What is Volition?

[AkuManiMani]

In the "Are You Conscious" thread FedUpWithFaith gave, what I think, is a pretty good description for the operational criteria of volition:

So let me tell you what elements I think are critical in volition for self-awareness and other cognitive aspects of consciousness that you might agree are critical too. First, it requires autonomous computation to define and explore a potentially indeterminate solution space of potentially very high degrees of freedom with no a posteriori constraints and few or no a priori limitations other than those which limit the nature of computation itself. Second, and essentially connected to the first principle, stochastic processing is required to expand, contract, and explore the solution space (and concommitant degrees of freedom) probablistically (no "absolute solution" is guaranteed). Third, given that you agree with me on the modeling and predictive nature of brain computation, I would argue that the first and second conditions above must not only apply to our immediate sense perception but to the simultaneous and reflective modeling and prediction of how our minds compute a reaction to sense perception. In this sense, my assertion is compatible with Dennett's "Multiple drafts" explanation for consciousness but provides deeper process understanding - especially relevant to how we do know the brain works, particular in its stochastic nature.

My personal opinion is that consciousness is required for volition. Conscious thought involves subjective valuation which necessarily entails the kind of open-ended processing FUWF describes above. If one had a sufficient operational definition for volition such a definition would give us some solid behavioral criteria for discerning whether or not an entity in question is conscious.

Any others care to take a crack at defining what they think constitutes volition?

 

[yy2bggggs]

Here's my thorough examination for the requirements of volition:

It requires that a planning element in your head move a muscle somewhere as a result of information representing the movement, to achieve some goal. Said planning element should comprise the set of things this virtual entity you call "you" is aware of (which is a fuzzy designation, but generally is comprised of shared information).

That's it. I could probably sprinkle the words "indeterministic" and "stochastic" in there to sugar it up for you, but I can't seem to find a place where those words fit into this story.

 

[AkuManiMani]

Here's my thorough examination for the requirements of volition:

It requires that a planning element in your head move a muscle somewhere as a result of information representing the movement, to achieve some goal. Said planning element should comprise the set of things this virtual entity you call "you" is aware of (which is a fuzzy designation, but generally is comprised of shared information).

I think that the key concept you brought up is the capacity to form goals. The actions of volitional entities are inherently purposeful and driven to achieve some mental objective(s).

That's it. I could probably sprinkle the words "indeterministic" and "stochastic" in there to sugar it up for you, but I can't seem to find a place where those words fit into this story.

I think the process of conscious goal formation may include a "stochastic" element of some kind. However, I do agree that the deliberate pursuit of the the goal itself need not have such an element, tho.

 

[yy2bggggs]

I think that the key concept you brought up is the capacity to form goals. The actions of volitional entities are inherently purposeful and driven to achieve some mental objective(s).

Possibly, but I don't think in the way you mean it. I consider volition per se to be the part where you're carrying out a goal.

I think the process of conscious goal formation may include a "stochastic" element of some kind. However, I do agree that the deliberate pursuit of the the goal itself need not have such an element, tho.

I think it's superfluous to shove indeterminism into the mix in terms of a definition. It's just as volition-worthy if it doesn't include stochastic methods as it is if it does.

 

[FedUpWithFaith]

I'm glad to find you guys here trying to define volition conventionally as an descriptive phenomenon. I'm honored you used my quote to help start up this thread but for anybody who comes here who didn't read my posts in the "Are You Conscious" thread might find it pretentious that I was starting with an explanatory operational definition based on computation.

There, I'm speculating on computational explanation that may plausibly and operationally define volition as a component of consciousness consistent with the other components I described. But obviously, we need to try to define the observable, the what, before we define the cause, the why.

I actually expected you to start a free will thread instead Aku. I thought we would continue to explore volition under consciousness. But this is fine. I look forward to watching it progress and participating.

 

[AkuManiMani]

I think that the key concept you brought up is the capacity to form goals. The actions of volitional entities are inherently purposeful and driven to achieve some mental objective(s).

Possibly, but I don't think in the way you mean it. I consider volition per se to be the part where you're carrying out a goal.

Heres a general description of how I think volition plays out:

[1] Perception: Some mental object(s) enter the awareness of a conscious entity thru sense stimulation, recollection, or are generated via conceptualization.

[2] Motivation: The entity assesses the object(s) and establishes some subjective valency regarding them. The strength and quality of the valency affects any subsequent motivation the subject may have towards the object(s) [think of motivation as the subject's emotional voltage]. Motivation acts as the currency of the psyche.

[3] Intention: Based on the subjective valuation of said object(s), the entity may form an intention oriented towards a projected goal. The course of action chosen may be a preconditioned response or formulated on the spot. My guess is that forming a novel behavioral response is more mentally taxing that falling back on existing dispositions [i.e. requires more motivation].

[4] Will: Once the entity choses to initiate a course of action the motivation they've built up is converted into will as it's exerted towards their chosen goal. Will is the force of a subject's conscious intent to carry out an action/inaction [think of will as being the power of one's mental exertion]. The stronger the force of will behind an intention, the more easily the subject can override contravening impulses.

I think the process of conscious goal formation may include a "stochastic" element of some kind. However, I do agree that the deliberate pursuit of the the goal itself need not have such an element, tho.

I think it's superfluous to shove indeterminism into the mix in terms of a definition. It's just as volition-worthy if it doesn't include stochastic methods as it is if it does.

Like I said, I think the mental events leading up to a conscious choice are where the indeterminacy comes into play. Choice is indeterminate and will is what is determined by choice. It's the indeterminacy of choice the puts the "free" in "free will".

 

[yy2bggggs]

Heres a general description of how I think volition plays out:
...

The one thing you left out is where the term "volition" comes into play. Could you also tie it into a particular case--such as, say, my holding my breath? (This is intentionally partially problematic... I want a good solid definition).

Also, the way we generally use words, volition is tied to the concept of "voluntary"--it seems as if it should refer to the action in itself. I shake my arm, and that might be voluntary, or it might be involuntary. To know this, you would have to know if "I" caused the action, or if it "just happened"... so that's why I tie the word volition just to the action per se. Volition should be a concept that connects to voluntary actions as opposed to involuntary actions.

Like I said, I think the mental events leading up to a conscious choice are where the indeterminacy comes into play.

Okay, but wouldn't this be theoretical rather than observed? I mean, you think this is the case, because it explains something, right?

Choice is indeterminate and will is what is determined by choice.

Would you consider this theoretical or definitive?

It's the indeterminacy of choice the puts the "free" in "free will".

And the term "free will" is just a term, so whatever properties you want to shove into it is arbitrary. I think volition should necessarily apply to the stuff that happens when I push a button as opposed to when I sneeze--and to do that, we need to be very careful to only describe what we're referencing, and not include any particular theories about it, when we're defining the term. I believe I'm doing that with my definition (and though it leaves some terms undefined, I think it's highly appropriate to do so; should those terms prove fuzzy, the definition should be equally fuzzy).

 

[AkuManiMani]

Heres a general description of how I think volition plays out:
...

The one thing you left out is where the term "volition" comes into play. Could you also tie it into a particular case--such as, say, my holding my breath? (This is intentionally partially problematic... I want a good solid definition).

Also, the way we generally use words, volition is tied to the concept of "voluntary"--it seems as if it should refer to the action in itself. I shake my arm, and that might be voluntary, or it might be involuntary. To know this, you would have to know if "I" caused the action, or if it "just happened"... so that's why I tie the word volition just to the action per se. Volition should be a concept that connects to voluntary actions as opposed to involuntary actions.

Sorry, I should have specified.

I see step 4 -- "Will" -- as being the stage where we enact voluntary behaviors. Conscious perception/conception is the seed of volition, and willed behavior is it's fruit.

Like I said, I think the mental events leading up to a conscious choice are where the indeterminacy comes into play.

Okay, but wouldn't this be theoretical rather than observed? I mean, you think this is the case, because it explains something, right?

I'd say its theoretical in the same sense that evolution is theoretical. Its an understanding I've formed based off of a lifetime of introspecting my own mental processes/behaviors and observing the behaviors of others. I experience my own conscious choices as being selected freely, and I happen to know that the vast majority of my deliberate behaviors are in part, or wholly, improvisations. Whether I write an essay or draw a picture, I know that the outcome is not determined until I consciously create it, and even then I'm liable to revise what I've produced. I also see others exhibiting external behaviors suggestive of a similar process of improvisation.

I know that my own choices are not determined until *I* determine them by choice. The script of my behavior does not appear in my mind until I've written it, and the part is not played until I choose to live it. Until I consciously determine my future actions they are by definition indeterminate, and I assume such is true of other people on the same basis that I assume that they are conscious as I am.

It's the indeterminacy of choice the puts the "free" in "free will".

And the term "free will" is just a term, so whatever properties you want to shove into it is arbitrary. I think volition should necessarily apply to the stuff that happens when I push a button as opposed to when I sneeze--and to do that, we need to be very careful to only describe what we're referencing, and not include any particular theories about it, when we're defining the term.

Which is why I went to great pains to emphasize that volition is based upon conscious choice. I think most here would agree that reactions like sneezing, coughing, and hiccups are involuntary -precisely- because they are not consciously chosen and initiated. They happen automatically and the only role volition may play in such responses would be in consciously -choosing- to actively suppress them.

 

[yy2bggggs]

Sorry, I should have specified.

I see step 4 -- "Will" -- as being the stage where we enact voluntary behaviors.

Okay, so, again, how does volition per se fit in?

Conscious perception/conception is the seed of volition, and willed behavior is it's fruit.

This doesn't help me. It's just poetry, and all it means is that volition somehow follows from perception indirectly.

I'd say its theoretical in the same sense that evolution is theoretical. Its an understanding I've formed based off of a lifetime of introspecting my own mental processes/behaviors and observing the behaviors of others.

Okay...

I experience my own conscious choices as being selected freely,

...which is a testament to what you experience...

and I happen to know that the vast majority of my deliberate behaviors are in part, or wholly, improvisations.

Knowledge comes causally from observation. What sort of observation could you make to distinguish whether or not they are improvisations, versus whether or not you're simply only aware of certain stages in the process?

Whether I write an essay or draw a picture, I know that the outcome is not determined until I consciously create it, and even then I'm liable to revise what I've produced.

Again, knowledge comes causally from observation, but I think you're overreaching from what you could possibly observe intuitively. How do you distinguish between an outcome not being determined until you consciously create it, from your simply only being aware of particular stages in the process? What sort of observation can actually distinguish between the two?

I also see others exhibiting external behaviors suggestive of a similar process of improvisation.

And what sort of behaviors would suggest this?

I know that my own choices are not determined until *I* determine them by choice.

And do you have evidence that you know everything that you do?

The script of my behavior does not appear in my mind until I've written it,

That I can accept, but it doesn't entail your thesis. This is specifically talking about being aware of the script of your behavior.

and the part is not played until I choose to live it.

And when do you become aware that you chose to live it?

Until I consciously determine my future actions

I dispute that this has meaning. You are conscious of something if you are aware of it. You determine something if you cause it. Being aware and causing are two completely different things. You can't aware an action into being--you have to cause it. And knowledge doesn't come from causing, it comes from being aware. This is just a continuation of my eternal interchanges with you though, and my general theme that an individual is psychically divisible into psychic parts.

So to say "consciously determine" is to say "awaringly cause". I posit that you just cause, and you become aware that you cause. Or possibly, you become aware that you're going to cause, then you cause. There's no particular reason for any particular timing.

they are by definition indeterminate,

No. Indeterminate has a definition that is completely removed from whether or not you're aware of something. That you don't know about something going on does not entail that the thing going on is indeterminate.

and I assume such is true of other people on the same basis that I assume that they are conscious as I am.

Sure, but I dispute that you know what you claim to know, on the basis that knowledge should come causally from the events, and that your description of your perception of events is not powerful enough to entail your conclusions.

Which is why I went to great pains to emphasize that volition is based upon conscious choice.

And I simply say that volition is based on what the "I" causes, not conscious choice per se. There's a virtual entity within my head that I refer to as the "I", and it involves the set of things whose planning elements are generally shared across a bunch of modules.

I think most here would agree that reactions like sneezing, coughing, and hiccups are involuntary -precisely- because they are not consciously chosen and initiated. They happen automatically and the only role volition may play in such responses would be in consciously -choosing- to actively suppress them.

Does volition describe the difference between sneezing and driving a car "automatically"?

 

[AkuManiMani]

Sorry, I should have specified.

I see step 4 -- "Will" -- as being the stage where we enact voluntary behaviors.

Okay, so, again, how does volition per se fit in?

Conscious perception/conception is the seed of volition, and willed behavior is it's fruit.

This doesn't help me. It's just poetry, and all it means is that volition somehow follows from perception indirectly.

I already described in post #6 how I think volition (aka, willed action) is initiated from consciousness. I figured simply rephrasing it metaphorically would help clarify but, since you insist:

[1-2] A conscious perception/conception catalyzes a motive response; [3] the subject orients and an intent towards a mental objective; [4] their motive response is then converted into willful exertion towards the intended goal.

Steps 1-3 I think describe the process of building up a readiness potential^WP in the brain and step 4 is where the subject consciously chooses to initiate a willed response.

I'd say its theoretical in the same sense that evolution is theoretical. Its an understanding I've formed based off of a lifetime of introspecting my own mental processes/behaviors and observing the behaviors of others.

Okay...

I experience my own conscious choices as being selected freely,

...which is a testament to what you experience...

and I happen to know that the vast majority of my deliberate behaviors are in part, or wholly, improvisations.

Knowledge comes causally from observation. What sort of observation could you make to distinguish whether or not they are improvisations, versus whether or not you're simply only aware of certain stages in the process?

I've no choice but to be intimately aware of my own conscious mental processes. Consciousness evaluates the mental information available to it, and then chooses a course of action. The logistical details concerning the neural parsing of sensory information into mental format, or the automatic coordination of motor functions is not directly available to my conscious deliberation, nor does it have to be. Just as a user does not have to be directly cognizant of the inner workings of their computer in order to use a UI, our consciousness doesn't need detailed knowledge of the brain mechanisms that convey information to it or carry out it's willed choices. In other words, a subject does not need to know how an arm is raised in order to intuitively know how to raise an arm.

Whether I write an essay or draw a picture, I know that the outcome is not determined until I consciously create it, and even then I'm liable to revise what I've produced.

Again, knowledge comes causally from observation, but I think you're overreaching from what you could possibly observe intuitively. How do you distinguish between an outcome not being determined until you consciously create it, from your simply only being aware of particular stages in the process? What sort of observation can actually distinguish between the two?

If I'm consciously formulating and enacting a non-learned behavior then I know that I am improvising said behavior. Unless you somehow know better whats going thru my mind than I do, you've no grounds to argue against this.

I also see others exhibiting external behaviors suggestive of a similar process of improvisation.

And what sort of behaviors would suggest this?

Writing new books, designing cars, inventing products, formulating theories, creating art, participating in jam sessions, etc...

I know that my own choices are not determined until *I* determine them by choice.

And do you have evidence that you know everything that you do?

I cannot choose to do something without being aware of that choice. If I'm not cognizant of an action then it is not my choice.

The script of my behavior does not appear in my mind until I've written it,

That I can accept, but it doesn't entail your thesis. This is specifically talking about being aware of the script of your behavior.

and the part is not played until I choose to live it.

And when do you become aware that you chose to live it?

Durrr....When I make the choice?

Until I consciously determine my future actions

I dispute that this has meaning. You are conscious of something if you are aware of it. You determine something if you cause it. Being aware and causing are two completely different things. You can't aware an action into being--you have to cause it. And knowledge doesn't come from causing, it comes from being aware. This is just a continuation of my eternal interchanges with you though, and my general theme that an individual is psychically divisible into psychic parts. So to say "consciously determine" is to say "awaringly cause". I posit that you just cause, and you become aware that you cause. Or possibly, you become aware that you're going to cause, then you cause.

My conscious choice is the cause of my willed behavior. If I do not choose it, I do not will it. I'm not seeing what you find so objectionable or baffling about this -- especially when you yourself said that in defining volition one must distinguish between actions like pushing a button and sneezing. The former is initiated by conscious choice while the latter is initiated by reflex.

There's no particular reason for any particular timing.

Sure there is. I make a choice whenever I feel like it -- its that simple.

they are by definition indeterminate,

No. Indeterminate has a definition that is completely removed from whether or not you're aware of something. That you don't know about something going on does not entail that the thing going on is indeterminate.

If a potential chain of action has not been formulated it is not determined. An essay and its contentments are not determined until a writer mentally forms a string of words and chooses to commit them to paper. A murder is not determined until someone chooses to end another's life. An invention is not determined until an inventor has a creative insight and chooses to instantiate it. Etc, etc...

Each of those potential products and actions are indeterminate until they are conceived and carried out.

and I assume such is true of other people on the same basis that I assume that they are conscious as I am.

Sure, but I dispute that you know what you claim to know, on the basis that knowledge should come causally from the events, and that your description of your perception of events is not powerful enough to entail your conclusions.

Then you're essentially disputing my own consciousness. Sorry, but I trust my own direct experience over your assertions.

Which is why I went to great pains to emphasize that volition is based upon conscious choice.

And I simply say that volition is based on what the "I" causes, not conscious choice per se. There's a virtual entity within my head that I refer to as the "I", and it involves the set of things whose planning elements are generally shared across a bunch of modules.

When I speak of "I" I'm not talking about one's mental representation of their self; I'm referring to the actual subject. The "I" -is- consciousness, and it is from consciousness that choices are made.

AMM: We choose our own actions.

Y2B: No we don't.

AMM: Erm...Who does, then?

Y2B: The "I".

AMM: ...

I think most here would agree that reactions like sneezing, coughing, and hiccups are involuntary -precisely- because they are not consciously chosen and initiated. They happen automatically and the only role volition may play in such responses would be in consciously -choosing- to actively suppress them.

Does volition describe the difference between sneezing and driving a car "automatically"?

You choose the load the behavioral program that -you- conditioned when you first learned to drive every time you decide to take the wheel. Unless you've somehow managed to sleepwalk to your car, unlock the door, turn the ignition and pull out of your driveway, driving is based upon your conscious choice.

 

[Limbo]

Maybe this short BBC vid belongs in this thread?

How to make better decisions

 

[AkuManiMani]

Maybe this short BBC vid belongs in this thread?

How to make better decisions

Thankies!

 

[yy2bggggs]

I already described in post #6 how I think volition (aka, willed action) is initiated from consciousness.

Perhaps you did, but I think you're missing the point here. You never explicitly said: "Volition is X". All you have to say is: "Volition is X". What you said instead was: "This is where volition comes into play", which doesn't tell me what you think volition is.

I need you to be explicit. If you never outright say what volition is, I can't assume that you mean it.

The most valuable part of your response here was actually the parenthetical, because that gives me the "volition is X". None of the going over it again had any value. (Incidentally, post #6 is on the same page, so I know where it is; nevertheless, your link to it is messed up).

I've no choice but to be intimately aware of my own conscious mental processes. Consciousness evaluates the mental information available to it, and then chooses a course of action.

This is speculative, and overreaching. There's information in your mind that you can reflect on and react to. That is information that you are "conscious of". And that's all you really know. But you're completely ruling out something you cannot possibly know from introspection--that this information goes to things you are not aware of, which in turn are involved in deciding. You have this big gap there that you're filling in with indeterminism.

Suppose I show you two different sets of numbers. One is generated by a really good PRNG, with lots of entropy. The other is generated by an RNG. Can you tell me which set is generated by the RNG, and which set is generated by the PRNG?

This isn't merely an analogy. If a part of you that you are not conscious of is involved, then by definition, you're not going to be aware of that part. If that part deterministically selects the choice, through a complicated process, then feeds you the output, it will appear exactly as you described--it will appear as if the choice were only made at that instant, and would appear indeterministic. This would be your PRNG.

So for you to know that this is an RNG, you would have to know that it's not a PRNG. And I dispute that this is possible for you to know via introspection.

The logistical details concerning the neural parsing of sensory information into mental format, or the automatic coordination of motor functions is not directly available to my conscious deliberation, nor does it have to be.

...which is precisely why you can't tell from introspection whether this comes from an RNG in your head or a PRNG in your head.

If I'm consciously formulating and enacting a non-learned behavior then I know that I am improvising said behavior. Unless you somehow know better whats going thru my mind than I do, you've no grounds to argue against this.

No. You know if and only if the information suggests something particular. If you can't distinguish between this being a truly random process, or a pseudo-random process, then there's no way for you to know it's truly random. Now you can formulate all sorts of false ideas, but you can't claim knowledge unless something about the actual truth of the matter influences which idea you formulate--so if you can't distinguish the PRNG from the RNG, you can't claim to have obtained knowledge. This is an epistemic constraint.

Writing new books, designing cars, inventing products, formulating theories, creating art, participating in jam sessions, etc...

RNG or PRNG?

I cannot choose to do something without being aware of that choice. If I'm not cognizant of an action then it is not my choice.

Sure, why not. The choice having been made, it's communicated with other aspects of your self, sufficiently so that you are aware that this choice has been made. Or the other way around. Either way works.

Durrr....When I make the choice?

You agreed with me earlier that there's a global workspace. A choice has been made somewhere--"pick up the apple", let's say. Let's zero in on exactly when this choice is made--the one that seems to be indeterministic to you. Now some signal somewhere in your head actually triggers picking up the apple--this is the signal that starts to go to the part of your brain responsible for reaching for the apple--what's going to actually begin triggering your motor responses. There's also a signal, probably the same one, that tells you that you just decided to reach for the apple. For you to be informed, this signal has to make it to a number of modules in the global workspace.

Now, first question: Do you not agree that these are two different things? That the act of starting to actually lift your arm, and being aware that you're going to lift your arm, is different? That one is the signal going to the specific part of your brain that controls the motor responses, and the other is just generally going to multiple other interested modules? (For example, a module capable of reporting that you've decided to pick up the apple?)

If these are two different events, wouldn't they have an arbitrary ordering in time somehow? One before the other? And is there a particular reason why the becoming aware of the action has to be before the starting to move the arm?

Sure there is. I make a choice whenever I feel like it -- its that simple.

No, it's that oversimplified.

If a potential chain of action has not been formulated it is not determined.

You're begging the question. What do you mean by formulated? My computer is chunking along computing a complicated result--when it's done, it will display the result on the screen. It has not yet formulated the characters it will put on the screen--so does that mean it's indeterminate?

An essay and its contentments are not determined until a writer mentally forms a string of words and chooses to commit them to paper.

I'm looking at my computer, waiting for the result. Is it not determined until I mentally perceive the string of numbers?

Each of those potential products and actions are indeterminate until they are conceived and carried out.

And the computer's results are indeterminate until it spits them out?

These are not by definition indeterminate. These things are indeterminate by fiat.

Then you're essentially disputing my own consciousness. Sorry, but I trust my own direct experience over your assertions.

I'm disputing that given two sequences--one from a very complicated PRNG and another from a RNG--that you can tell the difference through your direct experiences. Absolutely, I'm disputing this. In other words, I'm disputing that you even can directly experience that the process is indeterminate--aka, an RNG as opposed to a PRNG.

When I speak of "I" I'm not talking about one's mental representation of their self; I'm referring to the actual subject.

So am I.

The "I" -is- consciousness, and it is from consciousness that choices are made.

I dispute that. The subject is conscious, not consciousness. In other words, consciousness isn't the subject, it's what the subject is aware of.

AMM: We [consciously] choose our own actions.

Y2B: No we don't.

AMM: Erm...Who does, then?

Then we do.

It's dangerous to put words in my mouth. The same expectations that I have with you--if you don't explicitly say it, I can't assume it--you should extend to me--if I don't explicitly say it, don't assume it. The above conversation doesn't even hint at mimicking what we've been discussing.

You're saying consciously this and consciously that. But you're also claiming that it's indeterminate, and happens when you want to. There's a bit of a hole in your account, and it's in this hole where the interesting stuff happens. And I'm just pointing that out.

Essentially, somewhere in your story, you have "and... poof!" (aka, indeterminism, yet somehow, still caused by you), and that's the part of your story I disagree with.

You choose the load the behavioral program that -you- conditioned when you first learned to drive every time you decide to take the wheel. Unless you've somehow managed to sleepwalk to your car, unlock the door, turn the ignition and pull out of your driveway, driving is based upon your conscious choice.

Okay.

 

[FedUpWithFaith]

Before I argue with you guys I wanted to lay out my own perspective on volition. I purposely didn't read many of your arguments yet (but I will after this) because I didn't want them to bias or filter mine.

But I do think it's worthwhile laying out basic concepts people often try to define volition as:

Volition is choosing what you want to do.
Volition is goal-directed behavior and thought
Volition is conscious goal-directed behavior and thought
Volition is about thinking about what you want to do
Volition is a self-motivation, intention, and (free) will.
Volition is focusing attention on what you want to do.

I think if you ask most people you get some basic definition like these. I think there are a lot of fairly synonymous words in there (motivation, intent, will), many of which don't tell us much about volition. It seems to me that to provide an fundamental definition and explanation for volition we have to understand what choice, goal-direction, and consciousness or attention are. Since consciousness is the bigger bugaboo and volition is probably a necessary part of it as well, i.e., they are mutually explanatory to some degree, I would, for the sake of this discussion, restrict us to determining what aspects of volition are truly conscious and what parts may not be. In this sense, I believe thinking (consciously) about and focussing attention on what we want to do using reason etc. is sufficient for volition but not necessary. For me, it is simply the "highest" form of volition, intuitive goal-setting being the "lowest" offering the lowest level of conscious awareness or attention (though subconscious focus of attention may be very high).

I don't think we can describe or understand volition without carefully considering both the mind and environment (including the societies we live in). Evolutionarily, volition is a principle means (the other being instinct) by which we navigate our environment to optimize our chances of survival and propagation.

Volition must consciously or subconsciously (I'd argue it's most subconsciously) surmise the choices to be made and as many of their degrees of freedom as the brain can, or is "programmed" to handle.

Volition exists only to the extent that choices/options exists in the environment and in states of mind themselves. Those choices include how we can and do consciously and unconsciously focus our attention to choose to reflect upon/remember/draw lessons from the past, act in the present, and plan for the future to the extent our minds can anticipate it.

Our minds are modeling and predictive engines first and foremost that begin by transforming sensory inputs into coding the brain can efficiently process constructively. They model and predict our environment in parallel and virtually simultaneously with many kinds of our own mental states. In this sense, a necessary aspect is that volition always be modeling itself in a self-referential manner (I'd argue this is partly what brings upon consciousness in the first place and not vice-versa).

What is "modeling", "attention", "choice" and "goal-direction" then in neural terms? To address that I have to take a digression to discuss brain processing.

I and many neuroscientists and biophysicsts model neural processing as an energy landscape generated from the connections of neural networks. Multiple interconnected energy landscapes, in turn, attempt to model both the environment and the mind. This much is consistent with what science knows. Beyond this, it is still an open question as to whether additional neural landscapes are needed and used to analyze and derive solutions from all these connected landscapes or whether there are self-referential, holographic-like processes that enable the interconnection of landscapes to do this themselves. There is evidence to suggest both types of processes occur in the brain.

You can think of this landscape just like the peaks and valleys found in nature. The global or "best" solution to a particular goal-directed outcome is the deepest part(s) of the deepest valley. It's the "global minimum/minima". It is unclear at present if the brain has processes we don't of guaranteeing that it can find global minima. Our best ANNs utilize stochastic processes, as we know the brain does, to optimize the finding of global minima but it does not guarantee them. The brain probably can't either. If true, our brains, like our ANNs, often get stuck in "local minima" which are depressions or valleys at higher plateaus. For example, a deep well at the top of a tall mountain that is not deep enough to meet the lowest valley is a local minimal. Local minima can yield good solutions but they are never optimal. Of course, again, environment is critical. I would argue that if you want to solve the famous traveling saleman problem there is no way to chart the global minima. All you have are local minima.

Now, to get back to choice and goal-setting. The quality of choice and the degrees of freedom we have to make them is first constrained by the model of choice landscape our brains can perceptually and stochastically construct. I'd argue that creatures that encounter the same "choice" models/landscapes critical to survival repeatedly over generations with approximately the same optimal (or sub-optimal) solution develop instinct for that particular choice landscape. Goal-direction transforms to a simple look-up table-like neural assembly. That saves on processing and insures a good outcome fast that conscious "thinking about goals" doesn't.

Goal direction must reflect both perceptual and mental choice landscapes and how we optimize global and local minima across them. What is the goal? It's a process or path we need to optimize or a state we need to reach for optimal consilience between our models of past, present, and future. If the goal is to properly swing a tennis racket to hit balls back we are trying to consciously learn a behavior at first that becomes effortless (and unconscious) once we've mastered it. Afterward, such volition is subconscious even if the goal of wanting to play tennis in the first place isn't. much of our volition isn't conscious. Even if you're proving the most difficult math problem, you're effortlessly choosing and writing mathematical symbols and taking for granted concepts you mastered earlier.

Goal direction, in my view, becomes the means by which neural processing seeks an optimal path through the choice model/landscape. Some of these means require thinking and reasoning itself, the sub-processes of which have their own modeled landscapes and are highly conscious. Some means are "quick and dirty" and relatively subconscious except at presentation. We call this intuition.

Well, I have to go now so I gotta cut this short - LOL. Hope you found it interesting enough to read through all this mess.

 

[AkuManiMani]

I already described in post #6 how I think volition (aka, willed action) is initiated from consciousness.

Perhaps you did, but I think you're missing the point here. You never explicitly said: "Volition is X". All you have to say is: "Volition is X". What you said instead was: "This is where volition comes into play", which doesn't tell me what you think volition is.

I need you to be explicit. If you never outright say what volition is, I can't assume that you mean it.

Volition is conscious desire in action.

I've no choice but to be intimately aware of my own conscious mental processes. Consciousness evaluates the mental information available to it, and then chooses a course of action.

This is speculative, and overreaching. There's information in your mind that you can reflect on and react to. That is information that you are "conscious of". And that's all you really know. But you're completely ruling out something you cannot possibly know from introspection--that this information goes to things you are not aware of, which in turn are involved in deciding. You have this big gap there that you're filling in with indeterminism.

Suppose I show you two different sets of numbers. One is generated by a really good PRNG, with lots of entropy. The other is generated by an RNG. Can you tell me which set is generated by the RNG, and which set is generated by the PRNG?

If one is in a foul mood, then information present within their awareness is more likely to be interpreted negatively and potentially bias the subject's subsequent choices toward aggressive acts. The source of the subject's emotional disposition may originate from outside their conscious mental processing, but the choice of response must still be determined by a conscious decision. Until such decision is made the action the subject will take cannot be determined with any certainty -- hence the indeterminacy of conscious choice. One cannot deterministically predict what choice an individual will make. If you have evidence to the contrary please present it.

This isn't merely an analogy. If a part of you that you are not conscious of is involved, then by definition, you're not going to be aware of that part. If that part deterministically selects the choice, through a complicated process, then feeds you the output, it will appear exactly as you described--it will appear as if the choice were only made at that instant, and would appear indeterministic. This would be your PRNG.

Then what, pray tell, is the point of conscious deliberation if the same decisions can be made without it? Why not discard consciousness altogether and just have all those "complicated processes" govern the actions of an organism?

So for you to know that this is an RNG, you would have to know that it's not a PRNG. And I dispute that this is possible for you to know via introspection.

All I know is that, until I make a conscious choice, my actions cannot be predicted with certainty. Whether or not you want to assign those choices numerical values and call them "random" or "pseudo-random" is your own affair but, as far as I'm concerned, the onus is on you to establish that they are determinate.

The logistical details concerning the neural parsing of sensory information into mental format, or the automatic coordination of motor functions is not directly available to my conscious deliberation, nor does it have to be.

...which is precisely why you can't tell from introspection whether this comes from an RNG in your head or a PRNG in your head.

If I'm consciously formulating and enacting a non-learned behavior then I know that I am improvising said behavior. Unless you somehow know better whats going thru my mind than I do, you've no grounds to argue against this.

No. You know if and only if the information suggests something particular. If you can't distinguish between this being a truly random process, or a pseudo-random process, then there's no way for you to know it's truly random. Now you can formulate all sorts of false ideas, but you can't claim knowledge unless something about the actual truth of the matter influences which idea you formulate--so if you can't distinguish the PRNG from the RNG, you can't claim to have obtained knowledge. This is an epistemic constraint.

I'm always informed of my own conscious thought process and choices and my actions are always directed by my will. If you're a hapless spectator with no conscious control over your own actions, thats your affair. But don't presume to lecture me about what I am, and am not aware of concerning my own thought processes. If I tell you that I KNOW that I consciously direct my behavior you've no epistemic grounds whatsoever to dispute it.

Writing new books, designing cars, inventing products, formulating theories, creating art, participating in jam sessions, etc...

RNG or PRNG?

Tell you what: Assign a numerical value to each and every possible action an individual can make, observe their behavior, crunch the numbers and then come back and well me whether or not they're "random" or "pseudo random".

I cannot choose to do something without being aware of that choice. If I'm not cognizant of an action then it is not my choice.

Sure, why not. The choice having been made, it's communicated with other aspects of your self, sufficiently so that you are aware that this choice has been made. Or the other way around. Either way works.

So when are you not aware of your choice to post on the JREF forum?

Durrr....When I make the choice?

You agreed with me earlier that there's a global workspace. A choice has been made somewhere--"pick up the apple", let's say. Let's zero in on exactly when this choice is made--the one that seems to be indeterministic to you. Now some signal somewhere in your head actually triggers picking up the apple--this is the signal that starts to go to the part of your brain responsible for reaching for the apple--what's going to actually begin triggering your motor responses. There's also a signal, probably the same one, that tells you that you just decided to reach for the apple. For you to be informed, this signal has to make it to a number of modules in the global workspace.

Now, first question: Do you not agree that these are two different things? That the act of starting to actually lift your arm, and being aware that you're going to lift your arm, is different? That one is the signal going to the specific part of your brain that controls the motor responses, and the other is just generally going to multiple other interested modules? (For example, a module capable of reporting that you've decided to pick up the apple?)

Lets make this simple, Y2b. If your body performs an action you're not aware of then you did not choose it.

If these are two different events, wouldn't they have an arbitrary ordering in time somehow? One before the other? And is there a particular reason why the becoming aware of the action has to be before the starting to move the arm?

If you're having a convulsion or sleepwalking then you may not have any awareness at all of moving your arm. But in those instances you really couldn't be said to be voluntarily moving your arm. You're really rounding the fence to avoid the obvious here, Y2...

Sure there is. I make a choice whenever I feel like it -- its that simple.

No, it's that oversimplified.

Wait, wait, wait... Are you saying I don't choose at my own discretion?

If a potential chain of action has not been formulated it is not determined.

You're begging the question. What do you mean by formulated? My computer is chunking along computing a complicated result--when it's done, it will display the result on the screen. It has not yet formulated the characters it will put on the screen--so does that mean it's indeterminate?

The results the computer will produce can be predicted to an arbitrary degree of accuracy. The choices of a conscious subject cannot be. If you know of some means to do so please share it.

An essay and its contentments are not determined until a writer mentally forms a string of words and chooses to commit them to paper.

I'm looking at my computer, waiting for the result. Is it not determined until I mentally perceive the string of numbers?

Each of those potential products and actions are indeterminate until they are conceived and carried out.

And the computer's results are indeterminate until it spits them out?

Its determined once some outside agency [usually a user or admin] enters a particular input.

These are not by definition indeterminate. These things are indeterminate by fiat.

Would you be willing to argue that its possible for one to predict, to an arbitrary degree of accuracy, what a person will do? If so, what evidence do you have that this is the case?

Then you're essentially disputing my own consciousness. Sorry, but I trust my own direct experience over your assertions.

I'm disputing that given two sequences--one from a very complicated PRNG and another from a RNG--that you can tell the difference through your direct experiences. Absolutely, I'm disputing this. In other words, I'm disputing that you even can directly experience that the process is indeterminate--aka, an RNG as opposed to a PRNG.

As far as you're concerned I might as well be an "RNG".

When I speak of "I" I'm not talking about one's mental representation of their self; I'm referring to the actual subject.

So am I.

The "I" -is- consciousness, and it is from consciousness that choices are made.

I dispute that. The subject is conscious, not consciousness. In other words, consciousness isn't the subject, it's what the subject is aware of.

Nears I can tell, there is no "I" absent consciousness. To be unconscious is to be absent. To be dead is to be absent permanently.

You're saying consciously this and consciously that. But you're also claiming that it's indeterminate, and happens when you want to. There's a bit of a hole in your account, and it's in this hole where the interesting stuff happens. And I'm just pointing that out.

Yes, its very interesting that I can act on a whim.

Essentially, somewhere in your story, you have "and... poof!" (aka, indeterminism, yet somehow, still caused by you), and that's the part of your story I disagree with.

I'm sorry to tell you but "and...poof" is a feature of reality, whether you like it or not.

 

[AkuManiMani]

Volition is choosing what you want to do.
Volition is goal-directed behavior and thought
Volition is conscious goal-directed behavior and thought
Volition is about thinking about what you want to do
Volition is a self-motivation, intention, and (free) will.
Volition is focusing attention on what you want to do.

I think if you ask most people you get some basic definition like these. I think there are a lot of fairly synonymous words in there (motivation, intent, will), many of which don't tell us much about volition. It seems to me that to provide an fundamental definition and explanation for volition we have to understand what choice, goal-direction, and consciousness or attention are. Since consciousness is the bigger bugaboo and volition is probably a necessary part of it as well, i.e., they are mutually explanatory to some degree, I would, for the sake of this discussion, restrict us to determining what aspects of volition are truly conscious and what parts may not be. In this sense, I believe thinking (consciously) about and focussing attention on what we want to do using reason etc. is sufficient for volition but not necessary. For me, it is simply the "highest" form of volition, intuitive goal-setting being the "lowest" offering the lowest level of conscious awareness or attention (though subconscious focus of attention may be very high).

I think thats a pretty good description. The simplest expression of volition is subjective valency [desire, aversion, ambivalence, etc.] toward some mental object [which necessarily must involve attention/awareness]. Higher order functions, like goal setting and strategy, are just elaborations of this.

I don't think we can describe or understand volition without carefully considering both the mind and environment (including the societies we live in). Evolutionarily, volition is a principle means (the other being instinct) by which we navigate our environment to optimize our chances of survival and propagation.

Volition must consciously or subconsciously (I'd argue it's most subconsciously) surmise the choices to be made and as many of their degrees of freedom as the brain can, or is "programmed" to handle.

Hmm...I think that subconscious dispositions, like habits and conditioned impulses, are residual products of volition. Volition itself would be the conscious generation of impulses. The force of one's volition is what we colloquially call will. The stronger a subject's will, the more readily they can override or modify subconscious impulses.

Volition exists only to the extent that choices/options exists in the environment and in states of mind themselves. Those choices include how we can and do consciously and unconsciously focus our attention to choose to reflect upon/remember/draw lessons from the past, act in the present, and plan for the future to the extent our minds can anticipate it.

Our minds are modeling and predictive engines first and foremost that begin by transforming sensory inputs into coding the brain can efficiently process constructively. They model and predict our environment in parallel and virtually simultaneously with many kinds of our own mental states. In this sense, a necessary aspect is that volition always be modeling itself in a self-referential manner (I'd argue this is partly what brings upon consciousness in the first place and not vice-versa).

What is "modeling", "attention", "choice" and "goal-direction" then in neural terms? To address that I have to take a digression to discuss brain processing.

I and many neuroscientists and biophysicsts model neural processing as an energy landscape generated from the connections of neural networks. Multiple interconnected energy landscapes, in turn, attempt to model both the environment and the mind. This much is consistent with what science knows. Beyond this, it is still an open question as to whether additional neural landscapes are needed and used to analyze and derive solutions from all these connected landscapes or whether there are self-referential, holographic-like processes that enable the interconnection of landscapes to do this themselves. There is evidence to suggest both types of processes occur in the brain.

You can think of this landscape just like the peaks and valleys found in nature. The global or "best" solution to a particular goal-directed outcome is the deepest part(s) of the deepest valley. It's the "global minimum/minima". It is unclear at present if the brain has processes we don't of guaranteeing that it can find global minima. Our best ANNs utilize stochastic processes, as we know the brain does, to optimize the finding of global minima but it does not guarantee them. The brain probably can't either. If true, our brains, like our ANNs, often get stuck in "local minima" which are depressions or valleys at higher plateaus. For example, a deep well at the top of a tall mountain that is not deep enough to meet the lowest valley is a local minimal. Local minima can yield good solutions but they are never optimal. Of course, again, environment is critical. I would argue that if you want to solve the famous traveling saleman problem there is no way to chart the global minima. All you have are local minima.

Now, to get back to choice and goal-setting. The quality of choice and the degrees of freedom we have to make them is first constrained by the model of choice landscape our brains can perceptually and stochastically construct. I'd argue that creatures that encounter the same "choice" models/landscapes critical to survival repeatedly over generations with approximately the same optimal (or sub-optimal) solution develop instinct for that particular choice landscape. Goal-direction transforms to a simple look-up table-like neural assembly. That saves on processing and insures a good outcome fast that conscious "thinking about goals" doesn't.

Goal direction must reflect both perceptual and mental choice landscapes and how we optimize global and local minima across them. What is the goal? It's a process or path we need to optimize or a state we need to reach for optimal consilience between our models of past, present, and future. If the goal is to properly swing a tennis racket to hit balls back we are trying to consciously learn a behavior at first that becomes effortless (and unconscious) once we've mastered it. Afterward, such volition is subconscious even if the goal of wanting to play tennis in the first place isn't. much of our volition isn't conscious. Even if you're proving the most difficult math problem, you're effortlessly choosing and writing mathematical symbols and taking for granted concepts you mastered earlier.

Goal direction, in my view, becomes the means by which neural processing seeks an optimal path through the choice model/landscape. Some of these means require thinking and reasoning itself, the sub-processes of which have their own modeled landscapes and are highly conscious. Some means are "quick and dirty" and relatively subconscious except at presentation. We call this intuition.

Well, I have to go now so I gotta cut this short - LOL. Hope you found it interesting enough to read through all this mess.

Aside from a few minor points, you view of volition fits remarkably well with mine -- though you bring more technical knowledge to bear. This post was definitely an interesting read

 

[FedUpWithFaith]

Hmm...I think that that subconscious dispositions, like habits and conditioned impulses, are residual products of volition.

Yes, excellent point. I view them, in part, as volitional neural pathways subject to repeated, virtually identical I/O whose neural connection weights become so uniform/rigid and concomitantly lose stochastic adaptability that volition is curbed or even eradicated. For me, at least, I experience different habits with different levels of consciousness and some are completely subconscious. Those are the hardest to change. You have to "retrain" the rigid connection weights and at least temporarily render them stochasitcally adaptive again until a new habit is formed to replace it (if desired).

Volition itself would be the conscious generation of impulses. The force of one's volition is what we colloquially call will. The stronger a subject's will, the more readily they can override or modify subconscious impulses.

I disagree but that partly depends on your definition of consciousness. In my other posts at JREF you have probably gathered that I believe that many states/processes defined as conscious aren't. We may only differ on semantics. I would say that subconscious habit/conditioned impulses are no longer volitional because there is no real choice involved any longer - just pure goal direction along a well-worn path.

However, I would argue that many of the word choices you made in writing your response to me were both volitional and subconscious. You just don't realize how you subconscious was modeling, weighing, and optimizing the choices - the point being that there were still choices and goals being processed. At a minimum, I hope you will agree that your subconscious does a lot of heavy lifting in preprocessing volition, at least, even if your definition of volition is set semantically so that it must be conscious.

 

[AkuManiMani]

I think at this point it would probably be helpful if I added to my earlier list of terminology:

Volition: The process of conscious exertion.

Intention: The orientation of one's volition toward an objective(s).

Motivation: The emotional 'voltage' of an intention.

Will: The power of conscious exertion toward an objective(s).

Hopefully that we help qualify what I'm saying and avoid potential confusing in my usage of terms here

Hmm...I think that that subconscious dispositions, like habits and conditioned impulses, are residual products of volition.

Yes, excellent point. I view them, in part, as volitional neural pathways subject to repeated, virtually identical I/O whose neural connection weights become so uniform/rigid and concomitantly lose stochastic adaptability that volition is curbed or even eradicated. For me, at least, I experience different habits with different levels of consciousness and some are completely subconscious. Those are the hardest to change. You have to "retrain" the rigid connection weights and at least temporarily render them stochasitcally adaptive again until a new habit is formed to replace it (if desired).

Volition itself would be the conscious generation of impulses. The force of one's volition is what we colloquially call will. The stronger a subject's will, the more readily they can override or modify subconscious impulses.

I disagree but that partly depends on your definition of consciousness. In my other posts at JREF you have probably gathered that I believe that many states/processes defined as conscious aren't. We may only differ on semantics.

I've also taken the view that consciousness is the experiencing subject.

I would say that subconscious habit/conditioned impulses are no longer volitional because there is no real choice involved any longer - just pure goal direction along a well-worn path.

Hmm... It would seem that volition is necessarily proactive while subconscious mental processes are reactive. The vast majority of an individual's mental landscape comprises of unconscious processing and dispositions that react predictably and automatically to external and internal stimuli. On the other hand, even tho volition makes up a relatively small percentage of mental processes it has the ability to actively modify the mental landscape; even mere awareness is sufficient to leave memory traces.

Volitional behaviors that are repeated often would tend to wear behavioral 'channels' into the mind -- what we call habits. The more often they are used the less conscious effort one needs to expend in order to carry out that particular behavioral pattern. If a habit is worn deeply enough it may even require a greater exertion of conscious effort to break out of it. The stronger an individual's will, the more easily they can manipulate their mental landscape.

However, I would argue that many of the word choices you made in writing your response to me were both volitional and subconscious. You just don't realize how you subconscious was modeling, weighing, and optimizing the choices - the point being that there were still choices and goals being processed. At a minimum, I hope you will agree that your subconscious does a lot of heavy lifting in preprocessing volition, at least, even if your definition of volition is set semantically so that it must be conscious.

Actually, I do agree. I think that once we internalize a skill set they are relegated to subconscious processing. They can then be loaded like software apps in accordance with our intentions.

For instance, my language and typing skills had to be consciously learned and a great deal focused awareness had to be directed towards the learning process. Now that I've completely internalized those skills, they are routine and automatic. But even tho I can now utilize them with hardly any conscious effort, my volition still directs their usage.

 

[yy2bggggs]

If one is in a foul mood, then information present within their awareness is more likely to be interpreted negatively and potentially bias the subject's subsequent choices toward aggressive acts. The source of the subject's emotional disposition may originate from outside their conscious mental processing, but the choice of response must still be determined by a conscious decision. Until such decision is made the action the subject will take cannot be determined with any certainty -- hence the indeterminacy of conscious choice. One cannot deterministically predict what choice an individual will make. If you have evidence to the contrary please present it.

We're going to go in circles, but okay. Let's start with epistemology. What are the requirements to say that you know X?

Here's what I think they are:

1. X has to be a statement
2. X has to be true
3. You have to believe X
4. Your belief must be justified
5. The truth of X has to specifically, causally, lead to your belief

I don't just hold these requirements when I happen to be debating epistemology. I hold them all of the time. If you're going to claim you know X, this means all of the above conditions must be met. When applied to your ability to introspectively know that your consciousness is indeterminate, I simply don't believe you can meet condition 5. I also note that in all of this appeal to ridicule, you forgot to actually address whether or not you can tell the difference between an RNG and a PRNG.

Then what, pray tell, is the point of conscious deliberation if the same decisions can be made without it? Why not discard consciousness altogether and just have all those "complicated processes" govern the actions of an organism?

I never said they can be made without it. I said they aren't consciously made.

All I know is that, until I make a conscious choice, my actions cannot be predicted with certainty. Whether or not you want to assign those choices numerical values and call them "random" or "pseudo-random" is your own affair but, as far as I'm concerned, the onus is on you to establish that they are determinate.

This sounds like shifting the burden of proof to me. I'm asking you how you can tell that it's deterministic--you're coming back with, essentially, a just-so argument, and a "prove it's not" response... everything but an answer to how you can tell the difference.

Lacking a response telling me how you can tell the difference, I'm simply forced to remain with my default position--which is to doubt that you can.

I'm always informed of my own conscious thought process and choices and my actions are always directed by my will. If you're a hapless spectator with no conscious control over your own actions, thats your affair. But don't presume to lecture me about what I am, and am not aware of concerning my own thought processes. If I tell you that I KNOW that I consciously direct my behavior you've no epistemic grounds whatsoever to dispute it.

This is full of emotional content, yet lacking in the answer to the question of how you can tell the difference.

Tell you what: Assign a numerical value to each and every possible action an individual can make, observe their behavior, crunch the numbers and then come back and well me whether or not they're "random" or "pseudo random".

Shifting the burden of proof.

So when are you not aware of your choice to post on the JREF forum?

I don't know. I'm not generally aware of what I'm aware of until I'm aware of it.

Lets make this simple, Y2b. If your body performs an action you're not aware of then you did not choose it.

Why do you insist on making it "simple"? This is another set of points you didn't address.

If you're having a convulsion or sleepwalking then you may not have any awareness at all of moving your arm. But in those instances you really couldn't be said to be voluntarily moving your arm. You're really rounding the fence to avoid the obvious here, Y2...

You forgot to answer the questions.

There's no particular reason for any particular timing.

Sure there is. I make a choice whenever I feel like it -- its that simple.

No, it's that oversimplified.

Wait, wait, wait... Are you saying I don't choose at my own discretion?

No. I was saying there's no particular reason for any particular timing--and that you were oversimplifying things. By that I mean specifically that you are not even bothering to address the analysis. It seems you're still doing this. That's fine... I'll just call you out on it again.

The results the computer will produce can be predicted to an arbitrary degree of accuracy. The choices of a conscious subject cannot be. If you know of some means to do so please share it.

You're repeating this form of statement. "X is true. If you think it's false, please demonstrate that it's false."

But if you say "X is true", then I want to know how you know it's true. I'm uninterested in demonstrating that it's false, but that doesn't oblige me to accept that your claim that it's true holds any legitimacy.

Its determined once some outside agency [usually a user or admin] enters a particular input.

Okay, then we're on the same page... we really are talking about the same sort of indeterminacy.

But in both the computer's case when performing a long computation, and my case when I make decisions; I'm only aware of the result when it's presented to me, and I perceive what it is. And by introspection, all I can possibly know about is what I'm aware of. Because of this, I doubt that I have the capability to distinguish between a choice being made by a deterministic part of me that I'm simply not aware of the details of, and its being made by an indeterministic part of me.

Are you saying that you're better than I am? If so, I'd like to learn how to be better. Please teach me.

Would you be willing to argue that its possible for one to predict, to an arbitrary degree of accuracy, what a person will do? If so, what evidence do you have that this is the case?

No, not really. I believe it's possible to predict what a person would do to an arbitrary degree of accuracy, primarily, because that's the opinion that the experts in cognitive science hold, and I've no reason to believe they are wrong. I wouldn't be shocked if it were shown that indeterminacy did sneak in somewhere, though, nor do I really emotionally require only determinacy for one reason or the other.

But I will argue, do argue, and am arguing, that you cannot possibly know that it's impossible to predict what a person will do by introspection. And it would be nice if you could actually address that argument--by simply stating how you can tell the difference between a PRNG and an RNG.

As far as you're concerned I might as well be an "RNG".

Even if you were, though, you wouldn't be able to know you were. Even if you were and claimed that you were, you wouldn't know you were an RNG via introspection (ob ref to Gettier Problem again). Somehow, the random nature of the thing in itself has to cause you to believe that it has random nature, and I think anything an RNG can cause you to believe by introspection, a PRNG would equally suit.

Given the complexity of our brains, it's not even a leap to presume that the PRNG is what's at work.

Nears I can tell, there is no "I" absent consciousness. To be unconscious is to be absent. To be dead is to be absent permanently.

But this is insufficient to establish that the "I" is consciousness in itself.

Yes, its very interesting that I can act on a whim.

Sure... why not.

Essentially, somewhere in your story, you have "and... poof!" (aka, indeterminism, yet somehow, still caused by you), and that's the part of your story I disagree with.

I'm sorry to tell you but "and...poof" is a feature of reality, whether you like it or not.

Your response failed to address what you responded to.

 

[AkuManiMani]

If one is in a foul mood, then information present within their awareness is more likely to be interpreted negatively and potentially bias the subject's subsequent choices toward aggressive acts. The source of the subject's emotional disposition may originate from outside their conscious mental processing, but the choice of response must still be determined by a conscious decision. Until such decision is made the action the subject will take cannot be determined with any certainty -- hence the indeterminacy of conscious choice. One cannot deterministically predict what choice an individual will make. If you have evidence to the contrary please present it.

We're going to go in circles, but okay. Let's start with epistemology. What are the requirements to say that you know X?

Here's what I think they are:

1. X has to be a statement
2. X has to be true
3. You have to believe X
4. Your belief must be justified
5. The truth of X has to specifically, causally, lead to your belief

I don't just hold these requirements when I happen to be debating epistemology. I hold them all of the time. If you're going to claim you know X, this means all of the above conditions must be met. When applied to your ability to introspectively know that your consciousness is indeterminate, I simply don't believe you can meet condition 5. I also note that in all of this appeal to ridicule, you forgot to actually address whether or not you can tell the difference between an RNG and a PRNG.

Yy2bggggs, do you have some statistical method at your disposal for determining whether or not a string of numbers is randomly generated? Because, if you do, we can end this pointless quibbling right now with an empirical test.

If you're up to the challenge, I will post a string of numbers and you can test whether they are random or psuedo-random.

Then what, pray tell, is the point of conscious deliberation if the same decisions can be made without it? Why not discard consciousness altogether and just have all those "complicated processes" govern the actions of an organism?

I never said they can be made without it. I said they aren't consciously made.

Hold the phone. So now you're saying our choices cannot be made without consciousness, and yet, they are not consciously made. From this one can either conclude that:

.A. - Consciousness is an essential catalyst of decision making, in which case, it still produces choices that otherwise could not have been made.

or...

.B. - "Choices" are generated subconsciously as impulses of which consciousness has control over how -- or if -- they are expressed.

In either case, consciousness is a determining factor in the decision making process; consciousness still chooses.

All I know is that, until I make a conscious choice, my actions cannot be predicted with certainty. Whether or not you want to assign those choices numerical values and call them "random" or "pseudo-random" is your own affair but, as far as I'm concerned, the onus is on you to establish that they are determinate.

This sounds like shifting the burden of proof to me. I'm asking you how you can tell that it's deterministic--you're coming back with, essentially, a just-so argument, and a "prove it's not" response... everything but an answer to how you can tell the difference.

Lacking a response telling me how you can tell the difference, I'm simply forced to remain with my default position--which is to doubt that you can.

The challenge still stands. You're trying to convince -me- that my behavior is deterministic despite my introspection to the contrary; so as far as I'm concerned the onus is, and always has been, on you. If you really believe that my choices are deterministic put you money where your mouth is: Do you have some kind of quantitative test? Lets settle this.

I'm always informed of my own conscious thought process and choices and my actions are always directed by my will. If you're a hapless spectator with no conscious control over your own actions, thats your affair. But don't presume to lecture me about what I am, and am not aware of concerning my own thought processes. If I tell you that I KNOW that I consciously direct my behavior you've no epistemic grounds whatsoever to dispute it.

This is full of emotional content, yet lacking in the answer to the question of how you can tell the difference.

Because I am intimately aware of my own behavioral capabilities and know, with absolute certainty, that I can behave arbitrarily.

Tell you what: Assign a numerical value to each and every possible action an individual can make, observe their behavior, crunch the numbers and then come back and well me whether or not they're "random" or "pseudo random".

Shifting the burden of proof.

I've just offered my self as a test subject. Put your money where your where your mouth is or concede.

So when are you not aware of your choice to post on the JREF forum?

I don't know. I'm not generally aware of what I'm aware of until I'm aware of it.

Good grief! Could you tap dance a lil' more?

I'll rephrase the question: Have you ever participated in a JREF discussion without a conscious decision to do so?

Lets make this simple, Y2b. If your body performs an action you're not aware of then you did not choose it.

Why do you insist on making it "simple"? This is another set of points you didn't address.

Because I prefer to cut to the chase rather than indulge in obfuscation and bullartistry.

If you're having a convulsion or sleepwalking then you may not have any awareness at all of moving your arm. But in those instances you really couldn't be said to be voluntarily moving your arm. You're really rounding the fence to avoid the obvious here, Y2...

You forgot to answer the questions.

If you'd care to use your powers of deduction you can clearly see that I just did. The conscious decision to perform an action precipitates the action -- hence the act is volitional. If there is no conscious component it is not a volitional act -- i.e. it is involuntary.