Anthony Shaffer and "preknowledge about hijackers"

[Orphia Nay]

http://www.opednews.com/populum/diarypage.php?did=14448

"28 September 2009
Springfield, VA

I endorse the NYC CAN campaign and support the need for a new, independent, investigation of the events and failures that lead up to the 9/11 attacks.

The original 9/11 Commission inquiry became an exercise in bureaucratic ass-covering and obfuscation of accountability.

I had no intention of joining the ranks of “whistle blowers”. In 2003, when I made my disclosure to the 9/11 commission regarding the existence of a pre 9/11 offensive counter-terrorism operation that had discovered several of the 9/11 terrorists a full year before the 9/11 attacks my intention was to simply tell the truth, and fulfill my oath of office.

[...]

Instead of supporting the search for the truth, members of the Bush/Rumsfeld Department of Defense did everything within their power to destroy my 20 year career as a clandestine intelligence operative simply to try to discredit me and my disclosure.

[...]
Tony Shaffer"


It's been a while since I borrowed the Commission report from the library, but I think I'd remember if it said that the FBI knew exactly which terror suspects were going to attack when...

Hindsight is 20/20 after all.

I've done a bit of searching here at the forum, but I haven't found anything about how Shaffer's career and disclosure were discredited. Is he just trying to make a name for himself as a "whistleblower"?

It also seems odd that someone supporting a LIHOP postition is jumping on the MIHOP-ish (or really all-over-the-place) NYCCAN bandwagon of fail. Is this guy a complete nut?

Anyway, I thought this might be a topic debunkers and truthers could get their teeth into.

 

[Orphia Nay]

It's been a while since I borrowed the Commission report from the library, but I think I'd remember if it said that the FBI knew exactly which terror suspects were going to attack when...

Oops, the 9/11 Commission was a whitewash, remember?

Seriously, where did Shaffer ever blow his whistle? Which hijackers? What evidence was found of their plan?

 

[MikeW]

He's talking about Atta (primarily) being supposedly identified early as member of an al Qaeda cell. Google "Able Danger" for more.

 

[Childlike Empress]

Let Curt Weldon explain it to you (2:35 - 6:50):

 

[JamesB]

Avery is talking about this on 911 Blogger, saying it is why whistleblowers don't come forward. Nevermind that Shaffer is still serving as a LTC in the Army Reserve. Hardly the punishment of an out of control police state.

 

[SpitfireIX]

Avery is talking about this on 911 Blogger, saying it is why whistleblowers don't come forward. Nevermind that Shaffer is still serving as a LTC in the Army Reserve. Hardly the punishment of an out of control police state.

10 U.S.C. § 1034:

(b) Prohibition of Retaliatory Personnel Actions.—

(1) No person may take (or threaten to take) an unfavorable personnel action, or withhold (or threaten to withhold) a favorable personnel action, as a reprisal against a member of the armed forces for making or preparing—

(A) a communication to a Member of Congress or an Inspector General that (under subsection (a)) may not be restricted; or
(B) a communication that is described in subsection (c)(2) and that is made (or prepared to be made) to—

(i) a Member of Congress;
(ii) an Inspector General (as defined in subsection (i)) or any other Inspector General appointed under the Inspector General Act of 1978;
(iii) a member of a Department of Defense audit, inspection, investigation, or law enforcement organization;
(iv) any person or organization in the chain of command; or
(v) any other person or organization designated pursuant to regulations or other established administrative procedures for such communications.​

Fail.

 

[JamesB]

Apparently they punished Shaffer so much that he is now giving quotes to FoxNews. I hope they destroy my career next, I could use the PR.

http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2009/10/01/administrations-tone-mcchrystal-dims-command-shakeup/

"I feel very strongly that clearly if a commander is selected with the glowing marks that Gen. McChrystal received, he was the guy selected based on every understanding that he was the best-suited, best-qualified and someone who could clearly get the job done," said U.S. Army Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer, a former Army intelligence officer who served under McChrystal and is now a reservist attached to the Center for Advanced Defense Studies.

"I believe the president is obligated to support his commander. ... He selected him, he's the man."

Shaffer said the root of the change in tone is doubt about the strategy itself.

 

[geggy]

From Louis Freeh former FBI and whistleblower:

It was interesting to hear from the 9/11 Commission again on Tuesday. This self-perpetuating and privately funded group of lobbyists and lawyers has recently opined on hurricanes, nuclear weapons, the Baltimore Harbor Tunnel and even the New York subway system. Now it offers yet another "report card" on the progress of the FBI and CIA in the war against terrorism, along with its "back-seat" take and some further unsolicited narrative about how things ought to be on the "front lines."

Yet this is also a good time for the country to make some assessments of the 9/11 Commission itself. Recent revelations from the military intelligence operation code-named "Able Danger" have cast light on a missed opportunity that could have potentially prevented 9/11. Specifically, Able Danger concluded in February 2000 that military experts had identified Mohamed Atta by name (and maybe photograph) as an al Qaeda agent operating in the U.S. Subsequently, military officers assigned to Able Danger were prevented from sharing this critical information with FBI agents, even though appointments had been made to do so. Why?

There are other questions that need answers. Was Able Danger intelligence provided to the 9/11 Commission prior to the finalization of its report, and, if so, why was it not explored? In sum, what did the 9/11 commissioners and their staff know about Able Danger and when did they know it?

The Able Danger intelligence, if confirmed, is undoubtedly the most relevant fact of the entire post-9/11 inquiry. Even the most junior investigator would immediately know that the name and photo ID of Atta in 2000 is precisely the kind of tactical intelligence the FBI has many times employed to prevent attacks and arrest terrorists. Yet the 9/11 Commission inexplicably concluded that it "was not historically significant." This astounding conclusion--in combination with the failure to investigate Able Danger and incorporate it into its findings--raises serious challenges to the commission's credibility and, if the facts prove out, might just render the commission historically insignificant itself.

http://www.opinionjournal.com/extra/?id=110007559

 

[apathoid]

From Louis Freeh former FBI and whistleblower:

It was interesting to hear from the 9/11 Commission again on Tuesday. This self-perpetuating and privately funded group of lobbyists and lawyers has recently opined on hurricanes, nuclear weapons, the Baltimore Harbor Tunnel and even the New York subway system. Now it offers yet another "report card" on the progress of the FBI and CIA in the war against terrorism, along with its "back-seat" take and some further unsolicited narrative about how things ought to be on the "front lines."

Yet this is also a good time for the country to make some assessments of the 9/11 Commission itself. Recent revelations from the military intelligence operation code-named "Able Danger" have cast light on a missed opportunity that could have potentially prevented 9/11. Specifically, Able Danger concluded in February 2000 that military experts had identified Mohamed Atta by name (and maybe photograph) as an al Qaeda agent operating in the U.S. Subsequently, military officers assigned to Able Danger were prevented from sharing this critical information with FBI agents, even though appointments had been made to do so. Why?

There are other questions that need answers. Was Able Danger intelligence provided to the 9/11 Commission prior to the finalization of its report, and, if so, why was it not explored? In sum, what did the 9/11 commissioners and their staff know about Able Danger and when did they know it?

The Able Danger intelligence, if confirmed, is undoubtedly the most relevant fact of the entire post-9/11 inquiry. Even the most junior investigator would immediately know that the name and photo ID of Atta in 2000 is precisely the kind of tactical intelligence the FBI has many times employed to prevent attacks and arrest terrorists. Yet the 9/11 Commission inexplicably concluded that it "was not historically significant." This astounding conclusion--in combination with the failure to investigate Able Danger and incorporate it into its findings--raises serious challenges to the commission's credibility and, if the facts prove out, might just render the commission historically insignificant itself.

http://www.opinionjournal.com/extra/?id=110007559

This supports your delusion.......how exactly? Ohhhh, you've turned LIHOP...congrats on being less crazy.