The bill for the relief of the parents of Theresa Marie Schiavo (S. 686) does not create a new cause if action. Rather, it simply allows a de novo review of “alleged violation of any right of Theresa Marie Schiavo under the Constitution or laws of the United States†in federal court. Further, S. 686 makes clear that “Nothing in this Act shall be construed to create substantive rights not otherwise secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States or of the several States.â€
Consequently, S. 686 does not “reopen[] (or direct[] the reopening of) final judgments in a whole class of cases [or] in a particular suit.†Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 227 (1995). This is because any final determination made by the Florida courts regarding Florida state law will remain final under S. 686. S. 686 merely requires that a federal court assume jurisdiction over the federal law claims of Theresa Marie Schiavo. Doing so for Theresa Marie Schiavo is proper, as the Supreme Court in Plaut made clear that “The premise that there is something wrong with particularized legislative action is of course questionable. While legislatures usually act through laws of general applicability, that is by no means their only legitimate mode of action.†Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 239 n.9 (1995).
S. 686 also presents no problems regarding retrospective application. The Supreme Court has held that “A statute does not operate ‘retrospectively’ merely because it is applied in a case arising from conduct antedating the statute's enactment .., or upsets expectations based in prior law. Rather, the court must ask whether the new provision attaches new legal consequences to events completed before its enactment.†Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 269-70 (1994). S. 686 does not attach any new legal consequences to events completed before its enactment. S. 686 merely “changes the tribunal that is to hear the case,†and it is entirely proper to have a federal court hear federal law claims. See Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 274-75 (1994) (“Application of a new jurisdictional rule usually takes away no substantive right but simply changes the tribunal that is to hear the case. Present law normally governs in such situations because jurisdictional statutes speak to the power of the court rather than to the rights or obligations of the parties ... Changes in procedural rules may often be applied in suits arising before their enactment without raising concerns about retroactivity ... Because rules of procedure regulate secondary rather than primary conduct, the fact that a new procedural rule was instituted after the conduct giving rise to the suit does not make application of the rule at trial retroactive.â€) (quotations and citations omitted).
