Social Darwinism

[Jeremy]

I suppose that it is time for me step into the fire myself, and test the theories I hold to be true against public scorn and criticism. I would consider my self a Social Darwinist, in the sense that a significant part of human intelligence and personality is genetic rather than environmental, and that these genetic differences translate into observable differences in the social, economic, and political arena.

This thread was spurred by JustGeoff, when he made the following remarks in the Darwinian Archaeology / Cultural Evolution thread.

The explanation is that human beings have the capacity for co-creational free will. I am denying hard determinism and compatibilism and I am therefore rejecting purely darwinian explanations of human behaviour as being invalid (and dangerous) biological determinism. A similar theoretical mentality lay behind the idealogy of the nazis, for example.

Social Darwinism was, of course, an unmitigated disaster. Therefore one cannot claim that Darwinism has a track record of being successfully applied outside its original home.

I would like to start off by asking, Geoff, why do you think that Social Darwinism and biological determinism are dangerous failures? And, please, don't try to allude to "Social Darwinism=Nazism, Nazism=Bad, Social Darwinism= Bad", because you as well as I know that that is a logical fallacy.

 

[CrossHair]

Social Darwinism is not something that can be forced. Even when what is thought to be harmless introductions of non-indigionous animal species are introduced into environments for a specific purpose, they usually have unexpected harmful concequences.

 

[Jeremy]

Social Darwinism is not something that can be forced. Even when what is thought to be harmless introductions of non-indigionous animal species are introduced into environments for a specific purpose, they usually have unexpected harmful concequences.

Thank you for reminding me that I need to clarify the point of this thread.

When I say that I am a Social Darwinist, do not ready any politcal or policy posistions into it. I only mean what I stated above.

EDIT: To get the inevitable out the way, I do not advocate active eugenics.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

I would consider my self a Social Darwinist, in the sense that a significant part of human intelligence and personality is genetic rather than environmental, and that these genetic differences translate into observable differences in the social, economic, and political arena.

That's not social Darwinism, is it? Social Darwinism is when you apply "survival of the fittest" to social interactions. I don't believe there is any assumption that genetics plays a necessary role. After all, the idea came from Herbert Spencer, not Darwin.

~~ Paul

 

[Jeremy]

That's not social Darwinism, is it? Social Darwinism is when you apply "survival of the fittest" to social interactions. I don't believe there is any assumption that genetics plays a necessary role. After all, the idea came from Herbert Spencer, not Darwin.

You may be correct, Paul. Social Darwinism is a very ill-defined idea in the first place, and the reason I use the label for my beliefs is because that is what they have been criticized as being. However, I think I fail to see your distinction. Perhaps you would see me as more of a Social Darwinist if I added that due to the heritable nature of genes, there is actually some substance to class differences? All though, please do not presuppose my political policy on these matters.

 

[Bikewer]

It may have been 10 years ago or more when the big flap over Social Darwinism or Genetic determinism or whatever flared up.
I remember reading a polemic of sorts called "Not In Our Genes", which was a collection of writings by the "anti" crowd. I recall thinking at the time that the arguments were almost all political rather than scientific in nature, and that there were constant references to Eugenics and Nazism and so forth.

Even Stephen Jay Gould contributed an essay, although his was pretty mild. My memory may be foggy, but the tone of his essay was to the effect that the answer to the "nature or nurture" question was effectively "yes".

 

[Jeremy]

It may have been 10 years ago or more when the big flap over Social Darwinism or Genetic determinism or whatever flared up.
I remember reading a polemic of sorts called "Not In Our Genes", which was a collection of writings by the "anti" crowd. I recall thinking at the time that the arguments were almost all political rather than scientific in nature, and that there were constant references to Eugenics and Nazism and so forth.

Even Stephen Jay Gould contributed an essay, although his was pretty mild. My memory may be foggy, but the tone of his essay was to the effect that the answer to the "nature or nurture" question was effectively "yes".

A big problem in this field is emotional responses, and not only on the side of the anti crowd. Whenever someone objects to Social Darwinism on moral or political grounds, rather than on scientific ones, the Darwinists automatically call Moralistic fallacy. That is not to say that it is not a proper grievance, it is, but the Social Darwinists generally follow that with the statement (implicit or implied) "The only objection to Social Darwinism is a fallacy, therefor Social Darwinism must be correct". I have to strive not to do it myself.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

I would like to start off by asking, Geoff, why do you think that Social Darwinism and biological determinism are dangerous failures?

I think they fail only in the sense that they can only ever provide partial answers, but that those answers are widely understood as complete. It is a debate about the limits of science, and about the relationships between science and other areas of knowledge. My target in this case, as it has been in all the previous threads I've started round here recently, is the misapplication of science, or the claim of scientific authority where none is warranted. In other words, the validity of the theoretical results of social darwinism rest on assumptions which I do not accept, and I therefore do not accept the theoretical results. I view social darwinism as a failure for the same reason I view behaviourism to be a failure. It is an attempt to get the facts to conform to ones epistemelogical position. Social darwinism starts by assuming it is possible to provide full explanations of human culture and behaviour using Darwinistic theories. I am objecting to the validity of making this assumption without it being supported. I view it as dangerous because it leads to things like Dawkins' theory of the origin of religion - which I see as fundamentally mistaken and wrong-headed. My position on this, in common with my metaphysical position and my position on theism/atheism is an attempt to be neutral. I am trying to keep both sides honest, or at least to provide a hybrid position which attempts to balance both sides. If I think that either science or religion steps outside its valid domain of operations in a particular way, I will challenge it. In this case I am challenging a misapplication of science. I am just as likely to challenge a misapplication/misinterpretation of religious mythology.

 

[Jeremy]

If I think that either science or religion steps outside its valid domain of operations in a particular way, I will challenge it. In this case I am challenging a misapplication of science. I am just as likely to challenge a misapplication/misinterpretation of religious mythology.

I suppose that this is where we fundamentally differ, Geoff. I find it logically compelling that if you are going to accept certain facts and methods in one area, that these processes should therefore be applicable, at least in abstract, to all other areas. Prior to becoming a materialist atheist, I was a fundamentalist Christian. If one accepts a holy book to be infallible in one area, it must be so in all. When the evidence turned, however, and it became apparent to me that said holy book was not applicable in all areas, it made logical sense for me to assume that it was all false. No evidence has yet convinced me that science can not explain everything, and considering that we know that it explains many things, I feel it is safe to assume that it can or will explain everything.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

I suppose that this is where we fundamentally differ, Geoff. I find it logically compelling that if you are going to accept certain facts and methods in one area, that these processes should therefore be applicable, at least in abstract, to all other areas.

Really? One methodology for everything? I find that a very odd position to defend.

Prior to becoming a materialist atheist, I was a fundamentalist Christian. If one accepts a holy book to be infallible in one area, it must be so in all.

So why have you replaced the holy book of Christianity with another holy book? Why not ditch the whole idea of having a holy book at all? Your mistake was not your Christianity, it was your fundamentalism.

When the evidence turned, however, and it became apparent to me that said holy book was not applicable in all areas, it made logical sense for me to assume that it was all false.

This either/or fallacy is very common on this board. It is responsible for a great deal of misunderstandings in my threads, because people always assume that in attacking one side of the either/or I must be promoting the other - and this is usually not the case.

No evidence has yet convinced me that science can not explain everything, and considering that we know that it explains many things, I feel it is safe to assume that it can or will explain everything.

That is a dangerous assumption, IMO. Take that path and you end up thinking like Dawkins.

 

[Jeremy]

That is a dangerous assumption, IMO. Take that path and you end up thinking like Dawkins.

And what is wrong with Dawkins?

I have a question for you, Geoff. What is the line that divides religion and science? It was once considered that the origin of the earth was within the realms of religion, but now it is widely held as a scientific question. Human origins are a subject which has similarly changed paradigm. You now insist that human conciousness, morality, and culture are inexplainable by science. How are these subjects any different than those of origins and evolution?

 

[UndercoverElephant]

And what is wrong with Dawkins?

He's got blinkers on. Tunnel vision. It's just another sort of fundamentalism - a deep irony to which he is completely oblivious.

I have a question for you, Geoff. What is the line that divides religion and science?

That all depends on how you define science, and that is another great big can of worms.

It was once considered that the origin of the earth was within the realms of religion, but now it is widely held as a scientific question. Human origins are a subject which has similarly changed paradigm. You now insist that human conciousness, morality, and culture are inexplainable by science. How are these subjects any different than those of origins and evolution?

Because there are philosophical problems with the former cases and no philosophical problems with the latter ones. Science only answers empirical questions. Consciousness, morality and many aspects of human culture/behaviour cannot be given 100% empirical answers. Philosophy and religion must defer to science only in cases where empirical research can conceivably (or has already) provide(d) an answer. Science must defer to philosophy/religion where no empirical answer is possible.

 

[Jeremy]

He's got blinkers on. Tunnel vision. It's just another sort of fundamentalism - a deep irony to which he is completely oblivious.

No such irony appears when you see that he is not attacking philosophical fundamentalism, but an incorrect empirical answer often held fundamentally.

Because there are philosophical problems with the former cases and no philosophical problems with the latter ones. Science only answers empirical questions. Consciousness, morality and many aspects of human culture/behaviour cannot be given 100% empirical answers.

I honestly did not understand that. Please, explain to me what these philosophical problems are, and why they apply differently to the separate subjects. You seem to be saying that empiricism can not answer those problems because empiricism can not answer those questions.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Jeremy,

The philosophy of science (i.e. the questions about what science actually is, how it provides justifiable grounds for belief, what are it's limits, how it relates to other disciplines, etc....) is my primary area of interest within philosophy. The 20th century was a bad time for the philosophy of science. Between them, Popper, Kuhn and Feyerabend pretty much destoyed any idea that science is what most scientists think it is. It is not a method, that is for sure. Neither is it properly integrated. Neither is it always incremental. Neither is it dependent on falsification. Neither is it's course solely determined by non-subjective factors. Yet scientists often believe it is all of these things. The best way to define what science is is to describe it as a sort of mindset - a set of ideals which one attempts to satisfy on an ad-hoc basis. These ideals call for objectivity, repeatability (verifiability) and various other things. But there are certain areas of investigation where these ideals are difficult or impossible to achieve. This is where the problems start because some scientists have a tendency to attempt to apply the scientific ideals where they simply cannot be applied. The result is varying levels of absurdity, from claiming that all human altruism is ultimately governed by self-interest to claiming that minds don't exist to claiming religion is nothing but a parasitic "meme".

Patriotism is not enough. But neither is anything else. Science is not enough, religion is not enough, art is not enough, politics and economics are not enough, nor is love, nor is duty, nor is action however disinterested, nor, however sublime, is contemplation. Nothing short of everything will really do.

(From "the old Raja's notes on what's what" in "Island", which was Aldous Huxley's last novel and IMO the greatest piece of philosophical fiction ever written.)

Geoff

 

[Jeremy]

But there are certain areas of investigation where these ideals are difficult or impossible to achieve. This is where the problems start because some scientists have a tendency to attempt to apply the scientific ideals where they simply cannot be applied. The result is varying levels of absurdity, from claiming that all human altruism is ultimately governed by self-interest to claiming that minds don't exist to claiming religion is nothing but a parasitic "meme".

If you could, please explain to me why these things are unable to be questioned by science.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

If you could, please explain to me why these things are unable to be questioned by science.

I just explained why science is nothing more than a set of ideals. What those ideals have in common is (attempted) objectivity. In one way or another, something which is trying to be scientific is something which is trying to be objective. However, there is one major problem with this. That problem is that we are existentially trapped in a subjective world. We can never totally eliminate subjectivity. The things which are not appropriate for scientific answers are therefore the things which are most closely associated with things which are inherently and unavoidably subjective. The more subjective something is, the harder it is to apply the scientific principles. It is for this reason that the gold-standard science is physics. As you move away from physics, there are a ring of lesser "human sciences" such as pyschology, sociology, economics (to a certain extent), anthroplogy. These human sciences aim at objectivity but run into problems where their subject matter starts becoming more subjective. Beyond these disciplines are things like metaphysics, which tries to explain the subjective/objective distinction itself. At the outer limits, farthest away from physics, are the things which are most closely associated with subjectivity - questions about consciousness, religion, being, the meaning of life, ethics, morality etc.... When science tries to explain religion it is trying to apply objective principles to something which can only be properly understood by taking inherently subjective things into account. Does that answer your question?

 

[Jeremy]

I am not sure that I understand what you mean by inherently subjective. Yes, the perception of a chair is not a chair, and while it does take some faith to assume that our perceptions accurately portray the chair as it is, but from that assumption logically extends science.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

No such irony appears when you see that he is not attacking philosophical fundamentalism, but an incorrect empirical answer often held fundamentally.

He starts by doing what you describe, but he doesn't know when to stop.

I honestly did not understand that. Please, explain to me what these philosophical problems are, and why they apply differently to the separate subjects. You seem to be saying that empiricism can not answer those problems because empiricism can not answer those questions.

That is correct. In fact empiricism, taken to it's extreme, ultimately leads to Berkeleyan idealism. Berkeley was an empiricist. I reject both empiricism and foundationalism. I do not believe there can be any one foundation for knowledge, of any sort. Instead, you must construct multiple entry-points, multiple temporary foundations but no absolute foundations. You then justify your belief by trying to find a way to coherently combine the information provided from the multiple foundations. No holy books.

 

[Jeremy]

He starts by doing what you describe, but he doesn't know when to stop.

Care to offer an example?

That is correct.

A bit of an explanation may help.

 

[Jeremy]

Do you usually build on your arguments with a consecutive series of edits? Give me a seccond while I clarify my position based on the new things you have posted