Better the illusions that exalt us ......

[Robin]

Note, that you did not ask me to define the difference. Now that you have I make a good faith attempt to be as clear as possible:

Bentham supported a socially good based utilitarianism, whereas Mill supported a rights based libertarianism. In fact, most modern philosophers only consider Mill a utilitarian from a historical perspective, but if you look at what theory his is most similar to, it is most like libertarianism.
http://www.mises.org/reasonpapers/pdf/09/rp_9_1.pdf

Also, there is a good overview in the wikipedia page on J.S Mill, if you need to learn the basics.

"This philosophy has a long tradition, although Mill's account is primarily influenced by Jeremy Bentham, and Mill's father James Mill. However his conception of utilitarianism was so different from Bentham's that some modern thinkers have argued that he demonstrated libertarian ideals, and that he was not as much a consequentialist as was Bentham, though he did not reject consequentialism as Kant did."

"Mill defines the difference between higher and lower forms of happiness on the principle that those who have experienced both tend to prefer one over the other. This is, perhaps, in direct opposition to Bentham's statement that "Pushpin is as good as an Opera," that if a simple child's game like hopscotch causes more pleasure to more people than a night at the opera house, it is more imperative upon a society to devote more resources to propagating hopscotch than running opera houses."

To claim that these are just minor details is to express a misunderstanding of how philosophical enterprises work.

*sigh* Wikipedia - how impressive. Well excuse me, I don't go to secondary sources, I go the philosopher's own words rather than a free-range encyclopedia's interpretation of them.

Show me the differences in their own words. They both supported a utilitarianism based on the greatest happiness principle. They both regarded acts as moral when they increased the net happiness in the community, they were both very much consequentialists.

The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals, Utility, or the Greatest Happiness Principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure, and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain, and the privation of pleasure

J.S Mill - Utilitarianism

I must again repeat, what the assailants of utilitarianism seldom have the justice to acknowledge, that the happiness which forms the utilitarian standard of what is right in conduct, is not the agent's own happiness, but that of all concerned.

J.S Mill - Utilitarianism

III. By utility is meant that property in any object, whereby it tends to produce benefit, advantage, pleasure, good, or happiness, (all this in the present case comes to the same thing) or (what comes again to the same thing) to prevent the happening of mischief, pain, evil, or unhappiness to the party whose interest is considered: if that party be the community in general, then the happiness of the community: if a particular individual, then the happiness of that individual.

Jeremy Bentham - Principles of Morals and Legislation

IX. A man may be said to be a partizan of the principle of utility, when the approbation or disapprobation he annexes to any action, or to any measure, is determined by and proportioned to the tendency which he conceives it to have to augment or to diminish the happiness of the community: or in other words, to its conformity or unconformity to the laws or dictates of utility.

Jeremy Bentham - Principles of Morals and Legislation

Mill's opinion of rights?

To have a right, then, is, I conceive, to have something which society ought to defend me in the possession of. If the objector goes on to ask why it ought, I can give him no other reason than general utility.

J.S Mill - Utilitarianism

and

While I dispute the pretensions of any theory which sets up an imaginary standard of justice not grounded on utility, I account the justice which is grounded on utility to be the chief part, and incomparably the most sacred and binding part, of all morality

J.S Mill - Utilitarianism

If you find any of this confusing, perhaps it is you who is confused?

This is the sort of vagueness I was talking about.
#1 Opts not to make any attempt to define usage of utilitarianism.

Please feel free to demonstrate any part of Bentham's eminently clear definitions that could at even the remotest stretch be called vague.

#2 Actively tries to conflate the philosophies of two very different philosophers.

Very different philosophers, very similar philosophies.

Clearly Robin, wishes to maintain a position that gives as much wiggle room as possible.

Clearly I have maintained a clear, honest and consistent position throughout.

Now I am bored of your tedious ad hom.

(PS Let the record show that you had made up your mind that the definition was vague before you read it).

 

[Robin]

I have been saying this since page 3 or so, but let's repeat this in case there is any doubt.

A utilitarian cannot possibly regard as good a man who secretly rapes a comatose woman in a hospital because a utilitarian must, by definition, pursue the greatest happiness for the whole community.

A much greater happiness could be be gained by implementing procedures that would make such an act impossible - that happiness being the reassurance of relatives of such patients and any such patients who have recovered. This would far outweight the happiness of one rapist.

A much greater happiness would be the detection and imprisonment of the rapist.

Why do people insist that a Utilitarian should forgo the greater happiness of many for the lesser happiness of one? That is the question that still has not been answered.

 

[Robin]

This is the sort of vagueness I was talking about.
#1 Opts not to make any attempt to define usage of utilitarianism.

Even though 6 hours earlier:

My definitions come (as I have been pointing out for a while now) from the introduction to Bentham's "Principles of Morals and Legislation" which you can easily find on line with a bit of googling. Mill did not move away from these definitions so I also use them.

And the previous day, even before you requested the definition:

As noted above, I have consistently applied the Benthamite definition. You can find it in his "Principles of Morals and Legislation"

I have cited this document earlier in the thread too so I have never shifted from the famously clear definition contained in this single document.

So I have to wonder what a hopeless corner you have put yourself into that you feel the need to lie yourself out of it like this.

 

[Fiona]

Quote:
I must again repeat, what the assailants of utilitarianism seldom have the justice to acknowledge, that the happiness which forms the utilitarian standard of what is right in conduct, is not the agent's own happiness, but that of all concerned.]

J.S Mill - Utilitarianism

What is the force of the words bolded?

II. By utility is meant that property in any object, whereby it tends to produce benefit, advantage, pleasure, good, or happiness, (all this in the present case comes to the same thing) or (what comes again to the same thing) to prevent the happening of mischief, pain, evil, or unhappiness to the party whose interest is considered: if that party be the community in general, then the happiness of the community: if a particular individual, then the happiness of that individual.

Jeremy Bentham - Principles of Morals and Legislation

What is the force of the words bolded?

Quote:
IX. A man may be said to be a partizan of the principle of utility, when the approbation or disapprobation he annexes to any action, or to any measure, is determined by and proportioned to the tendency which he conceives it to have to augment or to diminish the happiness of the community: or in other words, to its conformity or unconformity to the laws or dictates of utility.

Jeremy Bentham - Principles of Morals and Legislation

What is the implication of the words bolded?

Quote:
While I dispute the pretensions of any theory which sets up an imaginary standard of justice not grounded on utility, I account the justice which is grounded on utility to be the chief part, and incomparably the most sacred and binding part, of all morality

J.S Mill - Utilitarianism

What do you think he is talking about here, in view of the words bolded?

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

I have been saying this since page 3 or so, but let's repeat this in case there is any doubt.

A utilitarian cannot possibly regard as good a man who secretly rapes a comatose woman in a hospital because a utilitarian must, by definition, pursue the greatest happiness for the whole community.

A much greater happiness could be be gained by implementing procedures that would make such an act impossible - that happiness being the reassurance of relatives of such patients and any such patients who have recovered. This would far outweight the happiness of one rapist.

A much greater happiness would be the detection and imprisonment of the rapist.

Why do people insist that a Utilitarian should forgo the greater happiness of many for the lesser happiness of one? That is the question that still has not been answered.

How is the community in any way harmed by an unwitnessed rape? Sure, relatives would feel better if they are assured that no unwitnessed rapes are possible (in the real world this would be impossible), but if it occurred, and they didn't know about it? How would they be harmed? I'm afraid you haven't really addressed the issue in your reply.

Or, to put it another way, there are many hypotheticals that can be devised to violate fairness but not harm/utility. Yes, in most instances utility and fairness coincide, but something is left out of the equation when fairness is not addressed specifically. Utility/harm/consequentialism are integral and very important parts of our moral world, but they don't exhaust all the possibilities.

 

[rocketdodger]

How is the community in any way harmed by an unwitnessed rape? Sure, relatives would feel better if they are assured that no unwitnessed rapes are possible (in the real world this would be impossible), but if it occurred, and they didn't know about it? How would they be harmed? I'm afraid you haven't really addressed the issue in your reply.

Or, to put it another way, there are many hypotheticals that can be devised to violate fairness but not harm/utility. Yes, in most instances utility and fairness coincide, but something is left out of the equation when fairness is not addressed specifically. Utility/harm/consequentialism are integral and very important parts of our moral world, but they don't exhaust all the possibilities.

They are not harmed by this actual instance of rape. They are harmed by the increased probability that the rapist will do it again and that next time it will be witnessed.

If you allow for current consequences to affect the posterior probability of future consequences -- and I don't know why someone wouldn't other than to construct a strawman to knock consequentialism -- then consequentialism does exhaust all the possibilities.

If you want to talk about a hypothetical where nobody will ever be harmed by the rapist, regardless of their definition of harm I.E. his actions don't change the probabilities of any other actions in the future ... well, then we are right back where we started -- why is what he is doing wrong?

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

They are not harmed by this actual instance of rape. They are harmed by the increased probability that the rapist will do it again and that next time it will be witnessed.

If you allow for current consequences to affect the posterior probability of future consequences -- and I don't know why someone wouldn't other than to construct a strawman to knock consequentialism -- then consequentialism does exhaust all the possibilities.

If you want to talk about a hypothetical where nobody will ever be harmed by the rapist, regardless of their definition of harm I.E. his actions don't change the probabilities of any other actions in the future ... well, then we are right back where we started -- why is what he is doing wrong?

These arguments are contructed to show that consequentialism does not answer the issue in the abstract, not what is likely in reality.

The guy's just going to do it once. Never again. It's still not fair.

Another classic example is this (not even close to possible reality): Charlie Manson is going to be executed now. Only Charlie and Gov. Arnie know the truth about the new execution device -- it's going to blast Charlie to the Blessed Isles. That maximizes happiness. The people are happy that evil Charlie has finally got what they see as his just desserts and old Charlie is off in the Blessed Isles.

But that doesn't seem fair, does it?

 

[rocketdodger]

These arguments are contructed to show that consequentialism does not answer the issue in the abstract, not what is likely in reality.

The guy's just going to do it once. Never again. It's still not fair.

...snip...

But that doesn't seem fair, does it?

Who thinks it isn't fair? You?

Because if you think it isn't fair, the issue is no longer abstract, is it? Unless you consider yourself to be an abstract being...

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

Who thinks it isn't fair? You?

Because if you think it isn't fair, the issue is no longer abstract, is it? Unless you consider yourself to be an abstract being...

By, "in the abstract" I was referring to one of the previous examples of the guy who rapes the unconscious woman. It is an abstract sort of example because someone who would do that in the real world would be very likely to do it again (as opposed to the example in which he only acts once) as you pointed out.

Whether it is I or someone else who thinks that Charlie going to the Blessed Isles is unfair is beside the point; but, yes, I think it would be unfair for Charlie Manson to spend eternity in the Blessed Isles while Mohandes K. Ghandi, who was not executed with the machine, does not. That violates my sense of fairness. And that is my point. There is more to ethics than merely consequentialism/harm/utilitarianism.

We seem to use at least two different modes of thought to deal with ethical issues -- harm and fairness (though I think we add in a fair bit of virtue ethics to the mix) -- which is why we have these endless discussions. I don't see a single answer to what constitutes ethics, though we must have some sort of internal program that decides between these different modes of thought.

 

[rocketdodger]

That violates my sense of fairness. And that is my point. There is more to ethics than merely consequentialism/harm/utilitarianism.

And my point is that I don't think you can define "fair" without relying on utility/happiness/harm at some point. Can you?

 

[Fiona]

Never mind. That didn't add anything. I was going round in circles

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

And my point is that I don't think you can define "fair" without relying on utility/happiness/harm at some point. Can you?

I don't know. I've never tried. But it doesn't really matter, because the utilitarian principle is not about no harm ever occurring. It concerns maximization of happiness in society as a whole. That we come into conflict is natural, so it is natural that someone suffer at some point. Defining 'fair' independent of harm is probably impossible, but meaningless for this discussion. There are forms of harm that we feel intuitively are unfair but that are allowed by utilitarian thought because utilitarianism doesn't cover all the bases -- as in the examples that Zosima gave and any form of scape-goating. One person suffering for the benefit of the many is simply allowable in utilitarianism but is not fair. If you want to generalize to any form of harm, then I'm not sure you could arrive at any sort of ethic at all. Virtually everything would be unethical.


ETA:
As to defining 'fair' without recourse to 'harm' -- one example that springs to mind is: two kids are sitting at a table quielty playing a game. To reward their good behaivor I give one a cookie and the other a carrot. Neither is harmed by what I do, but the carrot-holder sure thinks I'm not fair.

 

[articulett]

Our sense of fairness is an evolutionary trait not a trait that is taught to us through illusions or anything else:

http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/21773403/
http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/20/032.html

Some things feel wrong because our the ancestors who had such feelings preferentially survived and passed on genes.

We'd feel bad if we were the person giving out cookies and carrots... just as the kids did... it would not maximize happiness the way a fairer distribution would. I suspect researchers felt it was even wrong to do this with the monkeys... but they "utilized" the information to learn more about fairness... all maximizing utility. No matter how you slice it-- you don't need "some undefinable something" to help you make more moral choices. Really, we do what we are programmed to do with some degree of input from culture-- we confabulate the reasons we did stuff after wards to coincide with our internal sense of justice and/or the external judgment of others. Most of the stuff we do and don't do in a moral sense, we do and don't do because it feels right and/or we seek the reward or fear the punishment of not doing so.

Religions would like people to believe that morality comes from them or from God or from illusions of some sort-- faith, for example. But the evidence is not there for this at all. If the illusions that exalt are good for anything... they are good for making the exalted feel better thus encouraging them to do whatever it is they they believe they got that exaltation from. I prefer my exaltation be based on reality--but hey, I'm just a skeptic... and as Blauregen says, our whole purpose is to tear down dreams.

 

[dglas]

I believe what you folks are looking for is Universalizability, which does not at all require absolutism and does not contradict relativism. Take utilitarianism and take it a broader scale - to a societal level instead of seeking to apply it to a particular individual level. At a particular individual level "The Golden Rule" breaks down as well.

Harm/benefit are very fluid perception. In the case of Ichneumonwasp's two children there is a perception of relative harm due to a perceived disparity of benefit. This arises because rewards are not applied in a consistent way. So, I think this example fails in its intended purpose. However...

If one thinks on a broader scale in terms of general mores, one can begin to apply utilitarianist principles in a less problematic manner. They is still problematic precisely because benefit/harm are such such fluid perceptions, and also because harm/benefit quite often run hand in hand for the different participants in a given situation, but more coherent understandings of their application (in terms of universalizable principles as foundations for reasonable expectations of behaviour) can be developed.

So, taking the rather distasteful example of the coma patient rapist, "harm" is still being conducted because, should it become known, a violation of the reasonable expectations, expectations arising from perceptions of harm when such behaviour is exhibited in the case of a non-comatose victim, of all those who obey normative restrictions is being enacted. Harm is being dealt to the perceived realm of reasonable moral expectations, and therefore harm is being done to all those who abide by them and hold their expectations in terms of them. And here you have a perfectly secular vision of universalizable ethics, based on perceptions and expectations rather than "truths."

 

[rocketdodger]

IIf you want to generalize to any form of harm, then I'm not sure you could arrive at any sort of ethic at all. Virtually everything would be unethical.

No, because ethicality depends on a theshold amount of harm being done, not just any at all.

I don't understand why people are arguing with me here, all I am doing is showing that every system can be reduced to utility theory given a suitable definition of utility.

It boggles my brain why some people are so adamant that they make decisions that have nothing to do with utility. How is such a thing even possible!?!?

 

[articulett]

What Dglas said.

 

[articulett]

No, because ethicality depends on a theshold amount of harm being done, not just any at all.

I don't understand why people are arguing with me here, all I am doing is showing that every system can be reduced to utility theory given a suitable definition of utility.

It boggles my brain why some people are so adamant that they make decisions that have nothing to do with utility. How is such a thing even possible!?!?

Moreover, what exactly do they think that other thing is and where do they imagine they've "learned" it from?

I don't understand what is being argued. It seems that utilitarianism is standing for the the "truth" in the OP while some "illusions that exalt" are supposedly better for something in regards to morality. Who cares about the various definitions of utilitarianism or game theory or the hypotheticals? We have real world scenarios and I want to know if there is any way "illusions that exalt" can trump the truth... and if so when and what for. No one has made any convincing case whatsoever that illusions are necessary for morality or that those with illusions of some sort are moral if that is their point. If that isn't their point, then I sure wish they'd be clear on what their point is and/or answer their own damn hypotheticals and the questions asked of them.

 

[dglas]

No, because ethicality depends on a theshold amount of harm being done, not just any at all.

I don't understand why people are arguing with me here, all I am doing is showing that every system can be reduced to utility theory given a suitable definition of utility.

It boggles my brain why some people are so adamant that they make decisions that have nothing to do with utility. How is such a thing even possible!?!?

Well, you know, given a suitable definition of God's will or self-interest or determinism, everything boils down to any of those, too. There are two possible reasons why it can all boil down to X. X can be perfectly correct or X can be defined both to broadly and too narrowly. We must exercise caution...

 

[rocketdodger]

Well, you know, given a suitable definition of God's will or self-interest or determinism, everything boils down to any of those, too.

I don't think there is anything wrong with this. I don't care about the names people give things -- I care about what is. And if people want to think of the apparently deterministic world we live in as a carefully constructed product of God's will, that is fine with me -- at least they are admitting that as far as we can tell it is deterministic.

You can call an orange an apple as far as I am concerned. What you can't do is claim that an apple tree sprouts from an orange seed. Consistency is what matters.

 

[articulett]

Moreover, you can claim that apple tree sprung from the orange seed all you and that you are more moral and exalted for believing as much.

You might be exalted, you are probably not more moral, and you are definitely delusional regarding where the the apple tree came.