MRAPs replacing Humvees. Why did it take so long?

[This Guy]

Anyone else read the USA Today, Monday, July 16, 2007, about the MRAPs, and the time it took to get them to the troops?

For those that didn't, and aren't familiar with the MRAPs, a little info.

MRAP = Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicle.

Some numbers to consider - According to USA Today, "Gates said he was influenced by a news report - originally in USA Today - that disclosed Marine units using MRAPs in Anbar reported no deaths in 300 roadside bombings in the past year"

The floors of the MRAPs sit about 3 feet off the ground, and are V shaped. The Humvees sit 16 inches off the ground and are flat. Humvees (per the report) get 16 times the force, and without the deflection given by the V shape sustain much more damage from IEDs buried in the roadway.

Per the report, IEDs cause more than half of all combat deaths in Iraq.

The report indicates that request for MRAPs were being made as early as December, 2003.

Our troops are getting them now.

The first contract for what would become the Iraqi Light Armored Vehicle - virtually identical to the MRAPs sought by U.S. Forces then and now, and made in the USA by BAE Systems - was issued in May 2006. They began arriving 90 days later As of this spring, 400 units had been delivered. Again, these were for the Iraqi army, not our folks!

The report goes into more detail than I can repeat here, but one of the arguments given for the delay is that no one knew the enemy would shift to buried bombs, versus the roadside bombs they had been using.

What I can't understand about this argument is that throughout history, armies have looked for weakness in the enemy's forces. Whether that be tactical weakness or equipment weakness. When a weakness is found, it is exploited.

We (and our enemies) knew the sides of the Humvee was vulnerable. They exploited that weakness, and we responded by putting more armor there. Would it not stand to reason that the enemy would then look for another weak spot?

Valid arguments about the relatively slow speed of the MRAPs, compared to the Humvees were also made. But the report indicates the MRAPs of various designs are rated from 55 to 78 MPH. That's not too shabby for a safe vehicle, IMHO.

I forget the number of troop deaths the report claims could have been prevented if the troops had been in MRAPs rather than Humvees, but it was in the hundreds.

Here's a link to what I believe is a related article from May 23, 2007 -

http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2007-05-23-marines-mrap_N.htm

I know it takes a while to field new equipment. But it sure sounds like we could have done MUCH better on the MRAPs than we did.

Other views?

 

[luchog]

I know it takes a while to field new equipment. But it sure sounds like we could have done MUCH better on the MRAPs than we did.

Other views?

The primary obstacles to adoption and upgrade of equipment are cost and bureaucracy. It takes time to get through the red tape. And without sufficient funding, it just doesn't happen.

Then there's the issue that when a new piece of hardware is needed, that doesn't currently exist, there's a lot of designing, testing, redesigning, field trials, etc. Then there's the contracting, bidding, evaluating, tooling up for manufacturing, etc.

Maybe it could have been done faster. Certainly bureaucracy is always problem; but it's also a safeguard against unnecessary and fraudulent expenditures as well.

 

[Darth Rotor]

Anyone else read the USA Today, Monday, July 16, 2007, about the MRAPs, and the time it took to get them to the troops?

For those that didn't, and aren't familiar with the MRAPs, a little info.

MRAP = Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicle.

Some numbers to consider - According to USA Today, "Gates said he was influenced by a news report - originally in USA Today - that disclosed Marine units using MRAPs in Anbar reported no deaths in 300 roadside bombings in the past year"

The floors of the MRAPs sit about 3 feet off the ground, and are V shaped. The Humvees sit 16 inches off the ground and are flat. Humvees (per the report) get 16 times the force, and without the deflection given by the V shape sustain much more damage from IEDs buried in the roadway.

Per the report, IEDs cause more than half of all combat deaths in Iraq.

The report indicates that request for MRAPs were being made as early as December, 2003.

Our troops are getting them now.

The first contract for what would become the Iraqi Light Armored Vehicle - virtually identical to the MRAPs sought by U.S. Forces then and now, and made in the USA by BAE Systems - was issued in May 2006. They began arriving 90 days later As of this spring, 400 units had been delivered. Again, these were for the Iraqi army, not our folks!

The report goes into more detail than I can repeat here, but one of the arguments given for the delay is that no one knew the enemy would shift to buried bombs, versus the roadside bombs they had been using.

What I can't understand about this argument is that throughout history, armies have looked for weakness in the enemy's forces. Whether that be tactical weakness or equipment weakness. When a weakness is found, it is exploited.

We (and our enemies) knew the sides of the Humvee was vulnerable. They exploited that weakness, and we responded by putting more armor there. Would it not stand to reason that the enemy would then look for another weak spot?

Valid arguments about the relatively slow speed of the MRAPs, compared to the Humvees were also made. But the report indicates the MRAPs of various designs are rated from 55 to 78 MPH. That's not too shabby for a safe vehicle, IMHO.

I forget the number of troop deaths the report claims could have been prevented if the troops had been in MRAPs rather than Humvees, but it was in the hundreds.

Here's a link to what I believe is a related article from May 23, 2007 -

http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2007-05-23-marines-mrap_N.htm

I know it takes a while to field new equipment. But it sure sounds like we could have done MUCH better on the MRAPs than we did.

Other views?

Ralph Peters and Joe Galloway would tend to agree with you, and the best answer is that not enough people high enough up in the defense department thought it important enough to replace the thousands of HUMMV's with these, and take money away from other programs to do so, to change the acquisition plan.

I think that the standard Heavy division in the US Army has between two and three thousand Humvees of varying cofigurations. I think it would have taken a couple of years in any case to outfit two division, so early to mid 2005 would have been the soonest you saw them in the force.

A comment on the Iraqis: there were some studies done, forget the report last year and who wrote it, about the higher rate of casualties in Iraqi army and police units due to less body armor and lighter vehicles. Getting them MRAPs was a requirement to keep their casualties down and morale up, but that does not excuse not seeking added vendors for a larger buy, unless low inventory of strategic materials and certain grades of steel/plastic/armor was the logistic pinch in the pipe.

DR