Victor Danilchenko
Renaissance Man
- Joined
- Jul 15, 2002
- Messages
- 716
This is my first stab at a middlingly simple economic analysis, so bear with me.
Humans in general are risk-averse; this is why insurance industry exists. The expected (average) outcome of a risky situation being the same as the expected out come of a non-risky situation (i.e. 50/50 chance of losing $10K or winning $10K, vs. nothing happening), the risk itself has negative utility. This fact is further compounded by diminishing marginal utility of wealth.
Together, these two factors imply that society-wide welfare would be greatly increased by availability of some sort of protection scheme for risks. In fact, we have insurance for a vast number of eventualities; but not all of them are insurable. What conditions are necessary for insurance to be viable in a given domain? The standard list goes like this:
Onwards to unemployment!
Unemployment is a significant risk, and we would want it similarly covered. Furthermore, not only does the occurrence of unemployment carry great negative utility for the individual, it also incurs negative externalities -- the loss of excess production over labor cost, the abandonment of various financial obligations (such as house foreclosures), the bread-winner's family would suffer from privation, society would have to suffer higher crime rates, and in the worst-case scenario, society would have to pony up the cost of disposing of the bodies. No matter which way you slice it, society pays for uninsured unemployment indirectly.
So we want to have unemployment insurance, right? Nice try. Unemployment, turns out, is suspectible to three out of five problems listed above:
Of course, the ultimate test is reality. It's a telling fact that not even in US, the least welfarish of the 1st-world states, there is no unemployment insurance. In fact, AFAIK, there has never been a successful unemployment insurance industry anywhere!
So what do we do? We want to mitigate the negative utility for both individual and society which are inherent in the risk of unemploymenmt; but for technical reasons, private unemployment insurance seems impossible. The solution? Compulsory government unemployment support scheme. In fact, it probably couldn't be a true actuarial insurance for technical reasons, but it can accomplish the goal -- alleviate the detrimental effects of risk of unemployment; and the fact that it would be compulsory is what would make it possible to defeat the monster of moral hazard -- instead of causing the death spiral due to iterative departure of low-risk individuals, compulsory unemployment "insurance" would merely pay the inefficiency price, and not a very big one at that. The moral hazard doesn't have to be effected by a large segment of the insuree population, you see, and indeed most people who collect unemployment do so honestly.
So what are we left with? Our choices basically are either to left unemployment risks go uncontrolled, and pay the exorbitant price in both individual negative utility, and in negative externalities; or to have the government intervene and provide some sort of compulsory unemployment support scheme. I know which one I would choose...
Quod Erat Demonstrandum.
Humans in general are risk-averse; this is why insurance industry exists. The expected (average) outcome of a risky situation being the same as the expected out come of a non-risky situation (i.e. 50/50 chance of losing $10K or winning $10K, vs. nothing happening), the risk itself has negative utility. This fact is further compounded by diminishing marginal utility of wealth.
Together, these two factors imply that society-wide welfare would be greatly increased by availability of some sort of protection scheme for risks. In fact, we have insurance for a vast number of eventualities; but not all of them are insurable. What conditions are necessary for insurance to be viable in a given domain? The standard list goes like this:
- The occurrence of insured events must be independent: me suffering X should have no causal relationship to you suffering X.
- Probability of the insured event should be less that 1.
- The average rate of the insured event's occurrence must be predictable.
- There must be no adverse selection. "Adverse selection" is when the insuree is able to conceal from the insurer his or her true risk. If adverse selection is a factor, then the insurance company is forced to charge average premiums of everyone, high- and low-risk; this means that the low-risk individuals would find it inefficient to be insured, and leave the insurance, thus driving up the cost of servicing the remaining higher-risk individuals, in turn driving up the premiums, which in turn causes the next layer of low-risk individuals to leave, etc; resulting in a downward death spiral of the insurance market.
- There must be no moral hazard. Moral hazard is similar to adverse selection, except that it's the situation where the insuree is able to influence frequency of accurence and/or duration of the insured event. Presence of the moral hazard in a given insurance domain similarly tends to cause the downward death spiral of the insurance market.
Note that the problem posed by adverse selection and moral hazard aren't merely a question of inefficiency, but rather of creating a sort of downwards vicious cycle that is causes by iterative abandonment of the insurance by increasingly higher-risk individuals.
Onwards to unemployment!
Unemployment is a significant risk, and we would want it similarly covered. Furthermore, not only does the occurrence of unemployment carry great negative utility for the individual, it also incurs negative externalities -- the loss of excess production over labor cost, the abandonment of various financial obligations (such as house foreclosures), the bread-winner's family would suffer from privation, society would have to suffer higher crime rates, and in the worst-case scenario, society would have to pony up the cost of disposing of the bodies. No matter which way you slice it, society pays for uninsured unemployment indirectly.
So we want to have unemployment insurance, right? Nice try. Unemployment, turns out, is suspectible to three out of five problems listed above:
- Society-wide unemployment rate fluctuates with economy, making occurrences of unemployment be causally dependent upon each other.
- The average rate of unemployment is predictable only in the short term (and would become even less predictable under libertarian-style market); in the long term, it's no more predictable that the rate of inflation.
- The moral hazard in unemployment insurance is virtually uncontrollable. It's basically impossible to account for me telling my boss that I would work a week for free, if she lays me off afterwards; similarly, it's essentially impossible to tell the difference between legitimate but lengthy search for a good job, and mere procrastrination.
Of course, the ultimate test is reality. It's a telling fact that not even in US, the least welfarish of the 1st-world states, there is no unemployment insurance. In fact, AFAIK, there has never been a successful unemployment insurance industry anywhere!
So what do we do? We want to mitigate the negative utility for both individual and society which are inherent in the risk of unemploymenmt; but for technical reasons, private unemployment insurance seems impossible. The solution? Compulsory government unemployment support scheme. In fact, it probably couldn't be a true actuarial insurance for technical reasons, but it can accomplish the goal -- alleviate the detrimental effects of risk of unemployment; and the fact that it would be compulsory is what would make it possible to defeat the monster of moral hazard -- instead of causing the death spiral due to iterative departure of low-risk individuals, compulsory unemployment "insurance" would merely pay the inefficiency price, and not a very big one at that. The moral hazard doesn't have to be effected by a large segment of the insuree population, you see, and indeed most people who collect unemployment do so honestly.
So what are we left with? Our choices basically are either to left unemployment risks go uncontrolled, and pay the exorbitant price in both individual negative utility, and in negative externalities; or to have the government intervene and provide some sort of compulsory unemployment support scheme. I know which one I would choose...
Quod Erat Demonstrandum.