Interesting Ian
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If people would like to comment on the ideas expressed, how easy they find to understand, the grammar etc, I would much appreciate it.
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Are we Machines?
1. Preliminary
Are we machines? In other words is it possible we could, essentially, just be very sophisticated robots? If this is so then we will not differ in any substantive manner from any other physical object in the Universe – we will differ merely in our physical complexity. Many of us might balk at such a suggestion. It should be stressed though that merely from the fact that we might find this notion to be disturbing, if not repugnant, this does not in itself ensure the falsity of this thesis. We need to weigh in the balance all the reasons for supposing the mind has its source in the brain -- and that we are therefore essentially biological machines -- as well as all the reasons for supposing it is not. In this, the "Are we Machines" part of my website, I want to spell out the reasons why a lot of people, particularly educated people, do indeed believe that we human beings, although somewhat more complex in our operations than any other physical thing, are nevertheless not qualitatively different from any other physical thing. I then intend to try and show that, ultimately, such a stance cannot be maintained.
The Case For:
2. The evidence from the apparent dependency of mind on brain.
One very persuasive criterion by which we might judge that we are essentially machines is to ask ourselves whether our behaviour, in common with the behaviour of all other objects in the Universe, simply follows physical laws. By physical laws we simply are referring to the regularities that we observe in nature. Thus, possibly the most obvious example we could point to here, is the law of gravitation that accounts for the fact that objects, near the surface of the Earth, will, when released, fall at pretty much the same acceleration. The fact that the world exhibits such regularities allows us not only to predict future events, but also allows us to exercise a degree of control over our environment. Thus modern times has witnessed a bewildering proliferation of various machines capable of carrying out all sorts of tasks. But no matter how complex such machines might be, ultimately they are simply operating according to such physical laws that we have observed, and their behaviour is just as explicable with reference to physical laws as the motion of an apple is when released. The pertinent question here then is to ask if we have any reasons to suppose that our own behaviour has a differing origin. If we agree that it does not -- that is to say our own behaviour is wholly in accordance with physical laws -- then with what reason are we to suppose we are qualitatively different from any other physical thing? In particular what makes us think that we are not simply super-sophisticated biological machines?
One immediate objection here might be to point out that we grow and also modify our behaviour as a result from input from the environment; that is to say we learn from experience. Indeed, not just human beings do this, but all organisms do. This is in contrast to man-made machines, which, once constructed, do not generally change their internal organisation. This entails that, given the same input from the environment, unlike us and all other organisms, they will always exhibit the same behaviour. Therefore how can it be maintained that we are merely machines?
But the claim here is not that human beings are at all similar to today's machines. No, in saying that human beings are essentially nothing more than biological machines, we are talking about what machines could achieve in principle. And it is clear that we can have machines that can adapt and change, and even learn according to the input from its environment. In short this objection does not hold water.
So are we simply biological machines, albeit extremely sophisticated ones? Especially pertinent to our consideration here are those machines labelled computers. Computers can now carry out many tasks that were formerly thought to be exclusively a preserve of the human intellect, and, moreover, as a partial response to the objection mentioned above, can even adapt and learn. The most obvious example here are the playing of games such as chess where it is now possible to program a computer that can outperform the best chess players in the world. We even have computers that can carry out rudimentary conversations with people. These computers, at least for a while, might well manage to fool us into believing that we are conversing with a genuine person.
It should be pointed out here that even if one successfully argued against the notion that the brain operates on similar principles to a computer, it arguably would still operate according to physical laws. Thus the brain would still be a machine, and, at least in principle, could be created with a sufficiently advanced technology. Putting it another way, why should brains be the only type of thing that do not operate according to physical laws? And if they do operate according to such laws, then why suppose we differ in principle from any machine? We might admittedly be very complex machines, but essentially machines nevertheless.
Let's consider this point from a different angle. Our brains consist of billions of neurons. It seems reasonable to suppose that neurons simply operate according to physical laws just as much as anything else in the Universe. What would happen if we replaced one of our neurons with an electronic circuit which carries out the exact same physical process as the neuron had? If it carried out the exact same physical process or function, would it not be the case that we would notice no difference whatsoever? Furthermore we can imagine all our neurons getting replaced one by one until such electronic circuits had replaced every last one of our neurons. In this case we would have an electronic brain, and yet it seems we should still be conscious and indeed feel exactly the same! Of course it might be argued that no electronic circuit could ever duplicate the functioning of a neuron. But even if this is so, if in common with all other physical processes in the Universe the neuron functions according to physical laws, then, at least in principle, a artificial neuron is possible, even if it were to be forevermore beyond our ability to create! (1)
From a completely different direction, and albeit of a more indirect kind, we apparently find yet further reasons to suppose that we are simply machines. There is an overwhelming amount of evidence that one's emotions, patterns of behaviour and cognitive skills are intimately tied to the state of one's brain. Just to mention a couple of examples; our capacity to understand written and spoken words, or the capacity to speak and so on, are impaired or even eliminated with injuries to certain regions of the brain. Damage to the hippocampal and thalamic areas of the brain can destroy one's ability to store new long-term memories. In addition radical personality change may be brought about by injury to the brain. The most famous example here is undoubtedly Phineas Gage. We can also point to the effects of drugs which have a propensity to effect our emotions, attitudes and dispositions. Indeed even alcohol and caffeine do this.
These facts regarding not only the apparent tight correlation between our states of consciousness and physical states of the brain, but, as in the examples cited, such conscious states following physical states of the brain, powerfully suggest to many people that processes in the brain generate consciousness or, alternatively, that consciousness is simply another way of talking about brain processes – the thesis of materialism. But regardless of whether conscious states follow, or literally are brain processes, it is held that such apparent complete dependency of conscious states on the state of the brain almost certainly shows that consciousness, or more generally the mind, has its source entirely in the brain. If this is so then our mental lives simply will reflect everything that goes on in the brain, and we will indeed essentially be machines.
To sum up. The argument that many people make is that we have no compelling reason to suppose we are different from any other object in the Universe, and thus, in common with all other objects in the Universe, we are just as susceptible to physical laws as any other object. In particular, although the brain is extremely complex in its operation, there is no cogent reason to suppose that it is qualitatively different from any complex man-made machine. We might feel that we are different from any other object in the Universe, but the foregoing considerations might make us feel disposed to conclude that it is not a difference in kind we are talking about here, but rather, merely a difference in degree. This notion is especially persuasive when we note that mental states, including our emotions, dispositions, attitudes and general personality, can all apparently be affected by injury or alteration to the brain, thereby implying that the source of consciousness is within the brain. This being so, and acknowledging that the brain is a physical object like any other physical object that operates according to physical laws, it might seem that a sensible position is to conclude that we are, indeed, essentially machines.
3. The Evidence from Materialism
i) What is Materialism?
The conclusion reached in the previous section lies at the heart of a philosophical position regarding the nature of reality called Materialism. (2) Traditionally materialism was the thesis that everything that exists is matter. In present times, however, the notion of matter is considered to be a bit restrictive. We might tend to think of matter as stuff we can touch and see. But if matter is all that exists, then it follows that energy, gravity, and various exotic subatomic particles and so on, should also be considered to be matter. Consequently there is now a tendency to say that materialism simply means that everything that exists is physical. Furthermore that all change in the world can be wholly explained with reference to physical laws. Indeed, in acknowledgement of this, the word physicalism is sometimes used in place of the word materialism.
If materialism is the thesis that everything that exists is physical, then what does “physical†mean? Traditionally it has been maintained that it is the fundamental ‘stuff’ of the world. So for example, it is everything we perceive through our five senses, such as tables, chairs and trees. But it is also those things we can only see by virtue of the use of instruments such as microscopes and so on which simply extend the range of things we are able to sense. Finally it also includes those things whose existence we cannot directly see at all, with or without the use of instruments, but whose existence we nevertheless feel we can confidently infer. An obvious example here are electrons. Nobody can directly see electrons, and arguably we could never see them in principle, but we can set up experiments and obtain results that are explicable if we imagine the existence of very small entities with certain properties. These entities we label electrons.
Materialists have also traditionally regarded physical things and processes as having a mind-independent existence. Thus objects exist whether or not we are looking at them, and even if the Universe had never given birth to any sentient creatures, that Universe and all it contains would still enjoy a ‘full-blooded’ existence. This might appear to be belabouring the extremely obvious, but as we shall see in the Perception and Reality section (forthcoming), this commonsensical notion of reality can certainly be challenged.
So if everything is physical, this also entails that our minds are also entirely physical. In other words, that we are no different, at least in kind if not in complexity, from any other physical processes or things in the world.
ii). Why suppose Materialism is correct?
The considerations discussed in section 1 is our starting point here. If we are to conclude that our selves or conscious states are created by the brain, then this lends a lot of credence to the idea that we are essentially like any other object in the Universe. Given that all such objects and their properties are physical, then it follows that our selves are also physical and thus materialism is vindicated. (3)
But we have additional reasons for supposing Materialism to be correct; namely as suggested by the progress of science in understanding the world. To explain this, a digression is in order; more specifically we need to take a look at the genesis of our contemporary scientific understanding of reality. To this end we must now take a brief look at the scientific revolution of the 17th century.
Prior to the 17th Century there was a tendency to view the world as being ultimately mysterious. Lingering on from medieval times was the notion that the world was full of meaning - teeming with supernatural causes where angels and demons, spirits, occult powers and mystical principles played a prominent role. As a consequence our lives and the world were seen to be intrinsically capricious in nature and therefore beyond the comprehension of human beings. In addition, both literally and in terms of importance, man largely saw himself as being at the centre of the Universe, not least of which was that he generally believed himself to be endowed with an immortal soul. The scientific revolution inaugurated in the 17th Century was pivotal in eroding all these beliefs, and in particular fostered the notion of man as simply being a biological machine. It also was instrumental in creating our modern world together with its technological ubiquity.
So what kicked off this scientific revolution? This is a question that is much debated but there at least seem to be two crucial elements we can discern. Firstly there was the idea that if an omnipotent God had created the Cosmos, and we were the reason for its creation, would God not make the Cosmos amenable to human intellect? In particular, would he not make the cosmos operate according to well-defined laws that we might discern?
Secondly there arose the mechanistic philosophy. This philosophy regarding the nature of reality can be expressed succinctly in 5 points:
1. All action is by contact: no action at a distance.
2. All objects in the Universe are composed of microscopic ultimately small parts (indivisible 'atoms' or indivisible 'corpuscles').
3. All change in nature and natural phenomena results from alterations in the configurations of matter.
4. Determinism rules the world – that is an unbroken chain of cause and effect.
5. No teleology - i.e. events and processes are not governed by any purpose but simply are a result of mindless interactions with matter.
To us, from the vantage of the 21st Century, this philosophy regarding the nature of reality might seem very commonsensical. For example, surely for an object to be affected by another, some sort of actual touching is necessary, or at least some mechanism is required connecting the two, even if this mechanism cannot be seen? And surely, for any event in the Universe there must be a cause for it? Those of you who are familiar with modern physics will realise that at least these 2 axioms of the mechanistic philosophy have now essentially been rejected. Nevertheless, to a large measure, reality really does seem to operate according to such mechanistic principles. The notion developed in the 17th Century that reality acts wholly in accordance with such mechanical principles was an extraordinary fruitful one in terms of the subsequent prediction and manipulation of our environment and subsequent technology. Although we now recognise that reality is much more complex than what the mechanistic philosophy straightforwardly suggests, the fundamental approach precipitated by this philosophy lives on.
For our purposes the most crucial element of this philosophy was number "3"; that is “all change in nature and natural phenomena results from alterations in the configurations of matterâ€. This encapsulates the idea of reductionism: namely the belief that all aspects of complex phenomena can be understood by reducing them to their constituent parts. It is the motions of these parts and how they interact together which explain the phenomenon concerned. For example, consider a clockwork clock. By looking at the components of that clock - namely the cogs, the springs, and the wheels - and how they all interrelate together, we can actually understand how the minute and hour clock hands move.
Reduction also occurs when we have two apparently unrelated phenomena that are described by different scientific theories, but are then subsequently shown to be different instances of the same underlying scientific theory. Let us illustrate this by an example. Unsupported objects fall to the ground. Now we can describe this motion and encapsulate it into some theory; thus an unsupported object at some height above the Earth's surface will move in a straight line directed towards the Earth's centre and it will continually increase its velocity until striking the earth's surface; that is it will continually accelerate. But, on the face of it, we have a puzzle here. We often see the moon clearly up in the sky, yet it does not fall to the ground! Why does it not do the same as all other objects? Also the planets move in ellipses (a special type of elongated circle, or oval) around the sun. Why do not all the planets fall to the earth?
The obvious solution here is to suppose that the physics of objects near the Earth – referred to as terrestrial mechanics -- and the physics of objects in the “Heavens†– referred to as celestial mechanics -- are of two quite differing types. That is to say that the laws describing the motion of objects near the Earth are quite different from the laws describing the motions of objects in the “Heavens†(or in Space as we might nowadays put it). Indeed, in the early 1600’s, a mathematician from Austria called Johannes Kepler proposed laws describing the motions of planets; these laws are still considered to be an accurate description of the motion of any planet and any satellite. Likewise, around the same time, the Italian Galileo Galilei went some way in describing the laws governing the motions of objects on the Earth. Thus we had one set of laws describing the motion of objects close to the Earth's surface, and we have another set of laws describing the motions of objects in the heavens.
It was the English mathematician Sir Isaac Newton who, in the late 17th Century, showed that these two different sets of laws were in fact all governed by the same rules of physics. That is to say that these two sets of rules could be reduced to, or shown to arise from, just one set of rules. But how can two radically different types of motions, as exemplified by planets and satellites on the one hand exhibiting almost circular motion, and the falling of objects near the Earth's surface on the other hand, possibly be instances of the same set of rules?
To understand how, let's consider somebody who throws a ball. The path of this ball will follow a gently curving arc called a parabola. Let's consider the case where the ball is thrown horizontally -- that is parallel to the Earth's surface. If, hypothetically, we could throw the ball with sufficient force, and taking into account the fact that the Earth's surface is curved, then the curving arc that the ball will follow as it descends to the Earth's surface could precisely equal the rate at which the Earth's surface, due to its curvature, falls away from the path of the ball. In short the ball will orbit the Earth. It seems then that one object can orbit another, larger, object, but that the former object can nevertheless still be described as falling towards the larger object. We can see then how it is possible that the orbital motions of the planets around the Sun, and of satellites around planets, is simply a special case of the falling down process. We have shown how two apparently disparate phenomena have their origin in one underlying principle -- namely universal gravitation responsible for the falling down process.
Much of our experience tends to suggest that reality is reducible in the aforementioned manner. Complex things, whether machines or occurring naturally, can be understood by looking at the behaviour of their component parts. A modern example here are particle accelerators. In an analogically akin way to how we might smash a clock apart in an attempt to understand how it works, particle physicists smash atoms and subatomic particles into each other to find what they are made of and how they behave. Similarly, as was achieved so spectacularly by Sir Isaac Newton when he reconciled terrestrial and celestial mechanics, differing theories describing differing aspects of reality might expect to be ultimately reducible to an underlying theory. Indeed physicists sometimes refer to a "Theory of Everything" (T.O.E) that is the ultimate outcome of such reductionism. This is the notion that just as the 2 different theories comprising celestial mechanics and terrestrial mechanics can be reduced to the one theory of universal gravitational attraction, so all the differing theories describing various aspects of reality can be reduced to, or can be shown to be aspects of, one underlying theory. In other words just one theory would describe the totality of reality. (4)
If all phenomena can be understood by looking at its component parts and how these parts interact, then this process must continue until we reach the smallest component parts possible. In principle then reductionism entails that the physics of elementary particles – the smallest particles physics deems exists --should in principle be able to explain all things. In practice, though, reality is far too complex for this to be achieved. For this reason there are many differing branches of science, each with their own distinctive methods of investigation and theories. We have, for example, the sciences of:
· Physics
· Chemistry
· Biology
· Psychology
· Sociology,
As we descend the list each branch of science deals with phenomena on a progressively greater and greater scale, and each has their own distinctive method of investigation and theories peculiar to that discipline. Nevertheless, in principle, if not in practice, the reductionist must hold that the science dealing with the entities on the smallest scale -- namely physics – can explain and replace all the theories in the other scientific disciplines.
Let us try to illustrate this idea further by referring once more to the example of a clockwork clock. As an example of reduction it was stated above that by looking at the components of that clock - namely the cogs, the springs, and the wheels - and how they all interrelate together, we can actually understand how the hour, the minute and the second hands move. But suppose, for whatever reason, we were unable to understand the intricate mechanism. This need not stop us making certain observations such as noting the respective rotational speeds of the hour, minute and second hands. Indeed we can even formulate a very simple theory regarding the respective rotational speeds of the hands that can be expected to hold in the future.
Likewise, for each branch of science, we can systematically relate various phenomena that the particular science is concerned with, and subsume the data under some appropriate theory concerning how they will relate in the future. But just as we need to appeal to the underlying intricate mechanism to find the real reason for the movement of the hands in the clock, so we have to appeal to physics, indeed elementary particle physics, if we wish to find the real reason why phenomena are related in a certain way.
But now we come to the crucial point. If, as reductionism implies, all change in nature and natural phenomena results from alterations in the configurations of matter, then we human beings should of course constitute no exception. Indeed this was understood as far back as the birth of the mechanical philosophy in the 17th-century. Even as long ago as then it was widely debated whether animals could be understood as being, in essence, mere biological machines. More radical thinkers took this to its logical conclusion and advocated that human beings too might simply be elaborate machines.
Let us explore the implications of this. Consider the fact that we have the science of psychology to explain peoples’ behaviour. Now the (reductivist) materialist holds that the usage of psychological concepts is simply one of convenience. Although a lot of our behaviour is held to be explicable in terms of the desire on our parts to fulfil certain goals we may have, the materialist holds that the true real causes of my behaviour are the physical processes occurring in my brain. Such physical processes are an inevitable outcome of prior physical states of my brain, which, together with the input to the brain from the environment provided by the 5 senses, evolve or change according to physical laws. And in addition, according to the reductivist materialist, the physical state of the brain and its change to other physical states can ultimately be understood, at least in principle, by the properties and interactions of the most fundamental constituents composing our bodies; namely the properties and interactions of the elementary particles subsumed under the subject matter of physics. In short the science of physics is considered to be the most fundamental of the sciences, and is capable, in principle, of completing explaining our behaviour.
Thus far in this paper I have tried to briefly adumbrate the main reasons for supposing we human beings are essentially biological machines. The rest of this paper will be devoted to attacking this position. This will involve arguing that the considerations outlined in section 2 need not compel us to conclude that the brain generates consciousness. In addition, even taking into account compromise positions labelled as “non-reductive materialistâ€, I shall argue that we have no other option but to conclude that our minds, selves or consciousnesses cannot be described as “physical†without an unacceptable distortion of the word “physicalâ€. Indeed, I shall argue that considerations such as our experienced free will, together with the consideration of various thought experiments I shall introduce, should compel us, at a minimum, to embrace an interactive dualist position. That is that there is a self that is not itself physical, and although is affected by the brain, is nevertheless able to affect the brain in turn, most notably when we exercise our free will.
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1 For further musings on this thought experiment, see section 6
2 This definition should not of course be confused with materialism exemplified by the attitude that the accumulation of worldly possessions constitutes the greatest good.
3 It might be appropriate to mention here that even if the self is created by the brain, in and of itself this is insufficient to establish materialism is correct, and hence my qualification “this lends a lot of credence†in the text. The reader might be slightly puzzled at this remark, but hopefully I can make this clear when we come to section 5; especially where I address a position on the mind and body relationship labelled epiphenomenalism. In any case the reader should not be unduly concerned here as, should we feel disposed to accept that the self has its origin in the brain, by far the most popular position is materialism.
4 For those who are interested, the major stumbling block here, before even the possibility of a T.O.E can be entertained, is the reconciliation of Einstein’s general theory of relativity with Quantum Mechanics.
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Are we Machines?
1. Preliminary
Are we machines? In other words is it possible we could, essentially, just be very sophisticated robots? If this is so then we will not differ in any substantive manner from any other physical object in the Universe – we will differ merely in our physical complexity. Many of us might balk at such a suggestion. It should be stressed though that merely from the fact that we might find this notion to be disturbing, if not repugnant, this does not in itself ensure the falsity of this thesis. We need to weigh in the balance all the reasons for supposing the mind has its source in the brain -- and that we are therefore essentially biological machines -- as well as all the reasons for supposing it is not. In this, the "Are we Machines" part of my website, I want to spell out the reasons why a lot of people, particularly educated people, do indeed believe that we human beings, although somewhat more complex in our operations than any other physical thing, are nevertheless not qualitatively different from any other physical thing. I then intend to try and show that, ultimately, such a stance cannot be maintained.
The Case For:
2. The evidence from the apparent dependency of mind on brain.
One very persuasive criterion by which we might judge that we are essentially machines is to ask ourselves whether our behaviour, in common with the behaviour of all other objects in the Universe, simply follows physical laws. By physical laws we simply are referring to the regularities that we observe in nature. Thus, possibly the most obvious example we could point to here, is the law of gravitation that accounts for the fact that objects, near the surface of the Earth, will, when released, fall at pretty much the same acceleration. The fact that the world exhibits such regularities allows us not only to predict future events, but also allows us to exercise a degree of control over our environment. Thus modern times has witnessed a bewildering proliferation of various machines capable of carrying out all sorts of tasks. But no matter how complex such machines might be, ultimately they are simply operating according to such physical laws that we have observed, and their behaviour is just as explicable with reference to physical laws as the motion of an apple is when released. The pertinent question here then is to ask if we have any reasons to suppose that our own behaviour has a differing origin. If we agree that it does not -- that is to say our own behaviour is wholly in accordance with physical laws -- then with what reason are we to suppose we are qualitatively different from any other physical thing? In particular what makes us think that we are not simply super-sophisticated biological machines?
One immediate objection here might be to point out that we grow and also modify our behaviour as a result from input from the environment; that is to say we learn from experience. Indeed, not just human beings do this, but all organisms do. This is in contrast to man-made machines, which, once constructed, do not generally change their internal organisation. This entails that, given the same input from the environment, unlike us and all other organisms, they will always exhibit the same behaviour. Therefore how can it be maintained that we are merely machines?
But the claim here is not that human beings are at all similar to today's machines. No, in saying that human beings are essentially nothing more than biological machines, we are talking about what machines could achieve in principle. And it is clear that we can have machines that can adapt and change, and even learn according to the input from its environment. In short this objection does not hold water.
So are we simply biological machines, albeit extremely sophisticated ones? Especially pertinent to our consideration here are those machines labelled computers. Computers can now carry out many tasks that were formerly thought to be exclusively a preserve of the human intellect, and, moreover, as a partial response to the objection mentioned above, can even adapt and learn. The most obvious example here are the playing of games such as chess where it is now possible to program a computer that can outperform the best chess players in the world. We even have computers that can carry out rudimentary conversations with people. These computers, at least for a while, might well manage to fool us into believing that we are conversing with a genuine person.
It should be pointed out here that even if one successfully argued against the notion that the brain operates on similar principles to a computer, it arguably would still operate according to physical laws. Thus the brain would still be a machine, and, at least in principle, could be created with a sufficiently advanced technology. Putting it another way, why should brains be the only type of thing that do not operate according to physical laws? And if they do operate according to such laws, then why suppose we differ in principle from any machine? We might admittedly be very complex machines, but essentially machines nevertheless.
Let's consider this point from a different angle. Our brains consist of billions of neurons. It seems reasonable to suppose that neurons simply operate according to physical laws just as much as anything else in the Universe. What would happen if we replaced one of our neurons with an electronic circuit which carries out the exact same physical process as the neuron had? If it carried out the exact same physical process or function, would it not be the case that we would notice no difference whatsoever? Furthermore we can imagine all our neurons getting replaced one by one until such electronic circuits had replaced every last one of our neurons. In this case we would have an electronic brain, and yet it seems we should still be conscious and indeed feel exactly the same! Of course it might be argued that no electronic circuit could ever duplicate the functioning of a neuron. But even if this is so, if in common with all other physical processes in the Universe the neuron functions according to physical laws, then, at least in principle, a artificial neuron is possible, even if it were to be forevermore beyond our ability to create! (1)
From a completely different direction, and albeit of a more indirect kind, we apparently find yet further reasons to suppose that we are simply machines. There is an overwhelming amount of evidence that one's emotions, patterns of behaviour and cognitive skills are intimately tied to the state of one's brain. Just to mention a couple of examples; our capacity to understand written and spoken words, or the capacity to speak and so on, are impaired or even eliminated with injuries to certain regions of the brain. Damage to the hippocampal and thalamic areas of the brain can destroy one's ability to store new long-term memories. In addition radical personality change may be brought about by injury to the brain. The most famous example here is undoubtedly Phineas Gage. We can also point to the effects of drugs which have a propensity to effect our emotions, attitudes and dispositions. Indeed even alcohol and caffeine do this.
These facts regarding not only the apparent tight correlation between our states of consciousness and physical states of the brain, but, as in the examples cited, such conscious states following physical states of the brain, powerfully suggest to many people that processes in the brain generate consciousness or, alternatively, that consciousness is simply another way of talking about brain processes – the thesis of materialism. But regardless of whether conscious states follow, or literally are brain processes, it is held that such apparent complete dependency of conscious states on the state of the brain almost certainly shows that consciousness, or more generally the mind, has its source entirely in the brain. If this is so then our mental lives simply will reflect everything that goes on in the brain, and we will indeed essentially be machines.
To sum up. The argument that many people make is that we have no compelling reason to suppose we are different from any other object in the Universe, and thus, in common with all other objects in the Universe, we are just as susceptible to physical laws as any other object. In particular, although the brain is extremely complex in its operation, there is no cogent reason to suppose that it is qualitatively different from any complex man-made machine. We might feel that we are different from any other object in the Universe, but the foregoing considerations might make us feel disposed to conclude that it is not a difference in kind we are talking about here, but rather, merely a difference in degree. This notion is especially persuasive when we note that mental states, including our emotions, dispositions, attitudes and general personality, can all apparently be affected by injury or alteration to the brain, thereby implying that the source of consciousness is within the brain. This being so, and acknowledging that the brain is a physical object like any other physical object that operates according to physical laws, it might seem that a sensible position is to conclude that we are, indeed, essentially machines.
3. The Evidence from Materialism
i) What is Materialism?
The conclusion reached in the previous section lies at the heart of a philosophical position regarding the nature of reality called Materialism. (2) Traditionally materialism was the thesis that everything that exists is matter. In present times, however, the notion of matter is considered to be a bit restrictive. We might tend to think of matter as stuff we can touch and see. But if matter is all that exists, then it follows that energy, gravity, and various exotic subatomic particles and so on, should also be considered to be matter. Consequently there is now a tendency to say that materialism simply means that everything that exists is physical. Furthermore that all change in the world can be wholly explained with reference to physical laws. Indeed, in acknowledgement of this, the word physicalism is sometimes used in place of the word materialism.
If materialism is the thesis that everything that exists is physical, then what does “physical†mean? Traditionally it has been maintained that it is the fundamental ‘stuff’ of the world. So for example, it is everything we perceive through our five senses, such as tables, chairs and trees. But it is also those things we can only see by virtue of the use of instruments such as microscopes and so on which simply extend the range of things we are able to sense. Finally it also includes those things whose existence we cannot directly see at all, with or without the use of instruments, but whose existence we nevertheless feel we can confidently infer. An obvious example here are electrons. Nobody can directly see electrons, and arguably we could never see them in principle, but we can set up experiments and obtain results that are explicable if we imagine the existence of very small entities with certain properties. These entities we label electrons.
Materialists have also traditionally regarded physical things and processes as having a mind-independent existence. Thus objects exist whether or not we are looking at them, and even if the Universe had never given birth to any sentient creatures, that Universe and all it contains would still enjoy a ‘full-blooded’ existence. This might appear to be belabouring the extremely obvious, but as we shall see in the Perception and Reality section (forthcoming), this commonsensical notion of reality can certainly be challenged.
So if everything is physical, this also entails that our minds are also entirely physical. In other words, that we are no different, at least in kind if not in complexity, from any other physical processes or things in the world.
ii). Why suppose Materialism is correct?
The considerations discussed in section 1 is our starting point here. If we are to conclude that our selves or conscious states are created by the brain, then this lends a lot of credence to the idea that we are essentially like any other object in the Universe. Given that all such objects and their properties are physical, then it follows that our selves are also physical and thus materialism is vindicated. (3)
But we have additional reasons for supposing Materialism to be correct; namely as suggested by the progress of science in understanding the world. To explain this, a digression is in order; more specifically we need to take a look at the genesis of our contemporary scientific understanding of reality. To this end we must now take a brief look at the scientific revolution of the 17th century.
Prior to the 17th Century there was a tendency to view the world as being ultimately mysterious. Lingering on from medieval times was the notion that the world was full of meaning - teeming with supernatural causes where angels and demons, spirits, occult powers and mystical principles played a prominent role. As a consequence our lives and the world were seen to be intrinsically capricious in nature and therefore beyond the comprehension of human beings. In addition, both literally and in terms of importance, man largely saw himself as being at the centre of the Universe, not least of which was that he generally believed himself to be endowed with an immortal soul. The scientific revolution inaugurated in the 17th Century was pivotal in eroding all these beliefs, and in particular fostered the notion of man as simply being a biological machine. It also was instrumental in creating our modern world together with its technological ubiquity.
So what kicked off this scientific revolution? This is a question that is much debated but there at least seem to be two crucial elements we can discern. Firstly there was the idea that if an omnipotent God had created the Cosmos, and we were the reason for its creation, would God not make the Cosmos amenable to human intellect? In particular, would he not make the cosmos operate according to well-defined laws that we might discern?
Secondly there arose the mechanistic philosophy. This philosophy regarding the nature of reality can be expressed succinctly in 5 points:
1. All action is by contact: no action at a distance.
2. All objects in the Universe are composed of microscopic ultimately small parts (indivisible 'atoms' or indivisible 'corpuscles').
3. All change in nature and natural phenomena results from alterations in the configurations of matter.
4. Determinism rules the world – that is an unbroken chain of cause and effect.
5. No teleology - i.e. events and processes are not governed by any purpose but simply are a result of mindless interactions with matter.
To us, from the vantage of the 21st Century, this philosophy regarding the nature of reality might seem very commonsensical. For example, surely for an object to be affected by another, some sort of actual touching is necessary, or at least some mechanism is required connecting the two, even if this mechanism cannot be seen? And surely, for any event in the Universe there must be a cause for it? Those of you who are familiar with modern physics will realise that at least these 2 axioms of the mechanistic philosophy have now essentially been rejected. Nevertheless, to a large measure, reality really does seem to operate according to such mechanistic principles. The notion developed in the 17th Century that reality acts wholly in accordance with such mechanical principles was an extraordinary fruitful one in terms of the subsequent prediction and manipulation of our environment and subsequent technology. Although we now recognise that reality is much more complex than what the mechanistic philosophy straightforwardly suggests, the fundamental approach precipitated by this philosophy lives on.
For our purposes the most crucial element of this philosophy was number "3"; that is “all change in nature and natural phenomena results from alterations in the configurations of matterâ€. This encapsulates the idea of reductionism: namely the belief that all aspects of complex phenomena can be understood by reducing them to their constituent parts. It is the motions of these parts and how they interact together which explain the phenomenon concerned. For example, consider a clockwork clock. By looking at the components of that clock - namely the cogs, the springs, and the wheels - and how they all interrelate together, we can actually understand how the minute and hour clock hands move.
Reduction also occurs when we have two apparently unrelated phenomena that are described by different scientific theories, but are then subsequently shown to be different instances of the same underlying scientific theory. Let us illustrate this by an example. Unsupported objects fall to the ground. Now we can describe this motion and encapsulate it into some theory; thus an unsupported object at some height above the Earth's surface will move in a straight line directed towards the Earth's centre and it will continually increase its velocity until striking the earth's surface; that is it will continually accelerate. But, on the face of it, we have a puzzle here. We often see the moon clearly up in the sky, yet it does not fall to the ground! Why does it not do the same as all other objects? Also the planets move in ellipses (a special type of elongated circle, or oval) around the sun. Why do not all the planets fall to the earth?
The obvious solution here is to suppose that the physics of objects near the Earth – referred to as terrestrial mechanics -- and the physics of objects in the “Heavens†– referred to as celestial mechanics -- are of two quite differing types. That is to say that the laws describing the motion of objects near the Earth are quite different from the laws describing the motions of objects in the “Heavens†(or in Space as we might nowadays put it). Indeed, in the early 1600’s, a mathematician from Austria called Johannes Kepler proposed laws describing the motions of planets; these laws are still considered to be an accurate description of the motion of any planet and any satellite. Likewise, around the same time, the Italian Galileo Galilei went some way in describing the laws governing the motions of objects on the Earth. Thus we had one set of laws describing the motion of objects close to the Earth's surface, and we have another set of laws describing the motions of objects in the heavens.
It was the English mathematician Sir Isaac Newton who, in the late 17th Century, showed that these two different sets of laws were in fact all governed by the same rules of physics. That is to say that these two sets of rules could be reduced to, or shown to arise from, just one set of rules. But how can two radically different types of motions, as exemplified by planets and satellites on the one hand exhibiting almost circular motion, and the falling of objects near the Earth's surface on the other hand, possibly be instances of the same set of rules?
To understand how, let's consider somebody who throws a ball. The path of this ball will follow a gently curving arc called a parabola. Let's consider the case where the ball is thrown horizontally -- that is parallel to the Earth's surface. If, hypothetically, we could throw the ball with sufficient force, and taking into account the fact that the Earth's surface is curved, then the curving arc that the ball will follow as it descends to the Earth's surface could precisely equal the rate at which the Earth's surface, due to its curvature, falls away from the path of the ball. In short the ball will orbit the Earth. It seems then that one object can orbit another, larger, object, but that the former object can nevertheless still be described as falling towards the larger object. We can see then how it is possible that the orbital motions of the planets around the Sun, and of satellites around planets, is simply a special case of the falling down process. We have shown how two apparently disparate phenomena have their origin in one underlying principle -- namely universal gravitation responsible for the falling down process.
Much of our experience tends to suggest that reality is reducible in the aforementioned manner. Complex things, whether machines or occurring naturally, can be understood by looking at the behaviour of their component parts. A modern example here are particle accelerators. In an analogically akin way to how we might smash a clock apart in an attempt to understand how it works, particle physicists smash atoms and subatomic particles into each other to find what they are made of and how they behave. Similarly, as was achieved so spectacularly by Sir Isaac Newton when he reconciled terrestrial and celestial mechanics, differing theories describing differing aspects of reality might expect to be ultimately reducible to an underlying theory. Indeed physicists sometimes refer to a "Theory of Everything" (T.O.E) that is the ultimate outcome of such reductionism. This is the notion that just as the 2 different theories comprising celestial mechanics and terrestrial mechanics can be reduced to the one theory of universal gravitational attraction, so all the differing theories describing various aspects of reality can be reduced to, or can be shown to be aspects of, one underlying theory. In other words just one theory would describe the totality of reality. (4)
If all phenomena can be understood by looking at its component parts and how these parts interact, then this process must continue until we reach the smallest component parts possible. In principle then reductionism entails that the physics of elementary particles – the smallest particles physics deems exists --should in principle be able to explain all things. In practice, though, reality is far too complex for this to be achieved. For this reason there are many differing branches of science, each with their own distinctive methods of investigation and theories. We have, for example, the sciences of:
· Physics
· Chemistry
· Biology
· Psychology
· Sociology,
As we descend the list each branch of science deals with phenomena on a progressively greater and greater scale, and each has their own distinctive method of investigation and theories peculiar to that discipline. Nevertheless, in principle, if not in practice, the reductionist must hold that the science dealing with the entities on the smallest scale -- namely physics – can explain and replace all the theories in the other scientific disciplines.
Let us try to illustrate this idea further by referring once more to the example of a clockwork clock. As an example of reduction it was stated above that by looking at the components of that clock - namely the cogs, the springs, and the wheels - and how they all interrelate together, we can actually understand how the hour, the minute and the second hands move. But suppose, for whatever reason, we were unable to understand the intricate mechanism. This need not stop us making certain observations such as noting the respective rotational speeds of the hour, minute and second hands. Indeed we can even formulate a very simple theory regarding the respective rotational speeds of the hands that can be expected to hold in the future.
Likewise, for each branch of science, we can systematically relate various phenomena that the particular science is concerned with, and subsume the data under some appropriate theory concerning how they will relate in the future. But just as we need to appeal to the underlying intricate mechanism to find the real reason for the movement of the hands in the clock, so we have to appeal to physics, indeed elementary particle physics, if we wish to find the real reason why phenomena are related in a certain way.
But now we come to the crucial point. If, as reductionism implies, all change in nature and natural phenomena results from alterations in the configurations of matter, then we human beings should of course constitute no exception. Indeed this was understood as far back as the birth of the mechanical philosophy in the 17th-century. Even as long ago as then it was widely debated whether animals could be understood as being, in essence, mere biological machines. More radical thinkers took this to its logical conclusion and advocated that human beings too might simply be elaborate machines.
Let us explore the implications of this. Consider the fact that we have the science of psychology to explain peoples’ behaviour. Now the (reductivist) materialist holds that the usage of psychological concepts is simply one of convenience. Although a lot of our behaviour is held to be explicable in terms of the desire on our parts to fulfil certain goals we may have, the materialist holds that the true real causes of my behaviour are the physical processes occurring in my brain. Such physical processes are an inevitable outcome of prior physical states of my brain, which, together with the input to the brain from the environment provided by the 5 senses, evolve or change according to physical laws. And in addition, according to the reductivist materialist, the physical state of the brain and its change to other physical states can ultimately be understood, at least in principle, by the properties and interactions of the most fundamental constituents composing our bodies; namely the properties and interactions of the elementary particles subsumed under the subject matter of physics. In short the science of physics is considered to be the most fundamental of the sciences, and is capable, in principle, of completing explaining our behaviour.
Thus far in this paper I have tried to briefly adumbrate the main reasons for supposing we human beings are essentially biological machines. The rest of this paper will be devoted to attacking this position. This will involve arguing that the considerations outlined in section 2 need not compel us to conclude that the brain generates consciousness. In addition, even taking into account compromise positions labelled as “non-reductive materialistâ€, I shall argue that we have no other option but to conclude that our minds, selves or consciousnesses cannot be described as “physical†without an unacceptable distortion of the word “physicalâ€. Indeed, I shall argue that considerations such as our experienced free will, together with the consideration of various thought experiments I shall introduce, should compel us, at a minimum, to embrace an interactive dualist position. That is that there is a self that is not itself physical, and although is affected by the brain, is nevertheless able to affect the brain in turn, most notably when we exercise our free will.
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1 For further musings on this thought experiment, see section 6
2 This definition should not of course be confused with materialism exemplified by the attitude that the accumulation of worldly possessions constitutes the greatest good.
3 It might be appropriate to mention here that even if the self is created by the brain, in and of itself this is insufficient to establish materialism is correct, and hence my qualification “this lends a lot of credence†in the text. The reader might be slightly puzzled at this remark, but hopefully I can make this clear when we come to section 5; especially where I address a position on the mind and body relationship labelled epiphenomenalism. In any case the reader should not be unduly concerned here as, should we feel disposed to accept that the self has its origin in the brain, by far the most popular position is materialism.
4 For those who are interested, the major stumbling block here, before even the possibility of a T.O.E can be entertained, is the reconciliation of Einstein’s general theory of relativity with Quantum Mechanics.
You're the only person who thinks my paper deserves any comments 
So tell me; what is boring about it??
No, they simply mean that it cannot be possibly be achieved at this present time.