Are we Machines?

[Interesting Ian]

Are we machines? More precisely, do we, as human beings, differ in any substantive manner from any other physical object in the Universe? I intend to briefly spell out the reasons why a lot of people, particularly educated people, do indeed believe that we human beings are not substantially different from any other physical thing. Compelling as these reasons might seem, I then intend to try and show these reasons can be countered. It should be noted however, that it is not my intention to argue for the veracity of such an opposing perspective. Rather I intend to show that the supposition that we are essentially machines does not have the force that many people suppose.



The Case For

One very persuasive criterion by which we might judge that we are essentially machines is to ask ourselves whether our behaviour, in common with the behaviour of all other objects in the Universe, simply follows physical laws. By physical laws we simply mean regularities that we observe in nature. Thus, possibly the most obvious example we could point to here, is the law of gravitation which accounts for the fact that objects near the surface of the Earth, will, when released, fall at pretty much the same acceleration. The fact that the world exhibits such regularities allows us not only to predict future events, but also allows us to exercise a degree of control over our environment. Thus modern times has witnessed a bewildering proliferation of various machines capable of carrying out all sorts of tasks. But no matter how complex such machines might be, ultimately they are simply operating according to such physical laws that we have observed, and their behaviour is not qualitatively different, for example, from the motion of an apple when released.

Especially pertinent to our consideration here are those machines labelled computers. Computers can now carry out many tasks that were formerly thought to be exclusively a preserve of the human intellect. The most obvious example here are the playing of games such as chess, where it is now possible to program a computer that can outperform the best chess players in the world. We even have computers that can carry out rudimentary conversations with people. These computers, at least for a while, might well manage to fool us into believing that we are conversing with a genuine person.

This being so are there any reasons for supposing that human beings are anything more than extremely complex machines? Biological machines for sure, but machines nevertheless? As such they would operate according to the physical laws of nature, just as much as any man-made machine. It should be pointed out here that even if one successfully argued against the notion that the brain operates on similar principles to a computer, it arguably would still operate according to physical laws. The brain would still be a machine, and, in principle, could be created with a sufficiently advanced technology. Putting it another way, why should brains be the only type of thing that do not operate according to physical laws? And if they do operate according to such laws, then why suppose we differ in principle from any machine? We might admittedly be very complex machines, but essentially machines nevertheless.

Let's spell this out more carefully. Our brains consist of billions of neurons. It is reasonable to suppose that neurons simply operate according to physical laws just as much as anything else in the Universe. What would happen if we replaced one of our neurons with an electronic circuit which carries out the exact same physical process as the neuron had? If it carried out the exact same physical process or function, would it not be the case that we would notice no difference whatsoever? Furthermore, we can imagine all our neurons getting replaced one by one until every last one of our neurons had been replaced by such electronic circuits. In this case we would have an electronic brain, and yet it seems we should still be conscious and indeed feel exactly the same!

From a completely different direction, and albeit of a more indirect kind, we apparently find yet further reasons to suppose that we are simply machines. It is well known that when particular parts of the brain get injured, consciousness will become effected in predictable ways. Just to mention a couple of examples; our capacity to understand written and spoken words, or the capacity to speak and so on, are impaired or even eliminated with injuries to certain regions of the brain. In addition radical personality change may be brought about by injury to the brain. The most famous example here is undoubtedly Phineas Gage . We can also point to the effects of drugs which have a propensity to effect our emotions, attitudes and dispositions. Indeed even alcohol and caffeine do this.

These facts regarding the apparent tight correlation between our states of consciousness and physical states of the brain, and indeed, as in the examples cited, such conscious states following physical states of the brain, powerfully suggest to many people that processes in the brain generate consciousness or, alternatively, that consciousness is simply another way of talking about brain processes. In other words such mind/brain correlations almost certainly show that consciousness, or more generally the mind, has its source entirely in the brain. If this is so then our mental lives simply will reflect everything that goes on in the brain, and we will indeed essentially be machines.

To sum up. The argument that many people make is that we have no compelling reason to suppose we are different from any other object in the Universe, and thus, in common with all other objects in the Universe, we are just as susceptible to physical laws as any other object. In particular, although the brain is extremely complex in its operation, there is no cogent reason to suppose that it is qualitatively different from any complex man-made machine. We might feel that we are different from any other object in the Universe, but the foregoing considerations might make us feel disposed to conclude that it is not a difference in kind we are talking about here, but rather, merely a difference in degree. This notion receives further support when we note that mental states, including our emotions, dispositions, attitudes and general personality, can be effected by injury or alteration to the brain, thereby implying that the source of consciousness is within the brain. This being so, and acknowledging that the brain is a physical object like any other physical object which operates according to physical laws, it seems that a sensible position is to conclude that we are, indeed, essentially machines.



Response


The obvious response to point out here is that we, and possibly other sentient creatures, seem to be very different from any other object in the Universe. For example it might be pointed out that, unlike machines, we possess free will. Or more generally it might be pointed out that, unlike machines, we are conscious, and experience such things as hope, fear, pain, love, or indeed experience the feel of a warm summers day and that all is right with the world. Intuitively it might feel absurd to many of us that such conscious states could be experienced by any man-made machine. After all, they are simply devices operating according to physical laws, where as we feel that we ourselves are special, and that there is a fundamental qualitative difference between us (and possibly other sentient life forms), and the rest of the objects in the Universe.

Let's explore this in a little more depth. We intuitively suppose that the vast preponderance of physical processes in the Universe are not accompanied by any conscious awareness. Thus for example, a boulder rolling down a hill, or the Earth orbiting the Sun do not have any conscious awareness associated with these activities. And to belabour the obvious, such conscious awareness would not be necessary. It merely requires the application of physical laws to completely understand their behaviour. But this is emphatically not how we regard our own behaviour. We think of our behaviour as a result of our intentions.

The general point to note here though is that the original contention that we have no compelling reasons to suppose our behaviour is characteristically different from any other object in the Universe, can now be challenged. This is because, unlike our examples of the rolling boulder and orbiting Earth, it at least seems that we are the author of our own destiny and that we can genuinely choose from 2 or more alternative courses of action. This being so, it is simply no good appealing to the fact that every other object follows physical laws and thereby inferring that therefore we most probably do too. It is no good doing this because such reasoning (called inductive reasoning) can only be valid where we compare similar things. But we differ in that one crucial aspect. Namely our apparent ability to determine our own destinies. And, in the more general sense, we (and most probably other sentient creatures) differ in that we have accompanying mental experiences, normally denied to the behaviour exhibited by rolling rocks, orbiting planets, and such like. None of this entails we do not simply follow physical laws, but if we do, then we need to appeal to other reasons for supposing we do.

This still leaves the issue of mind-brain correlations. As mentioned we have a great deal of evidence that at least sometimes mind states follow on from brain states. The simple act of drinking alcohol is enough to confirm this. Does this not present extremely compelling evidence that the brain must therefore create the mind or consciousness? In short, no.

To see this imagine if you will 2 very intelligent people from the early 18th century who, by some means or other, are miraculously transported to our present day. Imagine further they encounter a television set showing a film. After being suitably astounded, and after tinkering around with its internal components and finding that tinkering with particular components effects the picture quality in particular characteristic ways, you can imagine one of them claiming that not just the picture, but the storyline of the film must be wholly generated by these internal components since tinkering with them affects the picture. He might claim there is overwhelming evidence that this must be so. The other person, however, will rightly point out that although he grants that the picture itself is generated by these internal components, it cannot be the case that the actual contents of the movie, the actual storyline with its depiction of various emotions and so on, can be generated by just these internal components. This is because there is nothing about the physical processes within the TV set which could conceivably lead to the generation ex nihilo of such a storyline.

Such might very well be the case with the self and its brain. That is to say the brain needn't actually create the self. Rather it might be the case that the brain simply modifies the self. Such a notion has been referred to as the transmission theory . Note that I am not saying at this juncture that the self and its brain is anything like a television set and television signal. Rather I am simply attempting to convey a graphical description of the following point:

The fact that states of "A" may be correlated with "particular states of "B", means neither that "A" and "B" are one and the same thing, nor does it entail that "B" originates from "A", or indeed "A" from "B". It could be that both "A" and "B" both independently are generated by "C", or indeed that they enjoy a self-subsistent existence. Or it could be the case that although states of "B" are modified by states of "A", "B" ultimately originates from "C" or indeed has no origin at all.

However I do think that arguably some important insights might be obtained by considering the television set simile further. But first let's consider a possible relationship between what we consider to be the self, mind and the brain. If the brain does not actually generate consciousness, then clearly neither the self nor consciousness can be actually equated with the brain or any physical processes within it. Indeed the actual self might well not be a physical thing at all. But what then is the self? I suggest a possible answer is that, in brief, it is the essential you. To elucidate; although our apparent personality, and intelligence, and interests may change radically throughout our lives, nevertheless we feel very strongly that there is a real sense in which we are one and the very same person throughout our lives. Thus despite, for example, our 5 year old self, our sober adult self, or our drunk adult self exhibiting quite radically different personality traits, and having differing intelligence and differing interests, we are still generally very firmly convinced that we are literally the same self throughout our lives and therefore throughout these various differing mind states.

Note that this notion of a literal same self is difficult to maintain if we suppose that the self is simply to be equated with the brain, or the processes taking place within it. Given that brain states are in a constant state of change, it would certainly seem that, in a literal sense, the self must also be in a constant state of change. Be clear as to what this means. It means that quite literally the self ceases to exist, to be replaced by another, whenever we go from being sober to drunk, or from being in a bad mood to a good mood, and so on. With this scenario it might be difficult to avoid concluding our sense of self is effectively an illusion. Indeed this is precisely what many philosophical materialists maintain (a materialist being the most prominent example of those who consider us to be essentially machines).

In order to clarify the issues regarding an unchanging self, let us return to the TV set simile. Note that the TV programme being displayed will remain the same TV programme no matter how much we tinker with the innards of the TV set. However, the quality of the picture displayed may vary widely. Possibly the brain, mind and self relationship that I have been attempting to spell out, might be clarified if we suppose that the self is analogically similar to the storyline of the TV programme being displayed, and peoples state of consciousness, or mind states, likewise correspond to the picture quality. Hence, just as the picture quality of a TV set may vary radically depending on the state of its internal components, so do our mind states vary according to the particular states of our brains. Nevertheless, notwithstanding these changes in the state of our brains dictated by age, sobriety or indeed simply mood states and so on, it nevertheless still remains the case that we continue to be the same self throughout, just as the storyline of a TV programme remains the same, even though we might alter the quality of the picture displayed by tinkering around with the innards of the set.

We can extend the analogy further. One of the arguments mentioned above for the notion that we are essentially machines is that we could imagine replacing our neurons one by one with electronic circuits which carry out the exact same physical processes or functions as the neurons had. It was implied that if we could do this, then this would show that our mind or self simply results from these physical processes. But it can now be seen that we are not forced to come to this conclusion. We could replace some of the internal components of a television set with other components which perform the same function, and yet this certainly does not mean that the storyline of the TV programme is generated by such components. This being so, then it is possible that even if our neurons could be replaced with electronic circuits leaving our minds intact, this need not imply that our minds are actually created by these underlying processes. It is important to understand though that this does not mean that we can actually build a machine that will be conscious. By replacing neurons with electronic circuits we need to bear in mind the self already exists, and should all neurons be replaced with electronic circuits, it would simply mean the self now operates through a brain composed of electronic circuitry! But we cannot create a self from building a machine ground up. Compare going back in time a couple of hundred years and creating a television set. Even if in perfect working order it would not be able to receive a TV signal but would simply display white noise.

To summarise, we have addressed the question of whether reason and evidence compels us to conclude that we are essentially no different from any other physical object in the Universe, and that our brains are the source of our conscious lives. It has been argued that we most certainly need not be compelled to accept such a conclusion. It has been suggested that it might well be the case that our essential selves simply operate through our brains as proposed in the transmission theory of the self. As has been mentioned, such a notion fits in well with our deep seated notion of the self which has it that our essential essence remains unchanged throughout our lives, even though our mind states might change quite radically. It has not been argued that this position is the actual correct one. This will be done in a future post.

 

[DanishDynamite]

Very, very well done, Ian! My hat is off to you. Really. I only wish you could be as clear and civil in your thoughts on a regular basis.

I must admit I've only read halfway through and therefore require a little time to respond, but from what I've read: Excellent!

 

[DanishDynamite]

Interesting Ian:

The obvious response to point out here is that we, and possibly other sentient creatures, seem to be very different from any other object in the Universe. For example it might be pointed out that, unlike machines, we possess free will.

Or rather, so our "I" thinks.

Or more generally it might be pointed out that, unlike machines, we are conscious, and experience such things as hope, fear, pain, love, or indeed experience the feel of a warm summers day and that all is right with the world. Intuitively it might feel absurd to many of us that such conscious states could be experienced by any man-made machine. After all, they are simply devices operating according to physical laws, where as we feel that we ourselves are special, and that there is a fundamental qualitative difference between us (and possibly other sentient life forms), and the rest of the objects in the Universe.

Intuitively, you are right. However, we also know that intuition is not a reliable method to judge what is actually going on.

Let's explore this in a little more depth. We intuitively suppose that the vast preponderance of physical processes in the Universe are not accompanied by any conscious awareness. Thus for example, a boulder rolling down a hill, or the Earth orbiting the Sun do not have any conscious awareness associated with these activities. And to belabour the obvious, such conscious awareness would not be necessary. It merely requires the application of physical laws to completely understand their behaviour. But this is emphatically not how we regard our own behaviour. We think of our behaviour as a result of our intentions.

Not to be flippant, but we also once thought that the Earth was flat, that thunder came from Thor and that blood-letting was a sound medical practice.

The general point to note here though is that the original contention that we have no compelling reasons to suppose our behaviour is characteristically different from any other object in the Universe, can now be challenged. This is because, unlike our examples of the rolling boulder and orbiting Earth, it at least seems that we are the author of our own destiny and that we can genuinely choose from 2 or more alternative courses of action.

I understand your point, but in this day and age we know that even purely physical objects such as computers can choose between many different alternatives.

This being so, it is simply no good appealing to the fact that every other object follows physical laws and thereby inferring that therefore we most probably do too.

Why not, given our knowledge of computers?

The fact that states of "A" may be correlated with "particular states of "B", means neither that "A" and "B" are one and the same thing, nor does it entail that "B" originates from "A", or indeed "A" from "B". It could be that both "A" and "B" both independently are generated by "C", or indeed that they enjoy a self-subsistent existence. Or it could be the case that although states of "B" are modified by states of "A", "B" ultimately originates from "C" or indeed has no origin at all.

Anything is possible. The problem in regard to your TV set analogy is that in fact "B" (the TV picture) cannot in any way be present without "A", the components of the TV. Furthermore, it could quickly be determined that even if "A", the components of the TV, were left untouched, the picture would not be there if the TV was encased in a Faraday cage or moved into a deep cave or any other number of things.

However I do think that arguably some important insights might be obtained by considering the television set simile further. But first let's consider a possible relationship between what we consider to be the self, mind and the brain. If the brain does not actually generate consciousness, then clearly neither the self nor consciousness can be actually equated with the brain or any physical processes within it. Indeed the actual self might well not be a physical thing at all.

Hold on. How could it not be? Are you saying that the physical actions performed by the human body are not physical? Or that they were not initiated by something physical? How would something not physical interact with something that was physical?

But what then is the self? I suggest a possible answer is that, in brief, it is the essential you. To elucidate; although our apparent personality, and intelligence, and interests may change radically throughout our lives, nevertheless we feel very strongly that there is a real sense in which we are one and the very same person throughout our lives.

I don't feel this. I'm very much aware that the person I was at 5 years of age has little to do with the person I am know.

Thus despite, for example, our 5 year old self, our sober adult self, or our drunk adult self exhibiting quite radically different personality traits, and having differing intelligence and differing interests, we are still generally very firmly convinced that we are literally the same self throughout our lives and therefore throughout these various differing mind states.

No. See above.

Note that this notion of a literal same self is difficult to maintain if we suppose that the self is simply to be equated with the brain, or the processes taking place within it.

No it isn't. As any neuroligst knows, the brain changes physically throughout life, not least during the formative years.

Given that brain states are in a constant state of change, it would certainly seem that, in a literal sense, the self must also be in a constant state of change.

Indeed it is.

Be clear as to what this means. It means that quite literally the self ceases to exist, to be replaced by another, whenever we go from being sober to drunk, or from being in a bad mood to a good mood, and so on. With this scenario it might be difficult to avoid concluding our sense of self is effectively an illusion. Indeed this is precisely what many philosophical materialists maintain (a materialist being the most prominent example of those who consider us to be essentially machines).

The "self" does not cease to exist. It simply changes gradually through the years.

In order to clarify the issues regarding an unchanging self, let us return to the TV set simile. Note that the TV programme being displayed will remain the same TV programme no matter how much we tinker with the innards of the TV set. However, the quality of the picture displayed may vary widely. Possibly the brain, mind and self relationship that I have been attempting to spell out, might be clarified if we suppose that the self is analogically similar to the storyline of the TV programme being displayed, and peoples state of consciousness, or mind states, likewise correspond to the picture quality. Hence, just as the picture quality of a TV set may vary radically depending on the state of its internal components, so do our mind states vary according to the particular states of our brains. Nevertheless, notwithstanding these changes in the state of our brains dictated by age, sobriety or indeed simply mood states and so on, it nevertheless still remains the case that we continue to be the same self throughout, just as the storyline of a TV programme remains the same, even though we might alter the quality of the picture displayed by tinkering around with the innards of the set.

Disagree. It is not the case that when we are drunk we simply aren't able to focus as well, or see as many colors, or hear as well, etc. We behave differently. We do things which we wouldn't otherwise do. Our storyline is completely different.

We can extend the analogy further. One of the arguments mentioned above for the notion that we are essentially machines is that we could imagine replacing our neurons one by one with electronic circuits which carry out the exact same physical processes or functions as the neurons had. It was implied that if we could do this, then this would show that our mind or self simply results from these physical processes. But it can now be seen that we are not forced to come to this conclusion. We could replace some of the internal components of a television set with other components which perform the same function, and yet this certainly does not mean that the storyline of the TV programme is generated by such components. This being so, then it is possible that even if our neurons could be replaced with electronic circuits leaving our minds intact, this need not imply that our minds are actually created by these underlying processes. It is important to understand though that this does not mean that we can actually build a machine that will be conscious. By replacing neurons with electronic circuits we need to bear in mind the self already exists, and should all neurons be replaced with electronic circuits, it would simply mean the self now operates through a brain composed of electronic circuitry! But we cannot create a self from building a machine ground up. Compare going back in time a couple of hundred years and creating a television set. Even if in perfect working order it would not be able to receive a TV signal but would simply display white noise.

If we were competent scientists we would quickly ascertain that the circuits in the TV could do nothing without being externally stimulated. In any case, your logic is confused. You said previously that we intuitively felt that a machine was different from us and couldn't be conscious. Now you are saying that a machine, built according to the specifications of the human brain, could be. Which is it?

 

[Interesting Ian]

Thanks for the comments DD. I'm trying to create a web site and what I've written so far is just the first section. I shall also be writing sections on materialism/epiphenomenalism, and free will which will address some of the issues you raise.

This section is basically arguing there is a possible alternative to the idea that we are essentially machines. Many people might feel for example that mind/brain correlations prove that we are machines. But I was attempting to show that such a conclusion can be questioned.

I haven't really argued for this alternative position yet, but will do so in the next section of my website.

BTW, and this is to everyone. Regardless of whether you agree with me or not, is what I've written easy enough to understand??

I note your confusion at the end DD, so I might have to think about altering that.

 

[DanishDynamite]

Thanks for the comments DD. I'm trying to create a web site and what I've written so far is just the first section. I shall also be writing sections on materialism/epiphenomenalism, and free will which will address some of the issues you raise.

Looking forward to it, Ian.

This section is basically arguing there is a possible alternative to the idea that we are essentially machines. Many people might feel for example that mind/brain correlations prove that we are machines. But I was attempting to show that such a conclusion can be questioned.

I haven't really argued for this alternative position yet, but will do so in the next section of my website.

I understand. As you know, I don't agree with your position. But I understand your intentions.

BTW, and this is to everyone. Regardless of whether you agree with me or not, is what I've written easy enough to understand??

A bit long, but very easy to understand. Hence my jubilation.

I note your confusion at the end DD, so I might have to think about altering that.

I'm interested in how you will change it without changing anything significant.

[Edited to add: Why the h*ll aren't my smileys showing up?]

 

[Interesting Ian]

Looking forward to it, Ian.
I understand. As you know, I don't agree with your position. But I understand your intentions.
A bit long, but very easy to understand. Hence my jubilation.
I'm interested in how you will change it without changing anything significant.

[Edited to add: Why the h*ll aren't my smileys showing up?]

Smileys have been turned off because it's the "critical" forum LOL

 

[Vitnir]

It's a very interesting subject you bring up, my own experience is reduced to Sci-Fi litarature though. Isaac Asimov has written some novels and short stories involving robots, their minds and the borders between man and machine. It is my belief that if a machine could be built as complex as a human brain and be programmed appropiately, there would be no essential difference between it and a human. We would have to give it right to vote, medical/technical care and we would put someone in prison if they were to put an axe to it.

Humans are in my belief machines, stupid, fallible and ill-designed machines.

I would avoid using words as "belabour" though if the audience is also composed of people who are not native english speaking. Overall I liked the essay very much, easy to read and no particular skill needed in philosophy, illustrations could improve presentation in the final version on the web.

edited for spelling (not english native speaker)

 

[coalesce]

This was a terrific post, Ian, and you should be proud of it.

I also look forward to seeing your site once it's done.

Insofar as the topic is concerned, I have no problem thinking of humans as machines. An incredibly complex one, but a machine nonetheless. Just because we aren't made of metal, plastic but of organic materials, doesn't diminish that I feel we are machines. Like a machine, we can be built (born), repaired, taught tasks, and learn (although the machines we make aren't up to that just yet). But I would like to know what I did with my warranty, and where I can get a few upgrades for myself...

Michael

 

[spargapis]

Totally agree, I also believe that we are machines (or whatever - "Form of existence of protein bodies"). I've been pondering on this subject for about a week, since one of the famous profs came to our school and talked about the origins of life in the Universe. I was tempted to ask about his definition of life , as he seemed to be keen on regenerating the life starting from carbon and nitrogen. It doesn't seem to me obvious though to start from these two basic elements, as any self-replicating system has a chance to be built from a different component (element) depending on the environment.
Thanks for an extremely enlightening essay.

 

[spargapis]

Ian, the only thing that is not clear for me now is the link between the processes in the brain and our consciousness? In other words, how we create this image of them (processes) in our "mind"?
What the definition of consciousness might be assuming that we are machines? Please, pardon my ignorance and refer me to the source or the book, if my question is too basic.

 

[LettristLoon]

Ian:

You seem to suggest, in your initial post, that whereas "consciousness" or "self awareness" are not necessary to explain the phenomenon of a boulder rolling down a hill, such things are necessary to explain human behavior.

I would like to suggest that you, Ian, are the only truly conscious being in the universe, and that everyone else's behavior can be explained away by physical processes occuring in accordance with physical laws, right there in their entirely physical and mundane (and complicated!) heads.

This is the one thing that makes me think that there might be more to "it" than what we can extrapolate, based upon our current knowledge of the physical universe. Humans acting as though they're self-aware could very well be a deterministic, machine-ish process, or else it could be the result of some random swerving on the part of some very small things--still, though, entirely, physically machine-like.

But actual, genuine self-awareness--unlike what a boulder seems to possess--that seems damn near physically impossible, doesn't it?

Which makes me think: Either a boulder is self-aware, or as self-aware as its level of complexity will allow, or there is something...

gag

cough

*hides*

...spiritual...

at work.

Oh jeez please kill me now.

- B

 

[Dymanic]

I look forward to seeing your website too.

Originally posted by Interesting Ian

More precisely, do we, as human beings, differ in any substantive manner from any other physical object in the Universe?

That seems a little less precise than it might be. I'd like to see the areas of common ground under the various perspectives -- and the point of divergence -- spelled out a little more clearly.

I don't see even the most fervent advocate of the machine model as denying that it at least feels like one has a self. That there is at least some connection between selves and brains does not appear to be in dispute by even the most enthusiastic proponent of T-theory. The observation that the human brain, as an arrangement of protein, is unique in both complexity and function is also accepted as self-evident by all. I don't recall having encountered specific claims that the brain is unique in any way at the level of molecular or atomic structure.

Unless I've missed something then, the question appears to expand to something like: "Are particles of the ordinary matter of which the brain is composed subject to changes (in properties such as mass, momentum, charge, spin, etc) in ways that somehow differ from the changes to which particles not part of a brain are subject; or are those particles subject to influence from forms of energy which have no effect on particles not part of a brain?

There are an infinite number of possible alternative explanations to which one might be driven by personal incredulity. I confess to not having devoted much time to the study of T-theory, but so far I haven't seen where it even makes -- much less fulfills -- any promise to provide an explanation for the mechanics of its effects, and why they have remained undetectable.

 

[Dancing David]

Nice post Ian, I may offer you that apology soon! I am very glad to see that you can represent the materialist POV without resorting to insults.

I am not sure about the TV signal anology, it bears some thought. I don't get the brain a the reciever of the self but will have to consider my response. I feel that while adequate for an alternative it is an oversimplification.

I thought materialists believed in free will, it was only immaterialists who said that there could not be free will under materialism.

I think your web site will be cool and should have an FAQ section.

 

[Soapy Sam]

Ian, the comments in green are intended to point out where I feel you are unclear, use terms ambiguously or use misleading metaphor. There are also a few minor grammar or punctuation points. In the spirit of the thread, I have tried and (nearly) managed to avoid direct criticism of content. The intention is to assist.

The Case For
Ian, I suggest you seek alternatives to "machine". To many readers, the essential characteristic of a machine is complex, artificial design (think Paley). Machines do obey physical law, but so do rocks, with fewer false (from your POV) associations.
One very persuasive criterion by which we might judge that we are essentially machines is to ask ourselves whether our behaviour, in common with the behaviour of all other objects in the Universe, simply follows physical laws.
Is it really persuasive? A human dropped from a tree does indeed fall at much the same rate as a similar sized bag of apples. That alone would not convince me that I should treat humans and apples as equivalent, and as an unrepentant Dawkinsist, I pretty well do think we are machines.



By physical laws we simply mean regularities that we observe in nature. Thus, possibly the most obvious example we could point to here, is the law of gravitation which accounts for the fact that objects near the surface of the Earth, will, when released, fall at pretty much the same acceleration. The fact that the world exhibits such regularities allows us not only to predict future events, but also allows us to exercise a degree of control over our environment. Thus modern times has (have?) witnessed a bewildering proliferation of various machines capable of carrying out all sorts of tasks. But no matter how complex such machines might be, ultimately they are simply operating according to such physical laws that (as?) we have observed, and their behaviour is not qualitatively different, for example, from the motion of an apple when released.( You mean they all fall when dropped? Or do you mean the function of any complex machine is a result of natural law?I think your gravity example detracts from clarity here).

Especially pertinent to our consideration here are those machines labelled computers. (Why not simply “ computers”?) Computers can now carry out many tasks that were formerly thought to be exclusively a preserve of the human intellect. The most obvious example here are (is) the playing of games such as chess, where it is now possible to program a computer that can outperform the best chess players in the world. We even have computers that can carry out rudimentary conversations with people. These computers, at least for a while, might well manage to fool us into believing that we are conversing with a genuine person.

This being so are there any reasons for supposing that human beings are anything more than extremely complex machines? Biological machines for sure, but machines nevertheless? As such they would operate according to the physical laws of nature, just as much as any man-made machine. It should be pointed out here that even if one successfully argued against the notion that the brain operates on similar principles to a computer, it arguably would still operate according to physical laws. The brain would still be a machine, and, in principle, could be created with a sufficiently advanced technology. Putting it another way, why should brains be the only type of thing that do not operate according to physical laws? And if they do operate according to such laws, then why suppose we differ in principle from any machine? We might admittedly be very complex machines, but essentially machines nevertheless.

Let's spell this out more carefully. Our brains consist of( contain?-ie there’s more to brains than neurons) billions of neurons. It is reasonable to suppose that neurons simply operate according to physical laws just as much as anything else in the Universe. What would happen if we replaced one of our neurons with an electronic circuit which carries out the exact same physical process as the neuron had? If it carried out the exact same physical process or function, would it not be the case that we would notice no difference whatsoever? Furthermore, we can imagine all our neurons getting replaced one by one until every last one of our neurons had been replaced by such electronic circuits. In this case we would have an electronic brain, and yet it seems we should still be conscious and indeed feel exactly the same!

From a completely different direction, and albeit of a more indirect kind, we apparently find yet further reasons to suppose that we are simply machines. It is well known that when particular parts of the brain get injured, consciousness will become effected (I think you mean "be affected" here, "become effected" implies that the method of creating consciousness is actually changed), in predictable ways. Just to mention a couple of examples; our capacity to understand written and spoken words, or the capacity to speak and so on, are impaired or even eliminated with injuries to certain regions of the brain. In addition radical personality change may be brought about by injury to the brain. The most famous example here is undoubtedly Phineas Gage . We can also point to the effects of drugs which have a propensity to effect our emotions, attitudes and dispositions. Indeed even alcohol and caffeine do this.

These facts regarding the apparent tight correlation between our states of consciousness and physical states of the brain, and indeed, as in the examples cited, such conscious states following physical states of the brain, powerfully suggest to many people that processes in the brain generate consciousness or, alternatively, that consciousness is simply another way of talking about brain processes. In other words such mind/brain correlations almost certainly show that consciousness, or more generally the mind, has its source entirely in the brain. If this is so then our mental lives simply will reflect everything that goes on in the brain, and we will indeed essentially be machines.

To sum up. The argument that many people make is that we have no compelling reason to suppose we are different from any other object in the Universe, (I see you discarded "machine" here) and thus, in common with all other objects in the Universe, we are just as susceptible to physical laws as any other object. In particular, although the brain is extremely complex in its operation, there is no cogent reason to suppose that it is qualitatively different from any complex man-made machine. We might feel that we are different from any other object in the Universe, but the foregoing considerations might make us feel disposed to conclude that it is not a difference in kind we are talking about here, but rather, merely a difference in degree. This notion receives further support when we note that mental states, including our emotions, dispositions, attitudes and general personality, can be effected by injury or alteration to the brain, thereby implying that the source of consciousness is within the brain. This being so, and acknowledging that the brain is a physical object like any other physical object which operates according to physical laws, it seems that a sensible position is to conclude that we are, indeed, essentially machines.



Response


The obvious response to point out here is that we, and possibly other sentient creatures, seem to be very different from any other object in the Universe. For example it might be pointed out that, unlike machines, we possess free will.(Flirting with circular argument surely?) Or more generally it might be pointed out that, unlike machines, we are conscious, and experience such things as hope, fear, pain, love, or indeed experience the feel of a warm summers day and that all is right with the world. Intuitively it might feel absurd to many of us that such conscious states could be experienced by any man-made machine. After all, they are simply devices operating according to physical laws, where as (whereas) we feel that we ourselves are special, and that there is a fundamental qualitative difference between us (and possibly other sentient life forms), and the rest of the objects in the Universe.

Let's explore this in a little more depth. We intuitively suppose that the vast preponderance of physical processes in the Universe are not accompanied by any conscious awareness. Thus for example, a boulder rolling down a hill, or the Earth orbiting the Sun do not have any conscious awareness associated with these activities. And to belabour the obvious, such conscious awareness would not be necessary. It merely requires the application of physical laws to completely understand their behaviour. But this is emphatically not how we regard our own behaviour. We think of our behaviour as a result of our intentions.

The general point to note here though is that the original contention that we have no compelling reasons to suppose our behaviour is characteristically different from any other object in the Universe, can now be challenged. This is because, unlike our examples of the rolling boulder and orbiting Earth, it at least seems that we are the author of our own destiny and that we can genuinely choose from 2 or more alternative courses of action.(Which is why using gravity earlier is ambiguous. Our destiny, once defenestrated, is entirely outwith our control, just like the apple). This being so, it is simply no good appealing to the fact that every other object follows physical laws and thereby inferring that therefore we most probably do too. It is no good doing this because such reasoning (called inductive reasoning) can only be valid where we compare similar things. But we differ in that one crucial aspect. Namely our apparent ability to determine our own destinies. And, in the more general sense, we (and most probably other sentient creatures) differ in that we have accompanying mental experiences, normally denied to the behaviour exhibited by rolling rocks, orbiting planets, and such like. None of this entails (why "entails"?) we do not simply follow physical laws, but if we do, then we need to appeal to other reasons for supposing we do. (Not sure I follow this last sentence clearly).

This still leaves the issue of mind-brain correlations. As mentioned we have a great deal of evidence that at least sometimes mind states follow on from brain states. The simple act of drinking alcohol is enough to confirm this. Does this not present extremely compelling evidence that the brain must therefore create the mind or consciousness? In short, no.

To see this (comma?) imagine if you will(,) 2 very intelligent people from the early 18th century who, by some means or other, are miraculously transported to our present day. Imagine further they encounter a television set showing a film. After being suitably astounded, and after tinkering around with its internal components and finding that tinkering with particular components effects the picture quality in particular characteristic ways, you can imagine one of them claiming that not just the picture, but the storyline of the film must be wholly generated by these internal components since tinkering with them affects the picture. He might claim there is overwhelming evidence that this must be so. The other person, however, will rightly point out that although he grants that the picture itself is generated by these internal components, it cannot be the case that the actual contents of the movie, the actual storyline with its depiction of various emotions and so on, can be generated by just these internal components. This is because there is nothing about the physical processes within the TV set which could conceivably lead to the generation ex nihilo of such a storyline.

Such might very well be the case with the self and its brain. That is to say the brain needn't actually create the self. Rather it might be the case that the brain simply modifies the self. Such a notion has been referred to as the transmission theory . Note that I am not saying at this juncture that the self and its brain is anything like a television set and television signal. Rather I am simply attempting to convey a graphical description of the following point:

The fact that states of "A" may be correlated with "particular states of "B", means neither that "A" and "B" are one and the same thing, nor does it entail (There's that odd use of "entail" again. If this is a specialist philosophical usage, you may want to find a more generally familiar term. "Imply" perhaps?)that "B" originates from "A", or indeed "A" from "B". It could be that both "A" and "B" both independently are generated by "C", or indeed that they enjoy a self-subsistent existence. Or it could be the case that although states of "B" are modified by states of "A", "B" ultimately originates from "C" or indeed has no origin at all.

However I do think that arguably some important insights might be obtained by considering the television set simile further. But first let's consider a possible relationship between what we consider to be the self, mind and the brain. If the brain does not actually generate consciousness, then clearly neither the self nor consciousness can be actually equated with the brain or any physical processes within it. Indeed the actual self might well not be a physical thing at all. But what then is the self? I suggest a possible answer is that, in brief, it is the essential you. To elucidate; although our apparent personality, and intelligence, and interests may change radically throughout our lives, nevertheless we feel very strongly that there is a real sense in which we are one and the very same person throughout our lives. Thus despite, for example, our 5 year old self, our sober adult self, or our drunk adult self exhibiting quite radically different personality traits, and having differing intelligence and differing interests, we are still generally very firmly convinced that we are literally the same self throughout our lives and therefore throughout these various differing mind states. (Are you, really? Your memory may be better than mine).

Note that this notion of a literal same self is difficult to maintain if we suppose that the self is simply to be equated with the brain, or the processes taking place within it. Given that brain states are in a constant state of change, it would certainly seem that, in a literal sense, the self must also be in a constant state of change. Be clear as to what this means. It means that quite literally the self ceases to exist, to be replaced by another, whenever we go from being sober to drunk, or from being in a bad mood to a good mood, and so on. With this scenario it might be difficult to avoid concluding our sense of self is effectively an illusion. Indeed this is precisely what many philosophical materialists maintain (a materialist being the most prominent example of those who consider us to be essentially machines).

In order to clarify the issues regarding an unchanging self, let us return to the TV set simile. Note that the TV programme being displayed will remain the same TV programme no matter how much we tinker with the innards of the TV set.( If we tinker with the tuner, we may get a different programme. Of course that does not change the programme itself, but it changes the one we see. Ian my point is not about the simile / metaphor, but that there are dangers that the reader will nitpick about the metaphor and lose the essential argument. Best to avoid this if you can). However, the quality of the picture displayed may vary widely. Possibly the brain, mind and self relationship that I have been attempting to spell out, might be clarified if we suppose that the self is analogically similar (analogous?) to the storyline of the TV programme being displayed, and peoples state of consciousness, or mind states, likewise correspond to the picture quality. (So if we fiddle with the tuning hardware, we really do change our mind? See what I mean about misleading metaphors?) Hence, just as the picture quality of a TV set may vary radically depending on the state of its internal components, so do our mind states vary according to the particular states of our brains. Nevertheless, notwithstanding these changes in the state of our brains dictated by age, sobriety or indeed simply mood states and so on, it nevertheless still remains the case that we continue to be the same self throughout, just as the storyline of a TV programme remains the same, even though we might alter the quality of the picture displayed by tinkering around with the innards of the set.
(Don't do this at home, kiddies!)

We can extend the analogy further. One of the arguments mentioned above for the notion that we are essentially machines is that we could imagine replacing our neurons one by one with electronic circuits which carry out the exact same physical processes or functions as the neurons had. It was implied that if we could do this, then this would show that our mind or self simply results from these physical processes. But it can now be seen that we are not forced to come to this conclusion. We could replace some of the internal components of a television set with other components which perform the same function, and yet this certainly does not mean that the storyline of the TV programme is generated by such components. This being so, then it is possible that even if our neurons could be replaced with electronic circuits leaving our minds intact, this need not imply that our minds are actually created by these underlying processes. It is important to understand though that this does not mean that we can actually build a machine that will be conscious. By replacing neurons with electronic circuits we need to bear in mind the self already exists, and should all neurons be replaced with electronic circuits, it would simply mean the self now operates through a brain composed of electronic circuitry! But we cannot create a self from building a machine ground up. Compare going back in time a couple of hundred years and creating a television set. Even if in perfect working order it would not be able to receive a TV signal but would simply display white noise. (Oooh. I think you should rethink this analogy completely.)

To summarise, we have addressed the question of whether reason and evidence compels us to conclude that we are essentially no different from any other physical object in the Universe, and that our brains are the source of our conscious lives. It has been argued that we most certainly need not be compelled to accept such a conclusion. It has been suggested that it might well be the case that our essential selves simply operate through our brains as proposed in the transmission theory of the self. As has been mentioned, such a notion fits in well with our deep seated notion of the self which has it that our essential essence remains unchanged throughout our lives, even though our mind states might change quite radically. It has not been argued that this position is the actual correct one. This will be done in a future post.(Ian, one overriding observation. You have read way too much 18th century writing and the style has entered your soul. Can I suggest you try, as an experiment, rewriting the article as if you were actually speaking aloud to a hypothetical thirteen year old nephew? ie try to write less like a philosophy text and more as you probably speak after five pints of Old Busthead. Pretend you are a technical writer under threat of death from the Plain English campaigners. eg, for "..their behaviour is not qualitatively different from.. " might read "..they act like.."

 

[Interesting Ian]

Thanks for your help Sam. I don't expect my grammar and punctuation to be perfect, indeed far from it. I certainly never passed English Language "O" level at school (I got an E). I'm surprised you haven't pointed to many more of such errors. I must have improved a hell of a lot since the age of 16! LOL

Let's have a look at your comments.

Ian, the comments in green are intended to point out where I feel you are unclear, use terms ambiguously or use misleading metaphor. There are also a few minor grammar or punctuation points. In the spirit of the thread, I have tried and (nearly) managed to avoid direct criticism of content. The intention is to assist.

The Case For
Ian, I suggest you seek alternatives to "machine". To many readers, the essential characteristic of a machine is complex, artificial design (think Paley). Machines do obey physical law, but so do rocks, with fewer false (from your POV) associations.

I'm doing a web site. I hope to get people, unfamiliar with philosophy, to give my stuff a read. I think to call my opening section "Are we machines?" might encourage people to have a quick look rather than calling it "Does a materialist based metaphysic exhaust all possibilities in the mind/brain
debate" or whatever

One very persuasive criterion by which we might judge that we are essentially machines is to ask ourselves whether our behaviour, in common with the behaviour of all other objects in the Universe, simply follows physical laws.
Is it really persuasive? A human dropped from a tree does indeed fall at much the same rate as a similar sized bag of apples. That alone would not convince me that I should treat humans and apples as equivalent, and as an unrepentant Dawkinsist, I pretty well do think we are machines.

If we follow physical laws in the totality of our behaviour i.e not just when we fall down, then it is indeed persuasive. I could emphasise voluntary behaviour to make it more clear. Mind you I would have thought that most people, on hearing someone talk about peoples' behaviour, would understand it as referring to voluntary actions rather than gravity {shrugs)

But no matter how complex such machines might be, ultimately they are simply operating according to such physical laws that (as?)

No

we have observed, and their behaviour is not qualitatively different, for example, from the motion of an apple when released.( You mean they all fall when dropped? Or do you mean the function of any complex machine is a result of natural law?I think your gravity example detracts from clarity here).

Well, I would disagree but what do other people think? I mention at the beginning of the paragraph about gravitation being an obvious instance of the regularities found in nature. I would say it is very clear from context what is meant and that talking about natural laws will be confusing and off putting to many people. Our voluntarily behaviour is not qualitatively different from a falling apple. Is that better?? I would have thought the word voluntary is superfluous when talking about the behaviour of people. I have to say I'm perplexed at your confusion. I suppose a lot of people simply won't understand my article. Oh well. I can't put it more simply than I have.

Especially pertinent to our consideration here are those machines labelled computers. (Why not simply “ computers”?)

Because people might be unclear that I consider computers to be machines.

Response


The obvious response to point out here is that we, and possibly other sentient creatures, seem to be very different from any other object in the Universe. For example it might be pointed out that, unlike machines, we possess free will.(Flirting with circular argument surely?)

Er . .no, not at all.

The general point to note here though is that the original contention that we have no compelling reasons to suppose our behaviour is characteristically different from any other object in the Universe, can now be challenged. This is because, unlike our examples of the rolling boulder and orbiting Earth, it at least seems that we are the author of our own destiny and that we can genuinely choose from 2 or more alternative courses of action.(Which is why using gravity earlier is ambiguous. Our destiny, once defenestrated, is entirely outwith our control, just like the apple).

I disagree that it is ambiguous. When talking about a person's behaviour people understand it as meaning voluntary behaviour. Not falling out of a window!

This being so, it is simply no good appealing to the fact that every other object follows physical laws and thereby inferring that therefore we most probably do too. It is no good doing this because such reasoning (called inductive reasoning) can only be valid where we compare similar things. But we differ in that one crucial aspect. Namely our apparent ability to determine our own destinies. And, in the more general sense, we (and most probably other sentient creatures) differ in that we have accompanying mental experiences, normally denied to the behaviour exhibited by rolling rocks, orbiting planets, and such like. None of this entails (why "entails"?)

What do you mean? I'm simply emphasising the point that this does not necessitate that we do not follow physical laws. But the word "entail" is more appropriate. than "necessitate".

we do not simply follow physical laws, but if we do, then we need to appeal to other reasons for supposing we do. (Not sure I follow this last sentence clearly).

We feel like we are different from all other objects in the Universe, so this calls into question the notion that we are just like any other object in the Universe. You need to show that our feelings are without justification.

The fact that states of "A" may be correlated with "particular states of "B", means neither that "A" and "B" are one and the same thing, nor does it entail (There's that odd use of "entail" again. If this is a specialist philosophical usage, you may want to find a more generally familiar term. "Imply" perhaps?)

I would have thought that the word "entail" was fairly clear. It means it "necessarily follows that". The word "imply" would not be entirely appropriate.

In order to clarify the issues regarding an unchanging self, let us return to the TV set simile. Note that the TV programme being displayed will remain the same TV programme no matter how much we tinker with the innards of the TV set.( If we tinker with the tuner, we may get a different programme. Of course that does not change the programme itself, but it changes the one we see. Ian my point is not about the simile / metaphor, but that there are dangers that the reader will nitpick about the metaphor and lose the essential argument. Best to avoid this if you can). However, the quality of the picture displayed may vary widely. Possibly the brain, mind and self relationship that I have been attempting to spell out, might be clarified if we suppose that the self is analogically similar (analogous?) to the storyline of the TV programme being displayed, and peoples state of consciousness, or mind states, likewise correspond to the picture quality. (So if we fiddle with the tuning hardware, we really do change our mind? See what I mean about misleading metaphors?)

No I don't. Changing the channel would be equivalent to another self operating through your brain rather than yourself, but it would be confusing and pedantic to talk about that. The message is conveyed clearly enough.

We can extend the analogy further. One of the arguments mentioned above for the notion that we are essentially machines is that we could imagine replacing our neurons one by one with electronic circuits which carry out the exact same physical processes or functions as the neurons had. It was implied that if we could do this, then this would show that our mind or self simply results from these physical processes. But it can now be seen that we are not forced to come to this conclusion. We could replace some of the internal components of a television set with other components which perform the same function, and yet this certainly does not mean that the storyline of the TV programme is generated by such components. This being so, then it is possible that even if our neurons could be replaced with electronic circuits leaving our minds intact, this need not imply that our minds are actually created by these underlying processes. It is important to understand though that this does not mean that we can actually build a machine that will be conscious. By replacing neurons with electronic circuits we need to bear in mind the self already exists, and should all neurons be replaced with electronic circuits, it would simply mean the self now operates through a brain composed of electronic circuitry! But we cannot create a self from building a machine ground up. Compare going back in time a couple of hundred years and creating a television set. Even if in perfect working order it would not be able to receive a TV signal but would simply display white noise. (Oooh. I think you should rethink this analogy completely.)

I entirely disagree. It conveys my ideas splendidly. I certainly cannot think of a better way to express what I'm saying. If you have any suggestions then let's hear them.

(Ian, one overriding observation. You have read way too much 18th century writing and the style has entered your soul.

Huh?? Apart from "the time machine" by HG Wells, I believe I have only ever read 3 books which was not published in either the 20th or 21st century. They were 3 books by George Berkeley published in the 18th century. Indeed I only read them for my Ph.D and even then I've read vastly more secondary source on his ideas, all from the 20th century. So I would say the style cannot possibly have entered my soul.

Can I suggest you try, as an experiment, rewriting the article as if you were actually speaking aloud to a hypothetical thirteen year old nephew?

Well I did more or less.

ie try to write less like a philosophy text and more as you probably speak after five pints of Old Busthead.

That's how I do talk after 5 pints.

Pretend you are a technical writer under threat of death from the Plain English campaigners. eg, for "..their behaviour is not qualitatively different from.. " might read "..they act like.."

Sam, could you do me a favour. Could you have a look on the Net and point to something on the mind/brain problem which you consider to be easier to understand than my article?? Thanks

PS And I mean the mind/body problem, so no science, it has to be a philosophical consideration.

 

[Dymanic]

Originally posted by Soapy Sam

I think your gravity example detracts from clarity here.

I have to agree, and to rephrase it as: "Our voluntarily behaviour is not qualitatively different from a falling apple" is even worse. I don't see it as being at all clear from context what is meant. What seems to need clarification is the fact that in the machine model, what correlates to the 'falling apple' is something on the scale of (say) a sodium ion.

Originally posted by Interesting Ian

I would have thought the word voluntary is superfluous when talking about the behaviour of people.

Under the machine model, it would appear to be meaningless. I am not clear on how the voluntary/involuntary distinction is made under the alternative(s), or what the implications are. I would expect just about anyone's idea of what constitutes 'behavior' to include acknowledgement that much of our behavior is not voluntary, and that some of these involuntary behaviors in humans are virtually indistinguishable from their counterparts in other animals. Perhaps only the 'voluntary' aspect is considered important?

 

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Soapy Sam

I think your gravity example detracts from clarity here.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

I have to agree, and to rephrase it as: "Our voluntarily behaviour is not qualitatively different from a falling apple" is even worse. I don't see it as being at all clear from context what is meant. What seems to need clarification is the fact that in the machine model, what correlates to the 'falling apple' is something on the scale of (say) a sodium ion.

What part of my article are you referring to here?? I made a mistake in my reply to Sam because in the original article I was referring to man made machines, not ourselves. Their behaviour is not qualitatively different from a falling apple. Here is the paragraph which Sam responded to.


One very persuasive criterion by which we might judge that we are essentially machines is to ask ourselves whether our behaviour, in common with the behaviour of all other objects in the Universe, simply follows physical laws. By physical laws we simply mean regularities that we observe in nature. Thus, possibly the most obvious example we could point to here, is the law of gravitation which accounts for the fact that objects near the surface of the Earth, will, when released, fall at pretty much the same acceleration. The fact that the world exhibits such regularities allows us not only to predict future events, but also allows us to exercise a degree of control over our environment. Thus modern times has witnessed a bewildering proliferation of various machines capable of carrying out all sorts of tasks. But no matter how complex such machines might be, ultimately they are simply operating according to such physical laws that we have observed, and their behaviour is not qualitatively different, for example, from the motion of an apple when released.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Originally posted by Interesting Ian

I would have thought the word voluntary is superfluous when talking about the behaviour of people.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Under the machine model, it would appear to be meaningless.

Ummm . . no. Voluntary behaviour just refers to the ability to exercise our own free will. Determinists and materialists do not normally deny the existence of free will. I'll discuss this in the free will section

 

[Soapy Sam]

Well, I agree that if you are aiming at philosophy newbies you need to avoid the dry learned style. You also must try to avoid potentially misleading terms, which is why I feel "object" or "thing" is better than "machine" as it avoids the implication of design. Unless that is intentional.
-----------------------------------------
Yes, I would stress intentionality and I would remove all mention of gravity precisely because it is no respecter of free will.
-----------------------------------------
"..such laws THAT we have observed?" No. "such...as ", but this sort of construction is what I meant about the 18th century style. Nobody talks like this. Why write like it?
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Ian it is precisely your (self imposed) task to make sure that as many readers as possible DO understand you. This means you must try to forestall and clarify that confusion. This is not an easy task. Do you think you will get it right in a first draft?
----------------------------------------
On the verb "to entail", my old copy of "Chambers' 20th Century" has two meanings:
1.to carve, cut or fashion.
2.To settle on a series of heirs.

The Internet Hyperdictionary gives-
3.[v] impose, involve, or imply as a necessary accompaniment or result; "What does this move entail?"
4.[v] have as a logical consequence; "The water shortage means that we have to stop taking long showers

Looks like 3 is a derivative of 2 and 4 has evolved from 3. So I withdraw the question. (Odd, I have seen that usage, but it just didn't feel right. It still doesn't. Habit I suppose.)
--------------------------------------------
You say (in your reply) that "we feel we are different from all other objects in the universe" Well, I disagree, but that's not relevant. What IS relevant is that your reply makes your point clearer than the original text. (I feel. Compare and see what you think).
--------------------------------------------

I fear you won't sell me on the TV analogy, because any way you look at it, you can (and indeed almost certainly will) change the programme if you fiddle randomly with the insides. (Not, as you say, the content of the program which is fixed elsewhere, but you definitely could change the channel and how could you tell if the program you find yourself watching was the one you would have seen had you not fiddled with the works?)
It introduces an avoidable ambiguity to your explanation, which is a point of potential weakness. It's always a risk with analogy. You have to decide if the metaphor has enough explanatory power to justify the potential confusion. I don't think it has. Your call of course. I wonder what others think?
--------------------------------------------------------

Re the 18th century style, yes , it was Berkeley I was referring to.
I'm more a Hutcheson, Hume and Hutton man. The Scots enlightenment produced plenty freethinkers, (many of them correspondents of Berkeley),but they all tended to write the same stilted prose- Johnsonian in style , but lacking his acid touch- which they got from thinking in Latin half the time, while guzzling gallons of claret. The sonorous polysyllables roll convincingly and authoritatively off the tongue...see? You've got me doing it now. It's addictive, but (I feel) offputting to the youthful novice. Be cool. Be hip. You feel this is relevant to the twenty first century. Write like you live in it.

A writer can't help bringing unconscious assumptions into his work (Good teachers are have learned this , through bitter experience, and change their ways accordingly). For example, you assume your readers will know that by human behaviour you mean conscious behaviour, yet you do not assume that they will think computers are machines. That seems strange, almost perverse, to me. My assumptions would tend to the opposite. Now what I think hardly matters. But what do THEY think?
Who are your target audience? You hope to educate them; you must then have some expectation of what mental baggage they are already lugging. Will they think more like you than like me? I see Dymanic has just agreed with one of my points. So I'm not alone. Of course you are very familiar withe the "average" mindset here, so we might expect certain types of criticism to be common here. Kick the article past people of other persuasions too. See if there are any common criticisms (whether of specifics or general style). Those will be what you need to work on.

I'll certainly have a look on the net, but even if there is a more concise and clearer exposition of your points out there- would it help you to read it? I feel we learn how to write best by reading bad writing: we see how awful it is and we strive to be better. The danger with good writing is that we despair of being as good and resort to plagiarism. Nope. Reject my painstakingly considered advice. Spurn the accrued wisdom of the ages. Do your own thing and be darned to you, sirrah!

It's a complex subject and an ambitious project, Ian. Don't expect to get it perfect at the first draft. I bet you are still revising come Christmas. I'll be interested to see the next bit.

I just realised it got light outside. I've been up all night! (A jump of four time zones and a switch from nightshift.) Bugger!

 

[Soapy Sam]

NO! The TV idea is lousy. Back to the drawing board.

I'm off to see if there are any edible mouse droppings in the cupboard.

ps This one seems comprehensible at first glance.(ie I haven't read it yet).
http://moebius.psy.ed.ac.uk/~dualism/papers/brains.html

 

[Dymanic]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian

What part of my article are you referring to here?? I made a mistake in my reply to Sam because in the original article I was referring to man made machines, not ourselves. Their behaviour is not qualitatively different from a falling apple

Yes, I see that I simply followed your lead! Here we go:

"To sum up. The argument that many people make is that we have no compelling reason to suppose we are different from any other object in the Universe, and thus, in common with all other objects in the Universe, we are just as susceptible to physical laws as any other object."

In the light of what has previously been said about gravity, and apples, the image invoked at that point has to do with people falling out of trees.

This being so, and acknowledging that the brain is a physical object like any other physical object which operates according to physical laws, it seems that a sensible position is to conclude that we are, indeed, essentially machines.

Now we have maybe brains falling out of trees. I guess what I'm looking for is something along the lines of the microevents which make up brain function occuring in accordance with the laws of physics.

I was also going to say something very much like Soapy's comment: "A writer can't help bringing unconscious assumptions into his work", for example, with regard to what we know 'intuitively':

We intuitively suppose that the vast preponderance of physical processes in the Universe are not accompanied by any conscious awareness

Do we? To assume that we do may be to take for granted the collective efforts of countless individuals over many centuries to identify the causative factors behind physical processes such as weather, volcanism, rocks rolling down hills, etc -- and to forget the effort required (through study) to become a beneficiary of that knowledge pool. Those explanations are often quite 'counter-intuitive' -- our intuitive inclinations in such matters being better reflected in the myths of our ancestors, and by the pervasiveness and persistence in our language of anthropomorphic metaphor. Using words like "angry" to describe phenomena such as hornets or storm clouds is likely to produce a functionally adequate understanding despite some flawed assumptions.

We think of our behaviour as a result of our intentions.

Consider this slightly modified version of that statement: We think of behavior as the result of intentions -- and refer to the last sentence above.

(Edited to add: I know, I know, you'll discuss it in the free will section)