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another interesting knowledge problem

stamenflicker

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Wittgenstein's concern: knowledge and understanding are not mental states because they have no temporal duration nor can they be predicated during the occurrence of a sensation.

He gives the classic chess example: "I know how to play chess." What is meant by that is "I think I can remember the rules of chess." Once a piece is moved, the knowledge for that particular piece is demonstrated. Besides the fact that such a demonstration is immediately temporal, it is not demonstrable that one knows the game of chess, until the next piece is moved, in which case the former move is no longer evidence of "knowing," but rather of "having known."

As such knowledge apart from recollection (or "to know" something) is highly dependent on the immediate sensation or representation of it, in other words the ex nilio representation of the thing in question. It such matters we can hardly assume that knowledge is empirical, only memory can fit that beast. Knowledge itself may very well be grammatical, as indicated by Wittgenstein.

Whilst debating the zombie issue, I thought this was equally as problematic regarding knowledge itself-- whether or not red is there cannot be known, it must be experienced.

Flick
 
This sounds like the "can't shoot me with an arrow" problem (it has to travel half the distance, half that distance, etc.), restated with "knowledge".

By the same logic, demonstrably, you can not say what state is in a computer, because it is largely inaccessible to you. MAYBE the other gigabyte of RAM doesn't really exist outside your video card. You can only read a little of it at a time on the monitor.
 
MAYBE the other gigabyte of RAM doesn't really exist outside your video card. You can only read a little of it at a time on the monitor.
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Yes, and there are only a finite number of primes because I can only think of a few of them at a time

Wittgenstein sounds like one of those people with pre-exam jitters. He's done all the revision, scored 90% or more on the mock, but still reckons that he might not be able to answer the questions come the moment of reckoning. After all, he's only proved that he had the knowledge some time in the past.

I think that it is a very useful feature of memory that I don't recall everything I know at the same time 24/7.

All of that said, I would have to agree that people forget.
So it has to be taken for granted that I still remember how to ride a bicycle. But if I can't take that for granted, don't I have to doubt everything?
 
Isn't he just trying to differentiate between a "state" (a "memory") and a "process"? The "knowledge" of how to play chess is stored essentially statically in the brain, and does not require active processing to maintain itself.

I think this goes to the heart of the flaw in the "colorblind scientist" (i.e., "Mary" as we have refered to her in other threads) Knowledge Argument. "Seeing Red" is a process that plays out temporally, it is not a "physical fact". Yet the KA attempts to refute physicalism by claiming that you can't "learn" red by reading about all of the physical facts of red. The KA doesn't address the point that "seeing red" is not a state, but a process that plays out over time.

At least, that's my armchair view of it.
 
I think this goes to the heart of the flaw in the "colorblind scientist" (i.e., "Mary" as we have refered to her in other threads) Knowledge Argument. "Seeing Red" is a process that plays out temporally, it is not a "physical fact". Yet the KA attempts to refute physicalism by claiming that you can't "learn" red by reading about all of the physical facts of red. The KA doesn't address the point that "seeing red" is not a state, but a process that plays out over time.

Witt doesn't deny "knowing," nor the "sensation" of X, he just groups them into a category of "something about which nothing can be said."

Flick
 
By the same logic, demonstrably, you can not say what state is in a computer, because it is largely inaccessible to you. MAYBE the other gigabyte of RAM doesn't really exist outside your video card. You can only read a little of it at a time on the monitor.

I don't think he's claiming the non-existence of anything. Instead, he's saying that we really can't speak logically about it. I'll stretch out on a limb for the purpose of discussion...

Perhaps the RAM does exist, but the information or the current, does not. In a likened manner, could not our synapses exist (clearly they do) and perhaps even the memory of an event exists as stored bits of chemical information (here's where science is a bit fuzzy still), but the act of "knowing" a thing must occupy temporal space/time. Therefore only one thing can be known at a time... ???

Flick
 
ChuckieR,

Yet the KA attempts to refute physicalism by claiming that you can't "learn" red by reading about all of the physical facts of red. The KA doesn't address the point that "seeing red" is not a state, but a process that plays out over time.
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This is pretty much what I was getting at last week with my analogy of the computer source code. Sure, if you are clever enough you can read the source code, and it will tell you *everything* that will happen, including the final result, how long it will take to calculate, what all the intermediate variables are, how much memory will be required, etc. But you still haven't actually run the program.

"The physical facts of red" is the source code.
"Seeing red" is executing the program.

Does executing the program introduce a "new physcial fact"? Only the fact that the program has actually been run.

(Edited...Sorry Flick, not really on topic. But then again, Witt might just have had too much time on his hands?)
 
Fail to see

I fail to see what is important about this. Knowledge is not pure sensation or inference, not all raw sensation. I think most people accept that. But to conclude that sensation and inference now do not play a role just doesn't follow, I mean you had to learn the chess rules for the first time at one point.

However I'd like to point out memory alone will not do it either. I can remember a specific instance of chess, not the "rules" given a blank slate to work with. Afterall the specifics of any two chess boards can be completely different as well as the game outcomes and how can you generalize when the specific sensation change so radically? Some deductive/cognitive reasoning is involved as well.

Also Wiggenstein only proves what he is trying to if we presume that memory and reasoning are not mental states. I see no reason to think this.

Perhaps I missed the point but I don't see anything new or profound here.
 
Also Wiggenstein only proves what he is trying to if we presume that memory and reasoning are not mental states. I see no reason to think this.

But he's not making any claims as to memory or reasoning. Only that the act of "knowing" a thing, anything is something illogical by its own right. The verb "to know" is what he calls "Grammatical Fiction." A paradox of sorts, such that it is logically impossible to claim to know anything outside of the moment. I think for a world of folks who deify Logic and Sensation, that's a pretty significant gap at the very heart of knowledge of what we claim to know. I'm sure I've not explained it as well as he did,again "knowledge" of anything is a fictional substitute for the sensation... knowledge and understanding can hardly be mental states since they appear to carry zero temporal duration. Knowledge does not appear to be mental activity... memory and demonstration are the mental activities. If we say we know something, then all we are really saying is that we can recall it, or perphaps reproduce it in some way as to be verified. This presents problems when we are faced with abstract entities, such as logic.

Basically Wittgenstein takes us to the heart of the problem... there can be no "criteria of correctness" when it comes to what we "know," and since what we "recall" is naturally suspect, we are left only with what we can demonstrate... but that leaves us in another quandry as we grapple with abstract concpets such as infinity, or logic, or whatever.

Flick
 
Still not seeing it

A paradox of sorts, such that it is logically impossible to claim to know anything outside of the moment.
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I fail to see why, first off he gave one example. That's hardly sufficient. Secondly, at most this proves you could only demonstrate knowledge of any one thing at any one time.

I think for a world of folks who deify Logic and Sensation, that's a pretty significant gap at the very heart of knowledge of what we claim to know. I'm sure I've not explained it as well as he did,again "knowledge" of anything is a fictional substitute for the sensation...
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I don't see why knowledge is a "fictional substitute" for sensation, indeed I don't think sensation alone is sufficient to establish any claim to knowledge.

I can show a cat thousands of chess games but the cat will never learn how to play chess. If it was but a matter of mere sensation, this should not be the case. Obviously then there is more to reasoning then mere sensation.


knowledge and understanding can hardly be mental states since they appear to carry zero temporal duration.
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I don't see why that follows. They must have some temporal duration, as they exist in a causal universe. I fail to see basically how this follows.


Knowledge does not appear to be mental activity... memory and demonstration are the mental activities. If we say we know something, then all we are really saying is that we can recall it, or perphaps reproduce it in some way as to be verified.
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See here I disagree. I believe there's more to it then simply "recalling" and event or "verifying" it ( withwhatever is meant by verification being an issue very open to debate I imagine).

This presents problems when we are faced with abstract entities, such as logic.

Basically Wittgenstein takes us to the heart of the problem... there can be no "criteria of correctness" when it comes to what we "know,"
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I don't see how he proved this at all. Is he saying because there is no single sufficient criteria that there is no criteria at all?


and since what we "recall" is naturally suspect, we are left only with what we can demonstrate... but that leaves us in another quandry as we grapple with abstract concpets such as infinity, or logic, or whatever.
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I'm starting to think your coming from a position of pure empricism.

If so, then yes there are a great many problems. Pure empricism is limited to specific sensation and specific memory and thus has problems with abstract concepts and inference.

But if one merely allows for a more rationalist outlook, these problems more or less fade away. As our standard of "verification" are not merely limited to any specific sensation.

For example background knowledge can be considered realiable until overturned, I believe in fact this is a basic tenet of logic and critical thinking. So there is no need to "demonstrate" it, as it has already been "verified" and is considered so until overturned. Of course this requires more conceptual mechanisms to verify itself.

Also reasoning makes it so we can make inferences i.e. a larger generalization from a small group of facts.

Lets take the chess example, I want to know if person X, lets say John knows how to play. (given background knowledge it is probably irrational to assume he's lying but I'll ignore that for now.)

John doesn't actually have to show me a board and every move to show this. John can simply describe a few pieces, a few moves, the object of the game and I can reasonably assume the rest of it. Of course this conclusion is provisional and not absolute, but it is at the moment more reasonable to believe then the alternative(the man is liar, only knows a bit and is faking the rest or simply got lucky with his guesses.) So I believe it. This is not mere induction of course but involves deduction by reference to my background knowledge. With such knowledge contaning assumptions like, people usually don't lie about chess games, if they know some basic rules they probably know the game as it is unlikely they'd learn some and not others, you only need know a few general principles to play chess.)

So for a rationalist the issue is not an impossible one but for a pure empircist perhaps this is a bit different as there really is no empirical basis for establishing the principle of assuming background knowledge, deductive reasoning or even empiricism itself.
 
I fail to see why, first off he gave one example. That's hardly sufficient. Secondly, at most this proves you could only demonstrate knowledge of any one thing at any one time.

He gives several others, but the point remains the same. Not only can you only demonstrate knowledge of any one thing, but that knowledge must appear in the moment, and therefore becomes unverifiable outside of it.

I don't see why knowledge is a "fictional substitute" for sensation

It's a grammatical substitute for the experience. If you say you know the game of chess, then that is a grammatical fiction, since the game is made up of numerous independent moves.

They must have some temporal duration, as they exist in a causal universe.

How can it have causal duration of its own account if it relies on a trigger or experience to be manifest. We could just as easily say that knowledge is a property of the item in question. In reality, we can't say anything meaningful about it either way.

Is he saying because there is no single sufficient criteria that there is no criteria at all?

Logically there can't be a meaningful criteria, since we have to assemble them from a variety of experiences. This holds true for knowledge, though perhaps not for reason or memory.

For example background knowledge can be considered realiable until overturned, I believe in fact this is a basic tenet of logic and critical thinking. So there is no need to "demonstrate" it, as it has already been "verified" and is considered so until overturned. Of course this requires more conceptual mechanisms to verify itself.

But the knowledge of this activity has only a minor temporal duration that is reliant on memory to be formed. To say that we "know it to be true" is in reality saying that we remember it as such.

So for a rationalist the issue is not an impossible

This is true only if the verb "to know" is redefined as "to remember," or "to assume." I realize that's his is a position of radical skepticism, but it logically follows.

Flick
 
stamenflicker

I fail to see why, first off he gave one example. That's hardly sufficient. Secondly, at most this proves you could only demonstrate knowledge of any one thing at any one time.

He gives several others, but the point remains the same. Not only can you only demonstrate knowledge of any one thing, but that knowledge must appear in the moment, and therefore becomes unverifiable outside of it.
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See I disagree. Mainly because I use a looser definition of demonstration. I also destinguish between demonstrating to others and demonstrating to the self.

I also don't count a specific moment as a demonstration but a seiries of moments added together. I don't think you can really divide the moments in such a matter.

I'd also like to know what Wittgenstein means by a moment exactly...a second, a minute, an hour?


It's a grammatical substitute for the experience. If you say you know the game of chess, then that is a grammatical fiction, since the game is made up of numerous independent moves.
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See here I disagree, I think knowledge consists of more then mere experience.

They must have some temporal duration, as they exist in a causal universe.
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Yes knowledge has a temporal duration but how temporal? That's the question.

How can it have causal duration of its own account if it relies on a trigger or experience to be manifest. We could just as easily say that knowledge is a property of the item in question. In reality, we can't say anything meaningful about it either way.
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Well I can say experience is part of it but not all of it.

Example, my ability to see is part prepared before hand by how my brain, eyes and nerves are structured. But without light waves, my vision may never actually activate. But that doesn't me seeing is merely a matter of having light waves present. I can show lightwaves to a blind man but he'll never see a thing.

So internal mechanisms can be triggered by external events. This doesn't negate the fact that much of the operation is internal though.


Logically there can't be a meaningful criteria, since we have to assemble them from a variety of experiences. This holds true for knowledge, though perhaps not for reason or memory.
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Well I guess a big difference is that I believe knowledge requires reason and memory.

But the knowledge of this activity has only a minor temporal duration that is reliant on memory to be formed. To say that we "know it to be true" is in reality saying that we remember it as such.
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To an extent or perhaps that we can access the memory. Or the memeories help form implicit assumptions we make when viewing an object. For example, when I step forward, I'm relying on my experience of how to move my legs, that there is gravity, that holes don't appear in the ground for no reason etc. I have to know all this to walk.

I don't have to be explicitly or fully aware of this for it to make up my background knowledge. In fact I am not. However I'd still count that as knowledge as I did learn these facts and can consciouslly recall them at any time.


This is true only if the verb "to know" is redefined as "to remember," or "to assume." I realize that's his is a position of radical skepticism, but it logically follows.
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Well I think knowledge is something like "justified true belief" and to justify a belief you need more then mere experience.

And a belief can remain justified(in the sense of being) without being justified(in the sense of action). I think in the word knowledge both meanings are included.

One thing that troubles me about Wiggenstein is he seems to be getting into psychology. Claims which cannot be solved by rational discussion and require empirical research to be settled.

For example that a person can only "know" one things at one time i.e. recall one thing at one time. This may be true, but I believe I can recall more then one thing at a time. Even demonstrate two or many things at a time. For example by describing how to play chess, I also show I know how to talk, speak English etc.

I personally think it more appropriate that psychology be left more to scientists, who can settle the issue, then philosophers, who can only offer conjecture.
 
I suppose, if I'm understanding you correctly, you view knowledge a unverifiable whole that is greater than the sum of its temporal, verifiable parts. If this is your stance, I can except that, even if it is slightly problematic. Much of the world works on this model, so it is acceptable, even if not logically so.

Flick
 
stamenflicker said:
Much of the world works on this model, so it is acceptable, even if not logically so.

Flick
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Idealism can provide rationales as to why this model is at least "logically possible". ;)

Need I add: unlike materialism or dualism? :D
 
stamenflicker

I suppose, if I'm understanding you correctly, you view knowledge a unverifiable whole that is greater than the sum of its temporal, verifiable parts. If this is your stance, I can except that, even if it is slightly problematic. Much of the world works on this model, so it is acceptable, even if not logically so.
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Not exactly, I simply believe there are many ways to verify a claim. By it being self-evident, by reasoning (2 + X=15), by empirical testing, etc. and by a combination of different types of reasoning. Perhaps my definition of verification is simply much more open then yours. If so what do you mean by verification exactly?
 
Perhaps my definition of verification is simply much more open then yours. If so what do you mean by verification exactly?

I think the definition is still open to debate. I suppose that is more the nature of my post than anything else. There are many who hold only to verifications that are either a) empirically demonstrable; or b) logical truths, or c) a combination of a and b.

Flick
 
stamenflicker

Well obviously the above standards are insufficient. Since you'd have to then at least accept something either non-induced or deduced to establish the first standards, something like self-evident axioms.
 
I can work with that concept provided we agree on a definition as well as the boundaries of the definition. Would it be something like... "that which has been demonstrated to be true in most any time, space, or human interaction?"

Flick
 
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