Terrorists "experimenting"?

[Pardalis]

If find this most unsettling, it's been the second time now this has happenned in a few days.

http://edition.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/meast/02/21/iraq.main/index.html

The terrorists, or is it just the insurgents (hard to tell the difference anymore) seem to be using different techniques of attacks. These don't seem to cause too much damage yet, which makes me wonder if these are "experiments"...

 

[Bikewer]

It's been noted that Iraq is a wonderful training ground for the various Al Qaeda types running around there.... A fellow hitting the talk-radio circuiit has a new book out showing how vulnerable much of the US infrastructure is to this sort of thing.
Not an encouraging sign.

 

[Garrette]

I"ve not read the book Bikewer mentions, but it would be silly to assume that those we are fighting are not trying new tactics and techniques. Our foes may not have the same technology or hardware, but they do have the same brains and with them the same ingenuity.

 

[Ziggurat]

Sure, they're experimenting. And it isn't really working. Note your story: chlorine gas truck kills 2 people, while a conventional suicide bombing kills 13. That's very inefficient, and the efficiency isn't likely to improve (if they keep doing it to try to hone their skills with chlorine gas, people will adapt to their attack methods faster than they can improve).

Here's an interesting question: why would the insurgents start experimenting with unproven, inefficient, and difficult methods of attack now, after all this time?

 

[Garrette]

Sure, they're experimenting. And it isn't really working. Note your story: chlorine gas truck kills 2 people, while a conventional suicide bombing kills 13. That's very inefficient, and the efficiency isn't likely to improve (if they keep doing it to try to hone their skills with chlorine gas, people will adapt to their attack methods faster than they can improve).

I'm not sure I buy this, but even if you're right, they can simply abandon the method as a failed one. That will not mean that they have failed in general; it will only mean they are adaptable.

Of course, we mustn't fall into the trap of judging success by our own standards. They would, of course, love to pull off a coup in which several hundred US troops were killed, but pure numbers are secondary to the mere fact of having been able to pull off the act.

Here's an interesting question: why would the insurgents start experimenting with unproven, inefficient, and difficult methods of attack now, after all this time?

I suspect you will suggest it is because their current methods aren't working. There may be some merit to that, but it is just as likely, or more so, that they are trying to find new ways to add to their success.

 

[fishbob]

Sure, they're experimenting. And it isn't really working. Note your story: chlorine gas truck kills 2 people, while a conventional suicide bombing kills 13. That's very inefficient, and the efficiency isn't likely to improve (if they keep doing it to try to hone their skills with chlorine gas, people will adapt to their attack methods faster than they can improve).

First try with gas kills 2, while 497th conventional attack kills 13? Efficiency is not likely to improve?
What planet are you from?

This is one more tool in their arsenal. Now they have the capability to select gas attack for the appropriate target.

PS: Efficiency is not likely to improve? They seem to be getting better at downing helicopters.

 

[firecoins]

It's been noted that Iraq is a wonderful training ground for the various Al Qaeda types running around there.... A fellow hitting the talk-radio circuiit has a new book out showing how vulnerable much of the US infrastructure is to this sort of thing.
Not an encouraging sign.

All infastructure is vunerable to something bad. It wouldn't be vunerable if we lived in a police state.

 

[steverino]

Sure, they're experimenting. And it isn't really working. Note your story: chlorine gas truck kills 2 people, while a conventional suicide bombing kills 13. That's very inefficient, and the efficiency isn't likely to improve (if they keep doing it to try to hone their skills with chlorine gas, people will adapt to their attack methods faster than they can improve).

Here's an interesting question: why would the insurgents start experimenting with unproven, inefficient, and difficult methods of attack now, after all this time?

They are currently disorganized, but if we pull out now, they will soon be visiting us here in the States in our shopping malls and sports stadiums with their inefficient attacks.

 

[Ziggurat]

I'm not sure I buy this, but even if you're right, they can simply abandon the method as a failed one. That will not mean that they have failed in general; it will only mean they are adaptable.

Sure, but in pretty much any war you have to contend with foes who will continually adapt, unless you've invaded the nation of mouth-breathing short-bus riders.

I suspect you will suggest it is because their current methods aren't working. There may be some merit to that, but it is just as likely, or more so, that they are trying to find new ways to add to their success.

Yes, in principle they could be experimenting to build on their successes, but why weren't they doing that earlier? Experimentation always involves risks, and they weren't willing to take those risks before, so what's changed? If they're succeeding, why mess with a proven strategy?

 

[Ziggurat]

First try with gas kills 2, while 497th conventional attack kills 13? Efficiency is not likely to improve?
What planet are you from?

Gas is difficult to disperse effectively. That's why even during its most prolific use in wartime (WWI), its effectiveness was more psychological than anything else. It's NEVER been an efficient killer, and it's much easier to protect against than explosives. And simply scaling up the amount used is harder to do (and less effective) than scaling up conventional explosives. The more they use chlorine gas attacks, the more people are going to learn how to respond to them, and since it's such an inefficient killer to begin with, the terrorists are not going to make any real advances in their capabilities in that regard.

This is one more tool in their arsenal. Now they have the capability to select gas attack for the appropriate target.

They used chlorine gas. The didn't use sarin. And frankly, exploding a tanker full of petrol (let alone a fertilizer truck bomb) would probably have done more damage. Except for possible psychological impact due to novelty (which wears off the more you use the weapon), there IS no target for which chlorine gas is a better weapon than conventional explosives.

PS: Efficiency is not likely to improve? They seem to be getting better at downing helicopters.

Now you're conflating two different issues (efficiency with gas attacks and attacks on helicopters). And actually, no, they haven't gotten better at downing helicopters.
http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htairfo/articles/20070219.aspx
"Actually, aircraft losses to ground fire have been declining every year, since 2003, mainly because of good defensive tactics. Moreover, the most vulnerable aircraft, helicopters, have been spending more time in the air, providing more targets. In 2005, U.S. Army aircraft (mainly helicopters) flew 240,000 hours over Iraq. That increased to 334,000 hours last year, and is expected to go to 400,000 hours in 2007. The more time helicopters are in the air, the more opportunities someone has to shoot at them."

 

[fishbob]

I don't see how you could have accidentally missed this part in your reference:

Seven helicopters have crashed in Iraq in the last four weeks. Most appear to have been hit by hostile fire.

Also must have missed this, on Feb 4:
source

U.S. pilots are changing tactics and procedures after four helicopters crashed in the last two weeks, the chief military spokesman said Sunday, acknowledging for the first time that the aircraft were lost to hostile fire.
. . . . . .

Maj. Gen. William Caldwell told reporters that the investigations into the crashes of three Army and one private helicopters were incomplete but "it does appear they were all the result of some kind of anti-Iraqi ground fire that did bring those helicopters down."

And this one: Iraq Helicopter Losses

The head of the army's aviation center has reported separately that insurgents are now using a new "aerial" improvised explosive device (IED) designed to shoot 15 meters (50 feet) into the air and explode under a low-flying helicopter, the weekly Defense News reported.

That darn reality seems to keep messing up your perfectly good opinions.

 

[Garrette]

fishbob, I suspect Ziggurat was implying that helicopter losses to hostile fire have gone done in relation to the total amount of flying hours. I don't know if that actually is what he's implying, but it seems to be. Nor do I know if it's true as the data needed to determine it aren't in the links.

 

[Garrette]

Sure, but in pretty much any war you have to contend with foes who will continually adapt, unless you've invaded the nation of mouth-breathing short-bus riders.

Yes. That is in line with my point.

Yes, in principle they could be experimenting to build on their successes, but why weren't they doing that earlier? Experimentation always involves risks, and they weren't willing to take those risks before, so what's changed? If they're succeeding, why mess with a proven strategy?

There are many possible answers to this, and I find it difficult to believe that you cannot conceive of them.

One possible reason is (as you implied, I think) that the other methods aren't working.

Other possible reasons include:

• They didn't have easy access to the gas before but do now
• They fear the US is adapting to their tried-and-true methods and so are attempting to remain ahead of the curve
• They see it as a major psychological weapon as opposed to a kinetic one (as you discuss in your reference to WWI). This gets back to my point.

There are others, but I'm sure you can come up with them, too.

 

[Ziggurat]

I don't see how you could have accidentally missed this part in your reference:

I didn't miss it. Nor did I miss this bit:

"In some of the recent cases, the hostile fire was carefully planned. That is, multiple machine-guns, including at least one heavy (12.7mm or larger) machine-gun, were placed along a route used by helicopters, and fired in a coordinated matter. This tactic is called "flak trap," and dates back to World War II (or earlier). The enemy has also been using portable surface-to-air missiles since 2003, including more modern models, like the SA-16 (which is similar to the American Stinger.) American helicopters are equipped with missile detection and defense (flare dispensers) equipment. Thus the most dangerous anti-aircraft weapon is the machine-gun, not the missile.

American helicopter pilots have been dealing with the risk of deliberate flak traps since 2003, and the current losses are partly the result in getting sloppy. That means flying the same routes too often, and too predictably, makes it easier for these ambushes to work." (emphasis mine)

I'm well aware of the entire contents of the link I posted. If you drew different conclusions from that link than I did, it's not because I missed any of it or didn't understand it.

And this one: Iraq Helicopter Losses

From your source:
"Lawrence DiRita, a Pentagon spokesman, said there was no reason to believe such a device was used to bring down any of the three helicopters that have crashed since January 8."

In other words, there's no reason to believe this new technique has actually been successful.

Helicopters getting shot down are actually infrequent events. Statistics of small numbers can make it seem like the rate is suddenly going up, but all that's really happened is you got a cluster at one time but the overall trend can still be going down. Sort of like perceptions about shark attacks: a few in a row can make it look like an epidemic.

 

[Ziggurat]

There are many possible answers to this, and I find it difficult to believe that you cannot conceive of them.

I can indeed conceive of lots of possible reasons. Most of them I find much less likely, however.

Other possible reasons include:

• They didn't have easy access to the gas before but do now

• 
  
  Possibly, but why can they get access now when they couldn't before? And if access to the gas was something they had trouble getting before, that suggests that such access can be shut off again, now that we know it's an issue.
  
  

  [*]They fear the US is adapting to their tried-and-true methods and so are attempting to remain ahead of the curve

  
  Why would they be so afraid of us adapting now? We've been adapting all along and they haven't tried anything like this before. If they were getting desperate, that might increase their fear of our adaptation. Otherwise, this doesn't explain why it never happened before.
  
  

  [*]They see it as a major psychological weapon as opposed to a kinetic one (as you discuss in your reference to WWI).

  
  Again, why now and not previously? The psychological effect would have been just as potent a year ago, why hold back?

 

[Garrette]

I can indeed conceive of lots of possible reasons. Most of them I find much less likely, however.

Than what? That they are getting desperate? I don't agree with your assessment if this is the case.

Possibly, but why can they get access now when they couldn't before?

Many possible reasons again. The one off the top of my head that seems most likely is that they finally have someone in place with the proper access.

And if access to the gas was something they had trouble getting before, that suggests that such access can be shut off again, now that we know it's an issue.

Possibly. If our killing insurgents was something they had trouble with before, that suggests that such killing can be prevented again, now that they know it is an issue.

Why would they be so afraid of us adapting now?

Who said it had to be a new fear? It should be a continuing fear of any commander.

We've been adapting all along and they haven't tried anything like this before.

Probably, or maybe they just didn't get to the implementation stage before. Regardless, there are many possible reasons why they have not tried it before.

If they were getting desperate, that might increase their fear of our adaptation. Otherwise, this doesn't explain why it never happened before.

I disagree.

Again, why now and not previously? The psychological effect would have been just as potent a year ago, why hold back?

For any of a number of possible reasons. Maybe it's as simple as they didn't think of it before.

 

[Ziggurat]

Than what? That they are getting desperate? I don't agree with your assessment if this is the case.

That's fine.

Possibly. If our killing insurgents was something they had trouble with before, that suggests that such killing can be prevented again, now that they know it is an issue.

Don't be silly. Your comparison isn't even coherent: the logical parallel would be that killing insurgents was something WE had trouble accomplishing before, and that now that THEY know it's an issue THEY can prevent it. What you posted doesn't make sense even internally. But of course, the parallel I posted isn't true, and the problems (preventing us from killing insurgents versus preventing their access to chlorine gas) simply aren't equivalent, as I'm sure you know.

For any of a number of possible reasons. Maybe it's as simple as they didn't think of it before.

That's actually what I consider the most likely of your alternatives. And if that (or something else like it) is correct, then these gas attacks don't mean much at all (since they aren't very effective).

 

[Garrette]

Don't be silly. Your comparison isn't even coherent: the logical parallel would be that killing insurgents was something WE had trouble accomplishing before, and that now that THEY know it's an issue THEY can prevent it. What you posted doesn't make sense even internally. But of course, the parallel I posted isn't true, and the problems (preventing us from killing insurgents versus preventing their access to chlorine gas) simply aren't equivalent, as I'm sure you know.

I recognize the analogy has problems, but I don't concede it is silly or that your analysis of it holds. But I'm not so enamored of it that I have to defend it, either, because I think you get the point.

That's actually what I consider the most likely of your alternatives. And if that (or something else like it) is correct, then these gas attacks don't mean much at all (since they aren't very effective).

You may be right. I hope so.

 

[fishbob]

fishbob, I suspect Ziggurat was implying that helicopter losses to hostile fire have gone done in relation to the total amount of flying hours. I don't know if that actually is what he's implying, but it seems to be. Nor do I know if it's true as the data needed to determine it aren't in the links.

I think he was implying exactly that, and I think the facts disagree with his implication. I think there is enough data in these few links to make a determination (Google and 5 minutes will get you dozens more).

From the links:
50 helicopters over 3 years (averages 17/year, or about 1.5 per month) - with the implication that early losses were greater than more recent losses.
Then we get 7 losses over the last 2 months.
By quantum transmogrification, this works out to be an increase of almost 200%. Factoring in the 17% increase in total flying hours makes Jack Diddly Squat difference.

Simply misunderestimating the capabilities of our enemies is not smart. Deliberately misundersrepresentating the capabilites of our enemies is dishonest.

 

[Garrette]

I think he was implying exactly that, and I think the facts disagree with his implication. I think there is enough data in these few links to make a determination (Google and 5 minutes will get you dozens more).

From the links:
50 helicopters over 3 years (averages 17/year, or about 1.5 per month) - with the implication that early losses were greater than more recent losses.
Then we get 7 losses over the last 2 months.
By quantum transmogrification, this works out to be an increase of almost 200%. Factoring in the 17% increase in total flying hours makes Jack Diddly Squat difference.

Simply misunderestimating the capabilities of our enemies is not smart. Deliberately misundersrepresentating the capabilites of our enemies is dishonest.

This falls apart with your extrapolation of 7 losses in 2 months to a yearly total of 42 or 3.5/month. As Ziggurat pointed out, you can't define a trend by looking at a short stretch that has an upswing.