Materialism and Free Will

[malfunktion]

If everything is made up of some type of material substance which operates according to some set of laws, can free will exist in humans?


Under this assumption, it would seem to me as if free will couldn't exist since our actions would really just be guided by chemical reactions to certain stimuli we encounter. Any thoughts?

Note: please correct me if I have misinterpreted materialism in any way.

 

[scribble]

The trouble with any disussion of free will is that no one can deny we have at least the illusion of it.

Some materialists will disagree with you, but I don't. I think free will probably doesn't exist. However, there's no test you can run that I know of that will determine whether it does.

In what sense can it be said to matter if free will is an actuality or an illusion? You act the same either way...

 

[uruk]

I still say free will is like ordering from a menu. Your free to choose what ever you want just as long as it's on the menu.

 

[Abdul Alhazred]

If everything is made up of some type of material substance which operates according to some set of laws, can free will exist in humans?

Under this assumption, it would seem to me as if free will couldn't exist since our actions would really just be guided by chemical reactions to certain stimuli we encounter. Any thoughts?

Note: please correct me if I have misinterpreted materialism in any way.

The laws of nature seem not to be deterministic.

If there is no free will, is anybody really asking this question?

 

[Gestahl]

Very good question....

Very good question, and one that has been brought up before.
Some things you should know about physics first:

1) Because we are limited to observing the Universe *with* the Universe, there are some things that remain non-deterministic about the universe: i.e. quantum mechanics where we can predict trends and probabilities, but not certainties.

2) It is unclear whether 1 can be overcome with math, intuition, and logic to get at the "Truth." I think not (Godel's theorem proves this for closed axiomatic systems, and I would wager that the universe is one).

3) So, materialism is *not* entirely deterministic. In fact, materialism does not even claim to be deterministic, or non-deterministic. Science does. The two are intertwined, but be careful which says which.

Information about the mind:

4) The human brain contains trillions of cells and those have trillions of atoms, so they would be *in principle* largely deterministic to a super-computer, but I would think it would be prohibitive, and not useful. Plus, the cells themselves act somewhat non-deterministically given the cell state, which is independent of the "state if mind" you are in. That is to say, neurons are not transistors.

5) Some things are too complex to model absolutely deterministically (weather, mind, turbulent flow, etc.) which we approximate with weather forecasts, psychology, and chaos theory, which make decent predicitons.

The great problem with science is jumping in scales. We have useful models at several levels for QM up to neural nets. However, at each step we have to approximate and "chunk" our views and data, or it gets too complex for us to model, and therefore we lose a little as we go from each "level" to the next.

People please back me up or correct the strengths of the chain.

QM -> atom-level: This is very well described and known.

atom-level to molecule level: Well known, but for large biological macromolecules, this is very complex.

At the molecule level, we have a hard time taking into account QM with molecule interactions: it's too complex. Therefore, it is very hard to describe chemistry with QM, although we trust that we could in principle, and using "atom-level" terms is much more convenient, although we have no clue what all the QM effects are on molecule construction or interaction. This is why protiens and such are so hard: they are so complex, you cannot ignore QM effects. And so on and so forth up to the mind.

Man, gotta wrap this up! So materialism is not necessarily deterministic, and even if it were, *apparent* free will can be generated from complex systems (see neral net experiments).

The question of whether free-will exists cannot be proven true or false, simply because we have no good definition of free-will. If free-will's only definition is "something we can't predict before-hand" then the universe could be said to exhibit free-will on the quantum level. I have not found a better definition, myself.

Short answer: Not even people entrenched in materialism can say for sure. It is not impossible, and we are not sure it even really exists.

 

[Yahweh]

Under the definition of Freewill as "You have freewill if you posess the ability to make "choices" at your own accord":

Decisional free will and scientific determinism co-exist because they are at different levels of discourse - in this case, neurology (metaphysics) and psychology (epistemology). Free will expresses how we operate at the personal level, and determinism explains how our brain works at the base physical level.

With the above differenciation, you can logically suggest "Voluntary Movements" are in fact "voluntary", the recongition of your own existence becomes coherent to consider, and the concept of freewill becomes logically harmonious scientific determinism.

Personally, I never did get how (simplified) Deterministic concept "this event preceded this, which preceded this, which preceded this" somehow amounts to "Yahweh, you are not in control of your own actions".

 

[Silicon]

There's enough randomness in the world to provide me free will.

I could have 2 totally different kind of lives right now, based on if I caught or missed the bus the day I met my wife.

Our opportunities create our possible choices.




Now to look at the way the brain works, there are more than one ways to make a choice. There's reasoning involved, and creativity is part of reasoning. If you can figure out a way to talk yourself into introducing yourself to that girl, you have used creativity to change your destiny.

And we know that creativity exists, and is seperate from physical determinism, for the same reason that there is no design for the airplane in Orville Wright's DNA. Creativity exists in the mind, and it also is the result of randomness, luck, happenstance, and innate ability.


Because randomness exists in life, there is creativity.

Because there is creativity, there is an internal discussion and weighing of possible solutions to every problem.

Because the mind actually weighs multiple solutions, and uses creatiity to come up with a solution, we have free will.

 

[Beleth]

The universe is goverened by laws which we can never actually know, just approximate. We can certainly predict some things with a high level of accuracy - eclipses, tides, that sort of thing - but there are many more things we can't even begin to predict, like the weather or the stock market.

All the thought-experiments I have ever heard of that refute the concept of free will involve time travel. I think that this is an interesting linking of concepts. I dont know what to make of it except to postulate that the inability to go back in time is a necessary prerequisite for having free will.


(edited for typos)

 

[Gestahl]

I dont know what to make of it except to postulate that the inability to go back in time is a necessary prerequisite for havnig free will.

Going back in time would be necessary to falsify or corroborate free will empirically, as far as I can see. I would not say it is a necessary condition for its existitence, however.

 

[phildonnia]

Re: Re: Materialism and Free Will

The laws of nature seem not to be deterministic.

The brain processes as currently understood do not even remotely approach the scale at which non-deterministic natural laws operate. They are more or less explainable through classical mechanics.

I think the question still stands, and a nasty one it is too. It is disturbing to think that I have no free will, but nature is under no obligation not to be disturbing to me.

 

[Gestahl]

Under the definition of Freewill as "You have freewill if you posess the ability to make "choices" at your own accord":

Decisional free will and scientific determinism co-exist because they are at different levels of discourse - in this case, neurology (metaphysics) and psychology (epistemology). Free will expresses how we operate at the personal level, and determinism explains how our brain works at the base physical level.

Exactly... see my statements above regarding the disparities between levels of description. Just because free will makes sense in talking about psychology, does not mean it really exists. Do superstrings "really" exist, or are the mathematical figments that make the numbers right? Does free-will really exist, or is it a mental figment that makes morals and dealing with people work?

Personally, I never did get how (simplified) Deterministic concept "this event preceded this, which preceded this, which preceded this" somehow amounts to "Yahweh, you are not in control of your own actions".

Because it makes the totality of your mental existence dependent upon a chain of events. Plus, if you talk to most honest people, they will say that most of the time *they* are not in control of their actions, because they are not thinking. The division comes because people think that "they" are somehow separate from the physical. Once you realize that "you" are just meat, "you" making a decision boils down to the universe, physics, and determinism forcing your brain into whatever state comes next by the rules.

 

[Silicon]

the notion of free will materialistically can be proven to be true or false if we merely understand the actual nature of how the brain makes choices.

If the brain cannot make an arbitrary choice based on two equally benign possibilites, then there is no free will.

But if you could make a choice, a random choice, if I said "Pick a number, and say odd or even". Then you do have free will if it can be shown that your brain did choose arbitrarily.

So the existance of an element of randomness is all that's required in the brain to produce a different "odd or even" choice when presented with the two possibilities.

Even if there is no randomness in the brain itself (which hasn't been proven) there certainly is in the world, and so our perceptions will create enough random stimulus that we use in making decisions.

A mix of internal and external elements will make me decide to choose even or odd, at any given point. So it's non-deterministic.

 

[phildonnia]

Even if there is no randomness in the brain itself (which hasn't been proven) there certainly is in the world, and so our perceptions will create enough random stimulus that we use in making decisions.

A mix of internal and external elements will make me decide to choose even or odd, at any given point. So it's non-deterministic.

I think "non-deterministic" is the wrong term. This implies that things are truly random. While this does occur at certain levels of physics, it doesn't really seem to apply to brain activity.

Perhaps "chaotic" is a better term; It's just so damn complicated that we cannot hope to analyze it.

Imagine the randomness of a flipping coin. The physics of this are well understood, and known to be deterministic. Yet you cannot predict a flipping coin because the actual calculation would be too complicated.

 

[Beleth]

Going back in time would be necessary to falsify or corroborate free will empirically, as far as I can see. I would not say it is a necessary condition for its existitence, however.

I don't think going back in time could corroborate free will. I think its only possible effect on free will would be to disprove it. Every example I can think of that allows for both time travel and free will ends in a paradox.

 

[Gestahl]

I think "non-deterministic" is the wrong term. This implies that things are truly random. While this does occur at certain levels of physics, it doesn't really seem to apply to brain activity.

Non-determinism only means you are not guaranteed the same results everytime. This does not imply randomness at all. Humans already are non-deterministic because we have memories and adapt. Each time something happens, we may respond differently.

The problem with prediciting the flipping coin is not one of heavy calculation, a computer can do it easily, no problem. The issue is sensitive dependence on initial conditions. We cannot measure with enough precision the starting conditions, and the results wildly diverge. This is the heart of chaos theory, which you alluded to. Its not too many variables, its too much error.

 

[phildonnia]

Non-determinism only means you are not guaranteed the same results everytime. This does not imply randomness at all. Humans already are non-deterministic because we have memories and adapt. Each time something happens, we may respond differently.

No, non-determinism means you're not guaranteed the same results with the same initial conditions. Once memories and adaptations are added, of course something different can happen.

Consider a computer pseudo-random number generator. It does not give the same results every time. But it would be wrong to call it non-deterministic. If we could start it over, (erasing its memory, in a sense) then it would do the same thing.

The question is whether the human mind would do the same thing "if it had it to do all over again". I admit this is probably an untestable question currently.

 

[Beleth]

The question is whether the human mind would do the same thing "if it had it to do all over again". I admit this is probably an untestable question currently.

That's what I mean with my comments about time travel. The only way to get everything exactly back to how it was so you can "do it all over again" is to go back in time, and we can't do that.

 

[Gestahl]

Consider a computer pseudo-random number generator. It does not give the same results every time. But it would be wrong to call it non-deterministic. If we could start it over, (erasing its memory, in a sense) then it would do the same thing.

First of all, most (useful) PRNGs use network traffic and human interaction for entropy to get the randomness. So your last statement is incorrect.

I use a different "computerized" jargon for non-deterministic, without really considering it mostly. Which is even different than the computer science definition of ND (which is what you are citing). The meaning I am using comes from the use in software documentation. This definition does not place any restrictions on the surrounding environment, i.e. if time is a part of your calculations, they are non-deterministic, because you have no clue what time it will be when the program runs. Computers are always deterministic within themselves, given you know all the external information. Non-determinism in computers is not meant to say it is random or that the results can't be computed deterministically, it just means "it depends on things that are not known at the time the program is being written, excluding the data *you* feed into it" ;-). It is very loose, but useful definition.

For example, in a program, I have a function that allocates memory. This is non-deterministic, because I have no way of knowing *from within the program* where the memory I get is going to be, since it depends on the OS version, the other programs running, how much RAM, etc. Not only that, but it can depend on network traffic, time of day, and human interaction. So there are both external and internal variances. My apologies for the confusions.

Now that I think of it, this non-determinism is about what I think about humans... we operate determinisitically, but because we have internal states (not necessarily known, but hinted at with emotion and "feeling") and a varying external environment. Even then, we can usually say what we would do if a situation happened, and we were in our current mental state. We do it all the time.

Whew... so back to the question... free will? Nope. Simply because I already know what I would do , given I am in the same general mental state that I would be in in the hypothetical situation.

I really need to stop ranting...

 

[Silicon]

I think the main problem is one of definitions.

We are taking an old christian argument about "free will" (whether or not we can change god's fate for us), and trying to apply it directly to the idea that in a materialistic viewpoint, the brain makes decisions based on the physical function of the brain, and nothing else.

Here's where we've invented gaps that do not exist, but merely carry over hidden suppositions from the old christian argument.

Suppositions such as the notion of "free will" itself. Do I have free will when I decide between the coke or the root beer.

OF course I have free will. I make the choice. I only don't have a choice if my brain makes the decision based on physical processes, and doesn't let the real me (?) have a vote.
You can see, that keeps the hidden assumption that I have a soul, or a hidden observer in my mind who is slave to the physical processes of the brain.

Thus, this is a non-materialistic model, with a hidden theist soul as a presupposition!

My brain is not seperate from "me". If my brain makes the decision, then I made the decision.

So we need to define terms, because if we're talking about free will, we are using a loaded term.

 

[phildonnia]

Yes, there has been a lack of definition of terms. The following have been called "non-determinism":

1) different behavior under identical conditions (quantum mechanics)
2) different behavior due to variable conditions (pseudo-random number generators)
3) different behavior due to high susceptibility to initial conditions(coin flipping)

With that out of the way, I meant to claim that "free will" is characterized by 2) and 3).

For non-materialists among us, I suppose 1) would be the most attractive characterization of "free will"; however our current understanding of brain processes does not require anything beyond classical mechanics.