Poll about realism

[UndercoverElephant]

This is a poll about people's position on the question of realism with respect to physical objects.

Direct Realism:

The objects of perception during veridical experiences (i.e. not hallucinations or lucid dreams) are real physical objects which exist totally independently of mind(s).

Indirect/representational Realism:

We are not directly aware of physical object, but we are indirectly aware of them. We are directly aware of sense-data/qualia/mental-impressions....

Anti-realism:

We are not directly aware of mind-independent physical objects. This position includes idealism, transcendental idealism (Kant) and various other theories which deny we can be directly aware of physical objects which can exist independently of mind.

----------------------------------------

Direct realism is challenged by various sorts of arguments, but this one is the strongest, IMO.

The Argument from hallucination against direct realism:

“Hallucination” refers here to an experience which is phenomenologically indistinguishable from the veridical perception of an object, but which concerns no object at all which actually exists, such as in the case of a Brain In a Vat. It does not apply to people who have taken drugs, because in this case there is a different brain state implied and therefore a different experience expected. The argument assumes that it is possible to induce a "perfect hallucination" in a BIV.

The Argument runs as follows:

P1: The BIV is immediately aware of something that looks like external physical object X.

P2: No X is actually present.

P3: They must therefore be aware must be something other than an external physical object X.

P4. But there is no qualitative or phenomenal difference between the objects of awareness in cases of hallucination and or perception.

P5: Given this indistinguishability, we should conclude that since the objects of immediate awareness in hallucination are not external physical objects, the objects of immediate awareness in veridical perception aren’t physical objects either.

Conclusion: Direct Realism is false. The objects of immediate awareness in hallucination and in veridical perception are something other than external physical objects. They are sense-data, ideas, etc….

 

[cpolk]

“Hallucination” refers here to an experience which is phenomenologically indistinguishable from the veridical perception of an object, but which concerns no object at all which actually exists, such as in the case of a Brain In a Vat. It does not apply to people who have taken drugs, because in this case there is a different brain state implied and therefore a different experience expected. The argument assumes that it is possible to induce a "perfect hallucination" in a BIV.

I do not accept that theory, because I cannot accept the assumption as a fact. IF we can induce a perfect hallucination on a brain that has otherwise no abilities to sense its environment, and IF we can prove that it is not induced in a manner similar to a dream-state, then we can revisit the possibility when we have something to study.

Otherwise, a human being is more than simply the brain alone. My choice, in this poll as well as my arguments for it, is to be direct.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

I do not accept that theory, because I cannot accept the assumption as a fact.

Hi cpolk. It's not a theory. It's a philosophical argument involving a hypothetical situation which you may or may not accept is possible in reality. You can deny P4, but most direct realists accept it and challenge other bits of the argument.

IF we can induce a perfect hallucination on a brain that has otherwise no abilities to sense its environment, and IF we can prove that it is not induced in a manner similar to a dream-state, then we can revisit the possibility when we have something to study.

If we could do it in reality then we could ask the brain what it experienced and this would no longer be a philosophical argument. But we can't do that. But we already know that the hallucination is not exactly the same as a dream state because dream states are being driven "top-down" and the BIV is being stimulated as if it was awake. The argument requires

a) that it is conceivable that exactly the same brain state could be induced in the BIV as a waking persons brain state

and

b) that an identical brain state is always accompanied by an identical mental experience.

Direct realists usually, but not always, accept these premises. If you reject either of them, then the argument fails. The people who do reject P4 give diverse reasons for doing so.

 

[Mercutio]

A) Pragmatism suggests that the question is unanswerable, and thus irrelevant. One vote for none of the above.

B) The poll wormhole puts you out into a thread about a paltalk poetry night--the one that prompted my sig. Thank you, internet gods, for this wormhole. It warmed my heart.

 

[Iacchus]

Yes, reality is definitely real.

 

[cpolk]

If we could do it in reality then we could ask the brain what it experienced and this would no longer be a philosophical argument. But we can't do that. But we already know that the hallucination is not exactly the same as a dream state because dream states are being driven "top-down" and the BIV is being stimulated as if it was awake.

My first real problem is that you state that it is not drug-induced, but that it is artificially-induced. What is the difference?

If it is to show, hypothetically, that it is possible that we are not living in a reality, but a hallucination, then what difference does that make if we have no control over it? We are still living in a world controlled by external forces, right? So from our perception, we must accept it as direct, because to do otherwise would not change what we are perceiving.

 

[Beleth]

I don't accept P4 either, because there is a difference: one of external verification. If I hallucinate something, I can ask another person whether they perceive my hallucination as well. It is highly unlikey that they will, and it is also highly unlikely that I am also hallucinating the other person. Therefore there is a difference between a hallucination and a perception.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Yes, reality is definitely real.

Hi Iaccus. Yes, I seem to remember explaining that particular tautology to our old friend LG on numerous occasions. Reality is definately real.

This is a slightly different question. It's specifically about whether there we can be directly aware of physical objects where physical objects are defined as things which are capable of existing independently of perception. These two claims are very hard to reconcile, leading to claims of indirect realism from people who have abandoned direct realism but don't want to be anti-realists. But indirect realism suffers from even worse problems - I think it is actually the least plausible of all the positions offered.

 

[PixyMisa]

It's specifically about whether there we can be directly aware of physical objects where physical objects are defined as things which are capable of existing independently of perception. These two claims are very hard to reconcile, leading to claims of indirect realism from people who have abandoned direct realism but don't want to be anti-realists. But indirect realism suffers from even worse problems - I think it is actually the least plausible of all the positions offered.

I don't see why the two statements are hard to reconcile at all, considering that we can trace a continuous physical path from the object to the awareness. Whether that is "direct" or "indirect" depends on the precise definition of "direct" in this context.

The argument of hallucination fails because hallucinations simply do not behave like perceptions of real objects. Hallucinations are most convincing when the subject's rational mind is clouded by illness or drugs, because the subject is not able to examine the hallucination rationally. Try to measure a hallucination, or, as Beleth said, ask someone else if they see it. In fact, in general, P1 is false; the hallucination doesn't look like something real, and if you were fully rational you would realise this immediately. Though it's been some time since I've hallucinated. I've had hallucinations once due to a high fever, and once, memorably, had hypnopompic hallucinations, which were rather unnerving - not because I thought they were real, but because I thought I was hallucinating. Uh... which I was. Fortunately, it only lasted a few seconds.

Err... Backtrack. I just realised you're talking about brains in vats.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

My first real problem is that you state that it is not drug-induced, but that it is artificially-induced. What is the difference?

The argument requires an artificially induced brain state which is identical to veridical waking experiences. Drug-induced states are known to be physically different to normal states, so one would not expect them to result in the same experience. This argument concerns a brain in a vat which is having all of its external nerve inputs stimulated artificially in order to fool the brain into believing it is interacting with a real physical world. The difference is that the drug-induced state can't be physically indentical to a normal waking state but the brain in the vat, according to people who accept this argument, can be in exactly the same state as a normal awake person.

If it is to show, hypothetically, that it is possible that we are not living in a reality, but a hallucination, then what difference does that make if we have no control over it?

Whether we control over it doesn't matter for the argument. The problem is as follows:

Direct realism claims that when we are awake that the objects of direct awareness are real physical objects. But if you accept the BIV is experiencing something which is indistinguishable from waking reality then you have to explain what the objects of direct awareness are for the BIV. They can't be physical objects, because no such objects actually exist. So they must be something else, i.e. "mental images" or "ideas" or "sense data" or "......." But if we are going to say the the objects of direct awareness during BIV-style "hallucinations" are mental images, and these experiences are indistinguishable from veridical experiences, then what is our justification for saying the the objects of direct awareness during veridical experiences aren't also mental images??? This is what leads people to indirect realism. They want to be able to say we percieve real physical objects, but the above argument forces them to claim that we can only directly percieve the contents of our minds, and that physical objects can only ever be perceived indirectly. You then run into the problem of why sense-data and experience-independent physical objects should be the same sort of thing - and I think that this particular problem is fatal, especially in the light of QM.

We are still living in a world controlled by external forces, right?

The BIV is indeed still limited by external forces. That is how the BIV's state is more like being awake than dreaming.

So from our perception, we must accept it as direct, because to do otherwise would not change what we are perceiving.

In a way, it doesn't really matter whether we are direct realists, indirect realists or non-realists with regard to the physical world. Everyone accepts that it seems like we directly percieve a physical world, and whether or not we actually do so is not going to change our existential situation, for sure. That isn't the point. This isn't an argument about ethics or whether the world can be changed or what difference this makes to science or any of those things. It is a purely philosophical argument about whether there is any coherent way to defend the claim that we are indeed directly aware of physical objects.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

I don't accept P4 either, because there is a difference: one of external verification. If I hallucinate something, I can ask another person whether they perceive my hallucination as well.

So can the brain in the vat. The computer that is feeding it signals can be programmed to provide the BIV exactly the same reactions fromo the simulated people as you would get from people when you're actually perceiving reality.

It is highly unlikey that they will, and it is also highly unlikely that I am also hallucinating the other person. Therefore there is a difference between a hallucination and a perception.

I am specifically talking about the brain in the vat, NOT instances of people hallucinating under the influence of drugs. You can't ask other people in "the matrix" whether they are in a matrix. Well, you can....but their answers aren't relevant.

 

[PixyMisa]

Okay, this time I'll actually address the argument.

The brain-in-a-vat argument is exactly identical to Berkelian Idealism and Simulational Idealism. The basic argument is that the world is not real, but it is something that acts in all ways as if it were real.

The proper response to this is "Piss off." Oops, no. The proper response to this is "It makes no difference whatsoever." If the world behaves in all ways and always as if it were real, then the only possible rational approach to understanding it is to treat it as if it were real. That's the difference between metaphysical naturalism and metaphysical materialism. I'm a materialist, but I realise that this is not required for science or for direct realism. If we are brains in vats, but the information presented to us is a perfect representation of a materialistic environment, then naturalism holds and direct realism is true.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

I don't see why the two statements are hard to reconcile at all, considering that we can trace a continuous physical path from the object to the awareness. Whether that is "direct" or "indirect" depends on the precise definition of "direct" in this context.

The fact that there is a causal path between the object and the perception is another argument against direct realism, known as the causal argument. It claims that we could only ever be directly aware of the last thing in the chain of causality.

Definitions of direct and indirect realism:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Direct_realism

"Direct realism is a theory of perception that claims that the senses provide us with direct awareness of the external world. In contrast, indirect realism and representationalism claim that we are directly aware only of internal representations of the external world."

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indirect_realism

Indirect realism, also known as indirect perception, and epistemological dualism, is the view in cognitive psychology that perception functions via internal representations of external reality. It is sometimes considered to be the same as representationalism. Indirect realism is problematical because of Ryle's regress and the apparent need for a homunculus. These problems have led some philosophers to abandon realism and suggest the existence of dualism and others to propose, or suggest through emergentism, that some form of new physics is operating in the brain such as quantum mind, space-time theories of consciousness etc.

PM:

The argument of hallucination fails because hallucinations simply do not behave like perceptions of real objects. Hallucinations are most convincing when the subject's rational mind is clouded by illness or drugs....

That is why I keep repeating that we are not talking about drug-induced experiences. We need to be discussing a situation where there is nothing "going wrong" in the brain, which is why the example of the brain in the vat is used. The term "hallucination" is historical, rather than literally what we are talking about:

See:

http://www.mindmatter.de/mmpdf/honderich.pdf

5. Deluded Brains in Vats

.....There is a terrible objection to the realist theory[...] The
objection is in fact the proposition or family of propositions that leads to
the representative theory. It has traditionally been known as the argument
from illusion. It is better named the argument from hallucination, or, if
you like, to come up to date, the argument from a brain in a vat.
It is not the proposition that there are variations in the experience of
different persons having to do with their different perceptual situations
and equipments – the look of the pennyand the warm hand in water and
so on (Ayer 1956, 1973). That we see a thing differently, as we say, is no
reason for concluding that we do not see one and the same thing. You
can add that something that did not look different from different points
of view would not be a physical object.
Rather, the essential proposition is that matters could be arranged so
that there did occur some perceptual experience that stood in no relation
at all to the surrounding physical world – delusion. The brain in the vat
in the laboratoryis stimulated by attendant neuroscientists, it is said, so
that the visual cortex and so on carries on in such a way that there is experience or awareness as in ordinary experiencing of, say, Wenceslas Square. But, ex hypothesi, Wenceslas Square is not there in the laboratory. Since there is something indistinguishable from actual perceptual experience of Wenceslas Square, it follows that the realist theory of perception is refuted
and the representative theory is vindicated.

, because the subject is not able to examine the hallucination rationally. Try to measure a hallucination, or, as Beleth said, ask someone else if they see it. In fact, in general, P1 is false; the hallucination doesn't look like something real, and if you were fully rational you would realise this immediately.

Absolutely, which is why that argument is not offered. The case of a lucid dream is a good example - here you are fully rational, and your brain is firing on all cylinders. You are also very much aware that you are dreaming, and not awake. But can you say the same for the brain in the vat, and why (or why not?)

Do you accept:

a) that it is conceivable that exactly the same brain state could be induced in the BIV as a waking persons brain state?

and

b) that an identical brain state is always accompanied by an identical mental experience?

If you do, then your previous object can't stand because the fully rational BIV wouldn't be able to distinguish between envattedness and non-envattedness. That is a crucial plank of the argument. There has to be an identical neural state and an indistinguishable experience.

 

[Vagabond]

Well, having actually taken hallucinogens in my youth I can tell you from first hand experience that the hallucinations you have are not distinguishable from reality. Not only that but normally you come to believe that the hallucinations are true reality and what we experience normally is the true hallicination. This takes some time to wear off and lingers for awhile even after the drugs have ceased having an effect. It was also quite common, you wouldn't believe how truly common for numerous people to have the exact same hallicinations and see the exact same thing. I don't have any explaination or answer as to why, I am just telling you.

I am indirect. I don't think it is possible to know if our senses are really showing us what reality is at any given time. Even if they are it's not possible to know or to prove. There is no way we can know if the "green" you see is the same "green" that I see or smells or tastes for that matter. There are many people who suffer from delusions they are totally convinced are real. If people interpret whatever reality in there own way can there be true objective reality?

 

[PixyMisa]

The fact that there is a causal path between the object and the perception is another argument against direct realism, known as the causal argument. It claims that we could only ever be directly aware of the last thing in the chain of causality.

Sigh. That's just playing around with the definitions of "direct" and "aware", something that neither of the two definitions addresses. If you have a direct physical causal chain between the event and the awareness of the event, it is perfectly reasonable to define that as a direct experience.

That is why I keep repeating that we are not talking about drug-induced experiences

Sorry, my mistake. See my later post for an actual relevant answer.

a) that it is conceivable that exactly the same brain state could be induced in the BIV as a waking persons brain state?

Definitely conceivable and completely unimportant.

b) that an identical brain state is always accompanied by an identical mental experience?

Yes. Edit: No. Experiences are processes, not states. So an identical brain process is always accompanied by an identical mental experience. Which never happens, but that's another subject entirely.

If you do, then your previous object can't stand because the fully rational BIV wouldn't be able to distinguish between envattedness and non-envattedness. That is a crucial plank of the argument. There has to be an identical neural state and an indistinguishable experience.

Yes, my first response didn't address the BIV argument at all.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Okay, this time I'll actually address the argument.

The brain-in-a-vat argument is exactly identical to Berkelian Idealism and Simulational Idealism.

Actually, it isn't - because berkelianism is a metaphysical theory and the BIV argument is an argument against a metaphysical theory. Accepting the argument might lead a person to berkelianism, but even that doesn't neccesarily follow.

The basic argument is that the world is not real, but it is something that acts in all ways as if it were real.

No. Both direct and indirect realism claim that the world is real. The difference is that indirect realism claims that the thing we directly experience isn't that real world. You can accept the argument from hallucination and still be a realist, but only an indirect realist.

The proper response to this is "Piss off."

Post reported to moderator.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Well, having actually taken hallucinogens in my youth I can tell you from first hand experience that the hallucinations you have are not distinguishable from reality.

I'd disagree with that, but it's not actually relevant to the argument. I am talking about a brain in a vat......

I am indirect. I don't think it is possible to know if our senses are really showing us what reality is at any given time. Even if they are it's not possible to know or to prove. There is no way we can know if the "green" you see is the same "green" that I see or smells or tastes for that matter. There are many people who suffer from delusions they are totally convinced are real. If people interpret whatever reality in there own way can there be true objective reality?

What you have described is a slightly different argument against direct realism called The Perceptual Relativity Argument:

"First Premise. A physical object, say a penny, may appear circular (or of a certain size or color) from one angle of view V1 and appear elliptical (or of another size or color) from another angle of view V2.
Second Premise. Let us assume that the penny is circular and remains constant in size and color.
Third Premise. One is immediately aware of something from V1, call it O1, and one is immediately aware of something from V2, call it O2.
Fourth Premise. O1 cannot be identical to O2, because O1 and O2 have different properties; for instance, one is circular while the other is elliptical, or they differ in size and/or color.
11
Fifth Premise. Even if O1, let us say, is qualitatively indistinguishable from the penny, it cannot be numerically identical to the penny. This is because, when one passes from one angle of view to another, there is no sudden change in appearance in what we are perceiving. We would expect such a change in appearance if what we are perceiving at, say, time t1 was the physical object, and what we are perceiving at, say, t2 was something other than it.
Conclusion. Direct Realism is false. We do not directly perceive physical objects. "

From (http://www.tcnj.edu/~lemorvan/APR_Proof.pdf)

 

[PixyMisa]

Actually, it isn't - because berkelianism is a metaphysical theory and the BIV argument is an argument against a metaphysical theory.

No. It is a metaphysical theory and an argument against a metaphysical theory. The fact that no-one takes it seriously makes no difference.

Accepting the argument might lead a person to berkelianism, but even that doesn't neccesarily follow.

I didn't say it did.

No. Both direct and indirect realism claim that the world is real. The difference is that indirect realism claims that the thing we directly experience isn't that real world. You can accept the argument from hallucination and still be a realist, but only an indirect realist.

Define "direct" then.

Post reported to moderator.

Yeah, whatever. My response to you wasn't "Piss off", my point was that the appropriate response to the argument from hallucination was "Piss off".

The point remains: It makes no difference, and cannot possibly make any difference. Exactly the same applies to Berkelian Idealism and Simulational Idealsim for exactly the same reason. It is an argument that doesn't argue anything.

No matter whether materialism is true, the universe is the mind of god, the universe is all a simulation, or I am a brain in a vat, as long as it behaves in all respects exactly as one would predict from materialism, naturalism is true and direct realism is true.

Unless you have a strange definition of "direct".

 

[cpolk]

I am indirect. I don't think it is possible to know if our senses are really showing us what reality is at any given time. Even if they are it's not possible to know or to prove. There is no way we can know if the "green" you see is the same "green" that I see or smells or tastes for that matter. There are many people who suffer from delusions they are totally convinced are real. If people interpret whatever reality in there own way can there be true objective reality?

Unless we are a brain in a vat, simple mechanics can determine that. Our biology is similar, so our senses are also similar. Similar things function similarly. As long as your eyes are working fine, and the biology is similar to others, you will visualize colors according to the same spectrum and your brain will interpret them similarly (because it is built similar as well).

 

[PixyMisa]

Both direct and indirect realism claim that the world is real. The difference is that indirect realism claims that the thing we directly experience isn't that real world. You can accept the argument from hallucination and still be a realist, but only an indirect realist.

That's inconsistent. The BIV argument holds that the world is not real, so if indirect realism holds that it is real, it can't accept the BIV argument.

Or, you are messing about with the definition of "real" as well as "direct" and "aware". In which case direct realism works even with the BIV argument.

Which is why I talk about things in terms of what the do, because talking about what they are just generates confusion.