My Malerin and Hypnopsi are wrong about God vs Matter

[rocketdodger]

In a previous thread Hypnopsi, championed by Malerin, claimed that idealism is more pragmatic because the notion of God is more supported by what we know than the notion of Matter.

This argument is invalid.

For an entity to be sure of anything, there must exist a referrent. For an entity to be sure something is not something else, there must exist at least two referrents.

I submit that our notion of "self" requires at least two referrents -- one internal and one external. In the base case, the internal referrent is "self" and the external referrent is "not self."

I don't see how there could be a notion of self without a satisfaction of at least this base case.

Thus, logically, if one is sure self exists, one is also sure that not-self exists I.E. if one is sure they can identify things as self then this mathematically implies they can partition the set of all things into self and not-self. Note that the fact that either partition may be empty is irrelevant -- the partitioning can be done.

And this is why Hypnopsi and Malerin are wrong -- if God is an extension of self, then we can say Matter is simply an extension of not-self. This invalidates the claim that there is more evidence for God than for Matter.

 

[cj.23]

This argument is invalid.

For an entity to be sure of anything, there must exist a referrent. For an entity to be sure something is not something else, there must exist at least two referrents.

I submit that our notion of "self" requires at least two referrents -- one internal and one external. In the base case, the internal referrent is "self" and the external referrent is "not self."

Interesting. So if universe exists, not-universe exists? If matter exists not-matter exists? Just thinking it through...

cj x

 

[rocketdodger]

Interesting. So if universe exists, not-universe exists? If matter exists not-matter exists? Just thinking it through...

cj x

No, that isn't what I implied at all.

I said

For an entity to be sure something is not something else, there must exist at least two referrents.

Which means the inverse of what you are asking -- if you want to say not-universe exists, then you must know of a referrent for not-universe in addition to a referrent for universe.

 

[Gate2501]

In before solipsism!

No seriously though, I bet this turns into a fight about how "self" is more valid than "not self."

Not my argument, I'm just sayin'.

Thats whats gonna happen here =p

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

No, that isn't what I implied at all.

I said

Which means the inverse of what you are asking -- if you want to say not-universe exists, then you must know of a referrent for not-universe in addition to a referrent for universe.

No, it's more along the lines of -- if there is a fundamental substance, then there is no way to define it because definition requires reference to something else (we explain in terms of other things). You can't define the fundamental substance in terms of itself because that is circular. It's probably better to call it undefined (or the unlimited) than matter or energy or God or self. We could attach any of those labels to it as long as we remember that we are just attaching a label to it and not identifying what it is.

 

[cj.23]

No, that isn't what I implied at all.

I said

Which means the inverse of what you are asking -- if you want to say not-universe exists, then you must know of a referrent for not-universe in addition to a referrent for universe.

What are the referrents for universe then?

cj x

 

[rocketdodger]

What are the referrents for universe then?

cj x

Why are you asking me? I have no idea.

 

[Undesired Walrus]

'What is mind? No matter. what is matter? Never mind.'

Homer Simpson