Modal Perfection Argument

[Robin]

Previously I introduced a thread about the Gale-Pruss Ontological argument. This is one of the arguments that is regarded as Theism's best case. Another such is Robert Maydole's "Modal Perfection" argument. It is presented in the "Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology", however I found in another forum somebody had done a good job of presenting the whole thing in one place - http://rfforum.websitetoolbox.com/post?id=3292725

It is a complex looking argument using second order modal logic, however at it's base it is pretty simple. Axioms M1,M2,M3 basically set up Godliness as a property that cannot imply it's own negation - so any attempt to show the property is impossible will result in a contradiction.

After that it is just a version of the old "if God is possible then he exists" sort of argument.

The whole thing is really a non-starter because the "greater than" predicate relies upon the assumption that there is an absolute, objective standard by which to judge "greatness". If "greatness" is just a subjective idea dreamed up by humans then the argument does not work.

To base an argument about the existence of God upon an assumption that would only be plausible if you already believed in God seems a little self-defeating to say the least.

There are other problems too, for example his support for M2 says:

M2 is true - if X is a perfection and X entails Y, then it is better to have X than not and Y is a necessary condition of X. But, it is always better to have that which is a necessary condition for what is better to have than not - the absence of the necessary conditioned means the absence of the conditioned, and per assumption, it is better to have the conditioned than not. Hence, it is better to have Y than not. Hence, Y is a perfection.​

However he seems to have overlooked the fact that the presence of a necessary condition does not imply the presence of the conditioned.

If property A is always better to have and property B is a necessary condition for it, then if I have property B and could not have property A, why would property B still be always be better to have?

 

[rocketdodger]

Yep.

If you can't frame an argument in terms of nothing but particle behavior, then it is an invalid argument.

 

[Lord Emsworth]

Whatever the argument may be about, it certainly isn't God.

 

[Aepervius]

basically, that argument prove nothing.

"If we conceive of a Supreme being as that which there can be no greater, then (M1 ^ M2 ^ M3) imply that there exists exactly one Supreme being.

M1. A property is a Perfection only if its negation is not a Perfection.
M2. Perfections entail only Perfections.
M3. Supremity is a Perfection."

Firstly, there is no reason whatsoever it should be *ONE* supreme perfect three-omni being.

M1 and M2 are a tautology and just defining what perfection means.
M3 is actually not correct IMHO. A supreme being COULD be imperfect. And still be supreme.

Basically, if this is the best the theist have to show for proof-by-logic that gods exists, I can sleep soundly.

 

[Robin]

basically, that argument prove nothing.

"If we conceive of a Supreme being as that which there can be no greater, then (M1 ^ M2 ^ M3) imply that there exists exactly one Supreme being.

M1. A property is a Perfection only if its negation is not a Perfection.
M2. Perfections entail only Perfections.
M3. Supremity is a Perfection."

Firstly, there is no reason whatsoever it should be *ONE* supreme perfect three-omni being.

M1 and M2 are a tautology and just defining what perfection means.

I would disagree..

If A->B it does not imply that B->A. So if "A" is a perfection and I had property "B" but not property "A" then it would not be contradictory that "B" was not a perfection.

Maydole's definition of "perfection" is "something that is always better to have not not" .

Better for whom, he does not say.

The concept that is being expressed by M1 and M2 would seem to be "possible".

M3 is actually not correct IMHO. A supreme being COULD be imperfect. And still be supreme.

The definition of "perfection" is so vague that either case could apply.

Basically, if this is the best the theist have to show for proof-by-logic that gods exists, I can sleep soundly.

Yes, as I always say, after thousands of years of deep, passionate consideration from some of the best minds in the world - this is still the best case Theism has.

This argument is essentially a very complex and technical way of saying "we got nothing".

 

[Dave Rogers]

I have a problem with this one:

M1. A property is a Perfection only if its negation is not a Perfection.

A perfect conductor passes finite current with zero applied voltage. A perfect insulator passes zero current with finite applied voltage. If a body is a perfect insulator, this negates the possibility that it may be a perfect conductor, and vice versa. Therefore, I see no reason why a property cannot be a perfection, but for its negation to include the possibility of a different perfection.

The question is, am I misunderstanding the argument, or understanding it too well?

Dave

 

[Modified]

I have a problem with this one:



A perfect conductor passes finite current with zero applied voltage. A perfect insulator passes zero current with finite applied voltage. If a body is a perfect insulator, this negates the possibility that it may be a perfect conductor, and vice versa. Therefore, I see no reason why a property cannot be a perfection, but for its negation to include the possibility of a different perfection.

The question is, am I misunderstanding the argument, or understanding it too well?

Dave

I'm not sure the concept of "always better to have than not" has any meaning, but assuming it does, conductors and insulators are not in that category.

 

[Dave Rogers]

I'm not sure the concept of "always better to have than not" has any meaning, but assuming it does, conductors and insulators are not in that category.

If I want to transmit power without loss, a perfect conductor is always better to have than not.

Dave

 

[Modified]

If I want to transmit power without loss, a perfect conductor is always better to have than not.

Dave

I'm pretty sure "always" is in this case intended to mean "at all times and under all conditions".

 

[Dave Rogers]

I'm pretty sure "always" is in this case intended to mean "at all times and under all conditions".

Then a perfection is not a property that it is always better to have than not.

In fact, that's one point - probably the first point - at which the argument is broken. The definition of perfection stated is that a perfection is a property is better to have X than not. This is not justified, or even sensible. For example, if X is the property of perfect insulation, then a substance possessing X is clearly not better to have in the specific instance that I want a material to transmit electrical power. Or, more metaphysically, perfect evil is not a better property to have in a supreme being than imperfect evil.

Dave