Moral Skepticism

[Tsukasa Buddha]

I'm starting my more in depth study of ethics and morality now, so I would like to have criticisms of my current view . In a previous thread, which I can't seem to find at the moment, there was a discussion about science, religion, morality, and values. I did a very messy job of it, so here I go again, and hopefully I will explain myself properly.

Some gave me the impression that science could be used to determine values or morality, I disagree. I believe that science has no business in values and that it only has moderate influence in morality.

I am using the term value to be the quality that a person gives an object or action that determines its goodness/badness or worth. And a well developed value system comprises a moral code. The place that I see science entering is under applied ethics, where one analyzes an action under their moral framework. There science can determine what the action actually does (Like whether abstinence-only is effective) and that can be analyzed under a person's ethical values to determine whether or not the action is moral or not. Morality gives us or ideal modes of behaviour, our ideal life, etc.

I do not believe that science enters into the arena of morals or values otherwise. Science is by nature objective. Values are always individual judgements, they are subjective and not able to be "true" or verified empirically. How does one demonstrate the truth of "Killing people is wrong?" How does one empirically test "wrongness" in the first place in terms of moral values? One can determine whether an action will be beneficial to the gene pool, whether it will be beneficial to one's survival, etc. But these are pragmatic decisions based on further value judgements. How is preserving the gene pool "good?"

Now, one counter is to say that some values are intrinsic/self-evident/objective, like valuing one's life or happiness, or even valuing life itself, and that our system can be based further on that based on reason and rationality (I got this from an Objectivist). I disagree. Just like the Founders and the Declaration of Independence, I think this is just a cop-out. I have yet to see someone demonstrate why some values are "intrinsic even if others deny them" or objective somehow.

I say that there is nothing objective about morality. I have yet to see a moral statement demonstrated to be objectively true that does not revert to a subjective value that is beyond rational discourse.

Now, evolutionary science, biology, game theory, etc. may detail about how moral behaviour evolved to benefit the survival of genes, but that does nothing to show why we should pay heed to these biologically imprinted impulses or whether they are rational.

Also, consider the case of a man whose brain damage led him to feel little to no emotions:

Elliot could think but he couldn’t judge value. “[T]the cold-bloodedness of Elliot’s reasoning prevented him from assigning different values to different options, and made his decision-making landscape hopelessly flat.”

http://dangerousintersection.org/?p=146

This fits with the idea that moral judgements and values are emotionally based. We can use rationality, reason, and science to determine how to best act in accord with our values, but they do not determine them. They are not "true" or "false".

Ergo, might makes right. The end.

 

[The Nimble Pianist]

Some gave me the impression that science could be used to determine values or morality, I disagree. I believe that science has no business in values and that it only has moderate influence in morality.

I wouldn't even go that far. I doubt that science can determine values or morals. How does one empirically test the morality of something? I've always understood ethics to be a subset of philosophy and not science. You might be able to make a case for utilitarian ethics being scientific, but even that I feel would be a stretch.

The place that I see science entering is under applied ethics, where one analyzes an action under their moral framework. There science can determine what the action actually does (Like whether abstinence-only is effective) and that can be analyzed under a person's ethical values to determine whether or not the action is moral or not.

*Emphasis mine*

You just stated previously that values cannot be determined scientifically yet you want a person's values to be the standard by which we judge, scientifically, his or her morals? Maybe I'm not understanding you.

I do not believe that science enters into the arena of morals or values otherwise. Science is by nature objective. Values are always individual judgements, they are subjective and not able to be "true" or verified empirically. How does one demonstrate the truth of "Killing people is wrong?" How does one empirically test "wrongness" in the first place in terms of moral values?

This is precisely why I don't think it's appropriate to consider ethics a science at all. As I mentioned previously, one might be able to make a case for the utility of actions being a scientific standard (but even this is boarders on subjectivism). Essentially (as it has been explained to me) utilitarianism boils down to *units of happiness*. We can ascribe a number of units to any given action (here's were the subjectivism lies) and a number of unites to the opposite action. Whichever action has the highest amount of utility (in number of units) is said to be more moral than the opposite action. If any action results in a negative amount of utility then the action is said to be immoral. An example might be murder: Let's say I desire to kill you. The utility in my killing you for me will be a certain number, yet obviously the lack of utility for you would be a larger, negative number thus resulting in an overall negative utility (i.e. an immoral action).

One can determine whether an action will be beneficial to the gene pool, whether it will be beneficial to one's survival, etc. But these are pragmatic decisions based on further value judgements. How is preserving the gene pool "good?"

Preserving the gene pool increases the amount of happiness for essentially everyone (and thus the utility of the action is positive). Philosophy has never been my strong suit but I don't think one can ascribe utility in such an indirect way.

I say that there is nothing objective about morality. I have yet to see a moral statement demonstrated to be objectively true that does not revert to a subjective value that is beyond rational discourse.

I generally agree.

Now, evolutionary science, biology, game theory, etc. may detail about how moral behaviour evolved to benefit the survival of genes, but that does nothing to show why we should pay heed to these biologically imprinted impulses or whether they are rational.

Exactly. We might be able to biologically state what causes sociopathy however science is not equipped to judge the morality of it.

Also, consider the case of a man whose brain damage led him to feel little to no emotions:

http://dangerousintersection.org/?p=146

This fits with the idea that moral judgements and values are emotionally based. We can use rationality, reason, and science to determine how to best act in accord with our values, but they do not determine them. They are not "true" or "false".

Not really. We can still argue about the ethics of an action without any respect to the actor. We can then subsequently bring in culpability by appealing to cognizance, maturity, motive, etc.

 

[Marquis de Carabas]

You just stated previously that values cannot be determined scientifically yet you want a person's values to be the standard by which we judge, scientifically, his or her morals? Maybe I'm not understanding you.

If I may (and Tsukura, of course, feel free to correct me if I'm way off-base here), look at the parenthetical in his sentence. I believe he is saying (and I agree) that given a value or set of values, science can be useful in determining whether or not a given action actually supports that value. If one has arrived at the value (through whatever means) unwed teenagers should not get pregnant, we can test whether or not abstinence-only sex education is effective in accomplishing the goal. Thus science is not determining the value; it is determining what policies can enforce that value.

As for morality and objectivity, I believe there are a few extremely loose objective moral values. The whole point of morality is social. Thus, anything which tends to work to destroy society is immoral. Of course, different societies function in different ways, so there are only a few things which can be said to have universal moral implications. Off the top of my head, I think of three (there may be more if I dwelt on it a bit): violence, sex, and honesty.

A society in which anyone can kill anyone at any time for any reason is a society doomed to failure. Any society, therefore, will develop some kind of set of morals for dealing with when and by whom and under what circumstances violence can be allowed. Exactly how an individual society deals with the issue is highly variable, but it must be dealt with.

Sex and honesty pretty much get thrown in because allowing anyone to hose anyone at any time for any reason and a complete disregard for truth will tend to lead to a lot more violence. Again, the set of values a particular society evolves to deal with these issues is highly variable, but they will deal with it somehow.

Really, I guess it all comes back to violence. It must be kept to an acceptable minimum for society to continue. Thus completely uncontrolled violence is immoral. Everything else--sex, honesty, and (since it just occurred to me as another widespread issue which must be dealt with) property rights--are dealt with as part of the control of violence.

Of course, this says nothing about why we should be concerned with preserving society, but it's not meant to. As I said, morality is about the preservation of society. Whether or not society should be preserved is not, to my mind, a moral question. Morality doesn't enter the conversation until after one has decided that society is worth keeping around.

 

[Iconoclast08]

Neuropsychology of morality

Some gave me the impression that science could be used to determine values or morality, I disagree. I believe that science has no business in values and that it only has moderate influence in morality.

Stephen Jay Gould heartily agreed with this using his NOMA principle in Rocks of Ages with regards to both morality and religion (Richard Dawkins ripped into him, and rightly so, regarding the latter, though).

I guess I would agree insofar as science does not always have a clear, direct role in dictating what morality should or should not be, but I think science certainly has a lot to say about the neuropsychological underpinnings of morality and its relation to actions and belief.

The place that I see science entering is under applied ethics, where one analyzes an action under their moral framework. There science can determine what the action actually does (Like whether abstinence-only is effective) and that can be analyzed under a person's ethical values to determine whether or not the action is moral or not. Morality gives us or ideal modes of behaviour, our ideal life, etc.

I would just call this loose interpretation and not necessarily "science" per se. If I am understanding you correctly here, you are saying that it's scientific to take an isolated action and judge "well, it's moral/immoral in accordance with what you believe". Is that "science" per se?

Of course, and I think you would agree with me here, this doesn't get at a generalizable, objective "right" or "wrong" per se. What is "moral" for the person (e.g., one of many hiding Jewish civilians refusing to silence and thereby suffocate a crying baby with Nazi soldiers outside) could be "immoral" in the utilitarian sense (getting 50 fellow civilians killed by refusing to silence one baby).

I do not believe that science enters into the arena of morals or values otherwise. Science is by nature objective. Values are always individual judgements, they are subjective and not able to be "true" or verified empirically.

Ok, but that doesn't mean that we can't study how and why people come to believe what they do.

I have yet to see someone demonstrate why some values are "intrinsic even if others deny them" or objective somehow.

Well, the "why" part is up for interpretation, but some types of moral decisions in the face of moral dilemmas (see studies by Jonathan Haidt and Joshua Greene, for example) do elicit predictable outcomes. Asking people to flip a switch to divert a runaway trolley about to kill 5 people onto an alternate set of tracks where it will just kill 1 person instead is the most common response when we are not directly "authoring" the event (versus the footbridge dilemma, for example, where people typically choose not to directly push a man off a bridge onto tracks below to stop a trolley from killing 5 others). These decisions have been examined in fMRI studies showing that utilitarian judgments tend to activate more areas of the brain involved in rational decision-making while the deontological "it's wrong no matter what, period!" type decision-makers tend to make decisions that are more limbically (emotionally) driven.

So I do think there is some objectivity underlying certain types of moral decisions. This can't be wholly relegated to "anything is up for grabs" subjectivity in discussing the basis of these decisions.

I say that there is nothing objective about morality. I have yet to see a moral statement demonstrated to be objectively true that does not revert to a subjective value that is beyond rational discourse.

If you take this emphasis, then yes. But I don't think this is a scientific emphasis.

This fits with the idea that moral judgements and values are emotionally based. We can use rationality, reason, and science to determine how to best act in accord with our values, but they do not determine them. They are not "true" or "false".

I think you are confusing levels of analysis here. While rationality/reason/science may not be able to definitively LABEL an action as moral/immoral in a purist fashion, we can certainly objectively study the neuropsychological BASES of these decisions, which, taken together with other evidence from other levels of analysis, may help us converge on how and why people come to believe what they believe. And there is evidence that certain types of moral decisions ARE emotionally (limbic system) based versus predominantly neurocognitively based.

 

[PixyMisa]

Also, consider the case of a man whose brain damage led him to feel little to no emotions:

http://dangerousintersection.org/?p=146

This fits with the idea that moral judgements and values are emotionally based. We can use rationality, reason, and science to determine how to best act in accord with our values, but they do not determine them. They are not "true" or "false".

No it doesn't.

It cites two men who had brain damage.

 

[Puppycow]

While science is not a tool to answer value questions or generate moral principles, I do think that, more broadly speaking, reason is a necessary part of morality. Compassionate but irrational behavior, while not necessarily immoral, could be immoral in some cases. Good intentions do not necessarily lead to good results, and hence reason is indispensible to morality. Both reason and compassion, as reason without compassion will lead to selfish behaviour, while compassion without reason will lead to bad consequences.

 

[the PC apeman]

It seems to me that asking what morals should be is akin to question begging. It's asking what would you prefer your preferences to be. What morals are is every bit open to science as to why some people prefer mint chocolate chip ice cream to pralines and cream. The problem is we have a long way to go in understanding how subjective experience comes about.