We're boned.Charlie Stross said:we're only at risk of disaster if we harbour self-destructive impulses.
.....and why he doesn't believe in it. Also the theological implications of 'uploading' and why he isn't a libertarian. Here.
Very active comments section.
The future, in which we can not comprehend what is happening, is a subset of the total group of time periods in which we cannot grasp what is happening, which includes, of course, the past, present and the future.In my opinion; Singularity is not when wonderful things happen, its when we can no longer grasp what is happening, and we get chaos.
Yeah, that's much closer to the original meaning. The fundamental concept of the Singularity is that you can't predict the outcome. It's a technological (and by extension, social, economic, and political) discontinuity.In my opinion; Singularity is not when wonderful things happen, its when we can no longer grasp what is happening, and we get chaos.
But in a similar way the you who existed ten years ago is also dead. I don't know that I see anything particularly appealing about "mind uploading", but I can see ways in which it could be made to at least seem to work, particularly if done one step at a time.I never understood the cult for the singularity. I mean, even if mind uploading happens, you do not really "upload" your mind, you jsut put a copy of its memory, itnerraction, and personality ina comptuer system, so that virtually there would be no way to differentiate you from it. Just like the teleportation paradox, it suffers from the fact that you are just creating a copy, and if the original dies, "you" died. The copy as a separate entity might live and go on eternaly as long as electricity is paid, but the original Aepervius the human would have died.
First: super-intelligent AI is unlikely because, if you pursue Vernor's program, you get there incrementally by way of human-equivalent AI, and human-equivalent AI is unlikely. The reason it's unlikely is that human intelligence is an emergent phenomenon of human physiology, and it only survived the filtering effect of evolution by enhancing human survival fitness in some way. Enhancements to primate evolutionary fitness are not much use to a machine, or to people who want to extract useful payback (in the shape of work) from a machine they spent lots of time and effort developing. We may want machines that can recognize and respond to our motivations and needs, but we're likely to leave out the annoying bits, like needing to sleep for roughly 30% of the time, being lazy or emotionally unstable, and having motivations of its own.
But in a similar way the you who existed ten years ago is also dead. I don't know that I see anything particularly appealing about "mind uploading", but I can see ways in which it could be made to at least seem to work, particularly if done one step at a time.
And "the singularity" isn't simply about mind uploading.
Anyway if you want to continue the discussion there is a thread on the first page on why "materialist are wrong" from DOC.
I never understood the cult for the singularity. I mean, even if mind uploading happens, you do not really "upload" your mind, you jsut put a copy of its memory, itnerraction, and personality ina comptuer system, so that virtually there would be no way to differentiate you from it. Just like the teleportation paradox, it suffers from the fact that you are just creating a copy, and if the original dies, "you" died. The copy as a separate entity might live and go on eternaly as long as electricity is paid, but the original Aepervius the human would have died.
Therefore I would not see that as immortality, more as a way to produce an immortal indentical twin offspring from me.
Mildly interresting , but not that much.
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ETA: the way I would see this working, is that you replace over long period of time bit by bit every neurone by a silicon/simulacre. By the end you would have a consciousness on simulacre, but it begs the question if it would be the same persons, just like brain damaged person are "changed" (they are the same entity but with personality changed or warped).
A difficult one I don't think would be easy to answer without making the experiment first.
Quite a few authors have explored those ideas, they make interesting reading. ETA: There is an entertaining but thought provoking sort-of-series of short stories by Greg Egan in which a "jewel" is implanted into someone's head and it mimics the develop of the human brain (shares the input, matches the changes the human brain under goes) and then at some arbitrary point folks decide to have the human brain removed and they continue (or do they...) running on the immortal jewel.
There is a continuity of body between the me of 10 years ago and the me of today, and at EACH step the neural network was maintained alive, even if bit and piece of it was quickly replaced and repaired.
There isn't such a continuity when you upload a copy, even if you immediately kill the original in the process.
Thinking that you really "upload" the person emans you think there is some magical soul like entity which is removed from the body/brain and put in the box. But there is no evidence for this, all we have evidence for is that our "self" our consciousness is the emergent property of OUR brain function. Duplicating those function into a black box do not make us "move" magically to there, it just make a copy which can than onward evolve/think separately from the original. Worst, duplicate the signal (*) and you can probably create more than one copy of the uploaded person. That make it even more clear what I mean.
This continuity you speak of, what is it exactly?
Imagine that I make a copy of you, and pause time at the exact moment of (instant) duplication. Now I have two identical units with no hair. What sets the original apart?
From my position, you are the one who believe in a soul like entity.
Imagine that you don't.This continuity you speak of, what is it exactly?
Imagine that I make a copy of you
This continuity you speak of, what is it exactly?
Imagine that I make a copy of you, and pause time at the exact moment of (instant) duplication. Now I have two identical units with no hair. What sets the original apart?
From my position, you are the one who believe in a soul like entity.