I have today been told by a materialist that he doesn't know what I could possibly mean "inherently subjective" and he sees no reason why subjective experiences like "seeing red" should be "anything more than physical processes".
(1) The physicalist worldview:
Materialism (or physicalism...
I contend that materialists must either reject the existence of consciousness, or alternatively conclude that consciousness is an epiphenomenon. Do you agree?
I should explain what I mean by consciousness. Basically I'm referring to phenomenology. That is to say that by consciousness I mean...
I'm just at this moment reading this web page. About 20% of the way down, under "4. Minimal Physicalism and Philosophy of Mind", it states:
But I'm confused by this. Let's take identity theory. If a pain literally is the very same thing as a neuron firing, then surely this is not the same...
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