what I mean by materialism. By materialism I mean that only the physical exists. Thus in oder for materialism to be true, then subjective qualitative states must also be physical. But what is physical? By physical I mean all that which plays some causal role (i.e fruitful role) in some scientific theory describing the world. In other words, if somethings exists, yet is not susceptible to being incorporated into some scientific theory, then it is not physical.

Further, if consciousness is taken to be basic -- that is to say that if it cannot be explained by reference to other physical entities (subatomic particles or whatever), then it is not physical. This is so even if one concludes that consciousness is created by certain physical processes. As I said consciousness must play a fruitful role in some scientific theory describing reality, or part of it. If consciousness is not causally efficacious (i.e does not play a fruitful role in some scientific theory), then consciousness is an epiphenomenon.

 

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

There are more alternatives. Some of us have tried to explain some of them to you. Please consider reading something about "Folk Psychology".

 

[Interesting Ian]

There are more alternatives. Some of us have tried to explain some of them to you. Please consider reading something about "Folk Psychology".

Name those alternatives.

 

[H'ethetheth]

I should also explain what I mean by materialism. By materialism I mean that only the physical exists. Thus in oder for materialism to be true, then subjective qualitative states must also be physical. But what is physical? By physical I mean all that which plays some causal role (i.e fruitful role) in some scientific theory describing the world. In other words, if somethings exists, yet is not susceptible to being incorporated into some scientific theory, then it is not physical.

One point of concern: I don't see how a materialist as you defined here could possibly believe in the existence of epiphenomena, since an epiphenomenon would be distinctly unphysical.
This leaves me with the assertion that if I am this specific kind of materialist, I cannot believe that tasting ice cream is like something (or like anything for that matter).
I don't agree with this, but it's possibly a question of what your definition of consciousness is. (I remember from the appropriately named thread, that such a definition does not exist according to you. I'm not sure if this is still the case though, since I too have done a lot of thinking because of that thread since then and evaluated and adjusted my idea of consciousness).

Edited for silly sentence structure

 

[Iacchus]

What the heck is an epiphenomenon?

 

[rharbers]

Consciousness is the faculty that percievers what exists. You canot be aware of something without someting to be aware of. Consciousness requires and is dependent on existence. Only after a consciousness is aware of something external can it identify itself.

Epiphenomenon. Consciousness, a secondary phenomenon accompanying another and caused by it? No. Consciousness is awareness.

 

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

Name those alternatives.

No! You always want everything pre-digested. In the last thread I pointed you to a problem, yet, you asked for reasons for my possition. Well, they were on my previous post. Sometimes you just ignore what contradicts what you believe, and you also turn around things in order for your position to remain "intact".

Not anymore Ian. I bet you can do your own homework!

 

[Interesting Ian]

By saying consciousness is an epiphenomenon it is meant that consciousness is caused or is a result of other processes, but that consciousness in its turn is completely causally inefficacious.

 

[Interesting Ian]

Re: Re: What materialists must believe.

One point of concern: I don't see how a materialist as you defined here could possibly believe in the existence of epiphenomena, since an epiphenomenon would be distinctly unphysical.

That's right. If one believes consciousness is an epiphenomenon then they are not strictly speaking a materialist.

Epiphenomenalism has formidable problems. For instance if consciousness doesn't affect anything physical, then how can we refer to it at all?

 

[Interesting Ian]

Let me try to make my point more clear. Consider the Earth as it orbits around the Sun. Is the Earth conscious? Does it orbit the Sun because of a desire on its part?

Presumably materialists would say not. If the Earth were conscious then this consciousness would be an epiphenomenon. This is because the Earth's behaviour can be completely described using physical laws. In other words, if the Earth is conscious, then there is no input that its consciousness is making since physical laws completely describe its behaviour. Thus if the Earth is conscious such consciousness must be an epiphenomenon.

Now consider human beings. Our behaviour -- the materialist must hold -- is completely explainable by events occurring in the brain. The events follow physical laws just as much as the Earth orbiting the Sun follows physical laws. Thus the same reasoning applies here as it does for the Earth. That is to say if human beings are conscious, then there is no input this consciousness is making. Thus if human beings are conscious such consciousness must be an epiphenomenon.

 

[H'ethetheth]

...Now consider human beings. Our behaviour -- the materialist must hold -- is completely explainable by events occurring in the brain. The events follow physical laws just as much as the Earth orbiting the Sun follows physical laws. Thus the same reasoning applies here as it does for the Earth. That is to say if human beings are conscious, then there is no input this consciousness is making. Thus if human beings are conscious such consciousness must be an epiphenomenon.

I'm not sure you realise this, but that last part states the following:

"...That is to say if human beings are both physical and conscious, then there's no non-physical input this consciousness is making, Thus if human beings are non-physically conscious, then non-physical consciousness must be an epiphenomenon."(underlines mine)

In other words, you have erected a staw man called 'epiphenomenalism' and demonstrated beyond doubt that it is indeed different from materialism.

More constructively, I get the feeling that by "input", you mean, "input uncaused by physical events". Together with this argument this means you state that deterministic consciousness is by definition not consciousness. Why? How would you tell the difference?

Edited for missing verb and cosmetics

 

[Interesting Ian]

I'm not sure you realise this, but that last part states the following:

"...That is to say if human beings are both physical and conscious, then there's no non-physical input this consciousness is making,

Meaning if we are physical beings, then we are not non-physical. WOW! Very profound I'm sure You have a serious reading comprehension problem if you imagine I said that.

Thus if human beings are non-physically conscious, then non-physical consciousness must be an epiphenomenon."(underlines mine)

Here you are saying materialism and epiphenomenalism exhaust all the postions on the mind/body problem. Apart from being laughably absurdly wrong, you are in absolute error in imagining I said anything like this.



So no I did not say what your paragraph said. Indeed I said absolutely nothing like that. And note I also made no reference to either physicality nor non-physicality. You've even underlined them!

Your paragraph is literally gobbledegook. You've understood nothing of my post.

In other words, you have erected a staw man called 'epiphenomenalism' and demonstrated beyond doubt that it is indeed different from materialism.

You are profoundly mistaken if you believe that I invented this position. And it is different from materialism by definition. But I've already said this. Why must I continually repeat myself all the time???

More constructively, I get the feeling that by "input", you mean, "input uncaused by physical events".

I mean what I said; namely input by consciousness.

Together with this argument this means you state that deterministic consciousness is by definition not consciousness. Why? How would you tell the difference?

"Deterministic consciousness" conveys nothing to me.

You have completrely failed to address my argument. Read my argument again, and this time please try to understand it.

 

[Mojo]

So, not content with constructing strawmen, Ian is now demanding that people subscribe to them?

 

[H'ethetheth]

I'm sorry if I've misread your argument, but I'm fairly sure I did not. Let's start at the beginning:

Basically the OP states: As a materialist one must either reject consciousness (as defined by Ian), or face epiphenomenalism.
We've established that epiphenomenalism and materialism are mutually exclusive, therefore the above directly translates to:

"Materialists have no choice but to reject consciousness as defined by Ian."

If you disagree with the above interpretation, something is seriously wrong with either of us.
Now If I look in the OP, I can't find any informative indication of what you think consciousness is, other than that eating ice cream feels like exactly that.

Ah, but further down you state that

Our behaviour -- the materialist must hold -- is completely explainable by events occurring in the brain.[...] Thus [...] if human beings are conscious, then there is no input this consciousness is making.

So, if a person's behaviour is governed exclusively by phyisics, consciousness is not the thing that is causing this person's behaviour because physics are already doing this. Thus if this person is nevertheless conscious, she must be 'epiphenomenally' conscious.

Have I quoted you wrongly? If I've still not got this right, could somebody please tell me where my reading comprehension is lacking?

If I have got it right, this conveys to me that the kind of consciousness that is, on one hand, incompatible with physics, yet compatible with epiphenomenalism, as well as dualism and idealism, must be rejected by me, if I desire to keep my reputation of intellectual integrity when telling someone I am in fact a materialist.

Grrrrreat.

 

[Interesting Ian]

I'm sorry if I've misread your argument, but I'm fairly sure I did not. Let's start at the beginning:

Basically the OP states: As a materialist one must either reject consciousness (as defined by Ian), or face epiphenomenalism.
We've established that epiphenomenalism and materialism are mutually exclusive, therefore the above directly translates to:

"Materialists have no choice but to reject consciousness as defined by Ian."

If you disagree with the above interpretation, something is seriously wrong with either of us.
Now If I look in the OP, I can't find any informative indication of what you think consciousness is, other than that eating ice cream feels like exactly that.

Ah, but further down you state that So, if a person's behaviour is governed exclusively by phyisics, consciousness is not the thing that is causing this person's behaviour because physics are already doing this. Thus if this person is nevertheless conscious, she must be 'epiphenomenally' conscious.

Have I quoted you wrongly? If I've still not got this right, could somebody please tell me where my reading comprehension is lacking?

If I have got it right, this conveys to me that the kind of consciousness that is, on one hand, incompatible with physics, yet compatible with epiphenomenalism, as well as dualism and idealism, must be rejected by me, if I desire to keep my reputation of intellectual integrity when telling someone I am in fact a materialist.

Grrrrreat.

All that seems to be fine, yes.

 

[Interesting Ian]

So, not content with constructing strawmen, Ian is now demanding that people subscribe to them?

What strawman have I constructed? I am asking people what they believe. I am asking if they agree with me. This has nothing whatsoever to do with strawmen.

 

[H'ethetheth]

All that seems to be fine, yes.

Well, then I voted wrongly.
I fully agree with your argument, although I thoroughly disagree with your idea of consciousness, which, as we've just established, I should.

 

[Mojo]

What strawman have I constructed? I am asking people what they believe. I am asking if they agree with me. This has nothing whatsoever to do with strawmen.

I strongly suspect that your entire definition of "materialism" is a strawman.

 

[Interesting Ian]

I strongly suspect that your entire definition of "materialsm" is a strawman.

Well, it's the kind of materialism that people tend to subscribe to nowadays; especially scientists. There's a more old fashioned type of materialism which includes the notion of material substance, but this type of materialism has no advantages over modern materialism and indeed simply creates additional difficulties.

 

[H'ethetheth]

I strongly suspect that your entire definition of "materialism" is a strawman.

Actually, Ian recently threw a summary of his idea of materialism before the lions here, to check before he'd incorporate it into his forthcoming(?) website. Check it out if you want to know, it's a long read though.